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Essays on Micro-Level Consumption Behavior and Open Economy Macroeconomics
Seungki Hong
This dissertation finds significant differences in the micro-level household consumption behav-
ior between emerging and developed economies, disentangles multiple possible explanations for
these differences, and evaluates their macroeconomic implication on business cycles.
The first chapter estimates the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory income
shocks using micro data for an emerging economy. To this end, I employ a nationally representative
Peruvian household survey. Two striking differences emerge when the Peruvian MPC estimates
are compared with U.S. MPC estimates obtained by the same method. First, the mean MPC of
Peruvian income deciles is much higher than that of U.S. deciles. Second, within-country MPC
heterogeneity over the deciles is substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S.
The second chapter studies the driving factor for the MPC differences between Peru and the
U.S. I begin by exploring three possible explanations for the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru
through the lens of a standard precautionary saving model: liquidity constraints, consumption
front-loading behavior, and heterogeneous interest rates. Then, I disentangle these possible expla-
nations by examining relevant data patterns appearing in the micro data. Specifically, participation
rates in borrowing activities and consumption growth rate patterns of the income deciles suggest
that liquidity constraints drive the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru. Then, I decompose the
cross-country MPC gap into the component driven by liquidity constraints and the component
caused by factors unrelated to liquidity constraints. To this end, I delineate a top income group
unaffected by liquidity constraints in each country by conducting an MPC homogeneity test and
evaluate its MPC. I find that liquidity constraints are also important for explaining the higher mean
MPC in Peru.
The third chapter makes a first attempt to study emerging market business cycles in a heteroge-
neous-agent open economy model. A central question in open economy macroeconomics is how
to explain excess consumption volatility in emerging economies. This chapter argues that to un-
derstand this phenomenon, it is important to take into account households’ idiosyncratic income
risk, precautionary saving, and MPCs. Financial frictions determining asset liquidity in the model
are calibrated such that MPCs are as high as empirical estimates from Peruvian micro data, which
are substantially greater than the U.S. MPC estimates. I then estimate the model using macro data
and Bayesian methods. The model captures the observed excess consumption volatility well. To
highlight the importance of high-MPC households in driving this result, I show that excess con-
sumption volatility disappears when households are counterfactually replaced with those exhibit-
ing U.S. MPCs. High-MPC households contribute to consumption volatility through i) their strong
consumption response to resource fluctuations and ii) large consumption reduction when assets be-
come more illiquid. The transmission mechanisms of trend shocks and interest rate variations that
previous studies use to explain excess consumption volatility are dampened because households
significantly deviate from the permanent income hypothesis, on which these mechanisms crucially
depend.
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Chapter 1: MPCs in Emerging Economies: Evidence from Peru
1.1 Introduction
Estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income shocks (MPC, here-
after) is essential for evaluating policy effects and testing economic theories such as the permanent
income hypothesis. Recently, the estimation of the MPC has also become crucial in the growing
literature on the importance of micro heterogeneity on macroeconomic dynamics.1
Although most MPC estimation exercises have been conducted in the context of developed
economies, there also exist several studies that estimate MPCs in emerging economies.2 How-
ever, these MPC estimates have important limitations to be used in the context of international
macroeconomics. First, these studies employ an experimental/quasi-experimental approach, which
exploits certain episodes with particular income shocks.3 This approach is not suitable for cross-
country MPC comparison between emerging and developed economies because it is difficult to find
comparable experimental/quasi-experimental settings in the two economies. Second, samples used
in these studies are usually not nationally representative. It is because under the experimental/quasi-
experimental approach, the sample needs to be restricted to those eligible for receiving the income
shocks that this approach exploits.4 5 This limitation could be particularly problematic when we
1See Kaplan, Moll, and Violante (2018), Auclert (2019), Auclert, Rognlie, and Straub (2018), and Auclert, Rogn-
lie, and Straub (2020), for example.
2See Paxson (1992), Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), and Egger, Haushofer, Miguel, Niehaus, and Walker (2019),
for example.
3For example, Paxson (1992) uses rainfall shocks in rural Thailand, and Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) and Egger
et al. (2019) use randomized cash transfers in rural Kenya.
4For example, Paxson (1992)’s sample is composed of rice farmers in rural Thailand, and Haushofer and Shapiro
(2016)’s and Egger et al. (2019)’s samples are composed of poor households in a small study district within rural
Kenya.
5Among those focusing on developed economies, there exist studies that employ the quasi-experimental approach
but still use a nationally representative sample. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) and Parker, Souleles, Johnson,
and McClelland (2013) estimate MPCs for U.S. households using tax rebates in 2001 and economic stimulus payments
in 2008, respectively. Their samples are nationally representative because most U.S. households were eligible for the
tax rebates and the stimulus payments.
1
need MPC estimates to discipline a macroeconomic model.
This chapter aims to overcome these limitations by estimating MPC with a semi-structural
method devised by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008) and a nationally representative sample
of an emerging economy. Blundell et al. (2008)’s method imposes a theory-guided covariance
structure on joint dynamics of income and consumption. This approach is suitable for cross-
country MPC comparison between emerging and developed economies because the same econo-
metric procedure can be applied to both economies’ micro data. I apply this method to the sample
from a Peruvian household survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO)6, which is nationally
representative and also meets all the data requirements of the method. Specifically, I estimate the
MPC of each income decile of the sample.
When the Peruvian MPC estimates are compared with U.S. MPC estimates obtained by the
same method, two striking differences emerge. First, the MPCs of the Peruvian deciles are sub-
stantially higher overall than those of the U.S. deciles. The mean MPC of the Peruvian deciles
(63.2 percent) is 54.3 percentage points higher than that of the U.S. deciles (8.9 percent). Second,
in both countries, lower income deciles tend to have higher MPCs, but the within-country MPC
heterogeneity over the income deciles is substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S. The MPC
of the bottom decile (94.2 percent) is 64.3 percentage points higher than that of the top decile (29.9
percent) in Peru, while in the U.S., the MPC of the bottom decile (16.0 percent) is 12.4 percentage
points higher than that of the top decile (3.6 percent).
Methodologically, this chapter employs one of the main approaches from the extensive litera-
ture on MPC estimation. In this literature, the key to estimating the MPC is to identify unexpected
transitory income shocks and to measure consumption responses to such shocks. To this end, three
approaches have been widely accepted: (i) exploiting experimental/quasi-experimental settings,
(ii) imposing a theory-guided covariance structure on joint dynamics of income and consumption,
and (iii) directly using answers to survey questions asking how much households would spend out
of hypothetical income shocks. Well-known works in each of the approaches include Johnson et al.
6Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (2004-2016)
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(2006) and Parker et al. (2013), Paxson (1992), Haushofer and Shapiro (2016), Egger et al. (2019)
for the first approach, Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014b) for the
second approach, and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) for the third approach, among many others. As
explained above, I use the second approach in this chapter because it is suitable for obtaining MPC
estimates from a nationally representative sample and comparing the estimates across countries.
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 examine causes and consequences of the findings of chapter 1, respec-
tively. In chapter 2, I study the driving factor for the differences between Peruvian and U.S. MPCs.
Specifically, I explore possible explanations for the cross-country MPC differences and disentangle
them by examining relevant patterns in the micro data. In chapter 3, I evaluate the macroeconomic
implication of the MPC differences between Peru and the U.S. on their business cycle differences
through the lens of a heterogeneous-agent open economy model.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 1.2, I discuss the key equation
for the MPC estimation and the underlying model from which the equation is derived. In particular,
I extend the underlying model of Blundell et al. (2008) by introducing liquidity constraints, verify
that the key identification equation does not change, and discuss how the different degrees of
liquidity constraints affect consumption responsiveness to transitory income shocks. Section 1.3
discusses the micro data sets used in the estimation and how I process them. Section 1.4 reports
the results of the MPC estimation. Section 1.5 concludes this chapter.
1.2 The Underlying Model and MPC Estimation
The key equation for the MPC estimation of this chapter is a first-order-approximated con-
sumption growth function derived from a version of the standard precautionary-saving models.
I begin by presenting the model. After that, I discuss the first-order-approximated consumption
growth function derived from the model. The derivation, which I provide in Appendix A.1, is
nearly identical to that of Blundell et al. (2008), except for the part that deals with liquidity con-
straints, which are absent in their underlying model. Then, I discuss how to estimate the MPC
using the consumption growth function and the imposed income process.
3
1.2.1 The Underlying Model
In period 𝑡, each household 𝑖 solves the following optimization problem.
max
















𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗−1)𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗−1, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , (SBC)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1, (LQC)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝐽𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 (NPG)
in which 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 denotes the remaining periods of household 𝑖’s lifetime after period 𝑡, S𝑖,𝑡 denotes the
state vector of household 𝑖, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 denotes a vector of dummy variables for observable characteris-




𝑡+ 𝑗 ) denotes household 𝑖’s preference shift in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 ,
𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 denotes real consumption of household 𝑖 in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 , 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 denotes household 𝑖’s one-
period asset purchased in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 , 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗 denotes the real interest rate associated with asset 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ,
and𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 denotes household 𝑖’s disposable income in period 𝑡+ 𝑗 . (SBC) represents sequential bud-
get constraints, (LQC) represents liquidity constraints, and (NPG) represents the no-Ponzi-game
constraint that households face.
As in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014b), I assume that each household 𝑖’s log
real income log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is composed of three components: a component explained by household 𝑖’s




𝑡 , a permanent component 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 , and a transitory component
4
𝜖𝑖,𝑡 . Specifically, I assume
log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + Z𝑖,𝑡 ,
Z𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑝𝑚), 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟), (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , and
(𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡
in which (𝑥𝑡)𝑡 represents time series (· · · , 𝑥𝑡−2, 𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑡+2, · · · ).
Let 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 denote the unpredictable component of log income:
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 := log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦
𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 .
Then, we have
Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1. (1.1)










𝑡 . They appear
in these places to make the model consistent with the data pattern that a sizable portion of income
and consumption variations are explained by observable characteristics.7 Specifically, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 includes
dummy variables for education, ethnicity, employment status, region, cohort, household size, num-
ber of children, urban area, the existence of members other than heads and spouses earning income,
and the existence of persons who do not live with but are financially supported by the household.
Among these characteristics, education, ethnicity, employment status, and region are allowed to
have time-varying effects.
7Some studies such as Guvenen and Smith (2014) do not have these terms in the model but instead assume that
the residuals of income and consumption after controlling for observable characteristics are income and consumption
of per-adult equivalent units, and the residuals should be explained by the model. This alternative approach does not
affect the estimation of Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameters but affects which consumption-to-income
ratio to be multiplied in converting the partial insurance parameters to MPC. I report the MPC estimates under this



































are the vectors of dummies for household characteristics with time-varying
effects and time-invariant effects, respectively, 𝜑𝑝1𝑡 and 𝜑





, respectively, and 𝜑𝑦1𝑡 and 𝜑






respectively. The model is general enough to incorporate aggregate uncertainty by allowing (𝜑𝑝1𝑡 )𝑡
and (𝜑𝑦1𝑡 )𝑡 to be stochastic.
The stochastic processes (𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , (𝜑𝑝1𝑡 )𝑡 , (𝜑
𝑦1
𝑡 )𝑡 , (𝑟𝑡)𝑡 are all exogenous in the
model. I assume that households’ idiosyncratic income shocks are independent of other exogenous
variables:
(Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜑𝑝1𝑡 , 𝜑
𝑦1
𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡)𝑡 .
Moreover, I assume that (𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 follows a Markov chain with transition probabilities that can be
affected by aggregate states. Then, (𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 satisfies
𝑃(𝑍𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 |S𝑖,𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑍𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ), 𝑗 ≥ 0
in which S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 denotes the aggregate state of the economy.
In the model, household 𝑖’s state vector S𝑖,𝑡 is composed of individual state S𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 and aggregate
state S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 as follows.










𝑡− 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0, (𝜑
𝑦1
𝑡− 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0, (𝑟𝑡− 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0
)
in which (𝑥𝑡− 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0 := (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡−2, · · · ) denotes the history of time series (𝑥𝑠)𝑠 up to time 𝑡.8
8The reason why S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 includes the whole history of exogenous aggregate variables is because I do not specify
their processes. If I assume that (𝑟𝑡 )𝑡 follows an AR(1) process and has no effect on other aggregate variables, for
6
Given the assumptions on the exogenous processes, equation ‘log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦
𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖,𝑡’ is equiva-
lent to the following decomposition.
log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 [log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ] +
{
log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸 [log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ]
}
,
𝐸 [log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ] = 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦
𝑡 , log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸 [log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S
𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑡 ] = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 .
In the same way, any variable 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 can be decomposed as follows:
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ] +
{
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ]
}
,
𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ] = 𝑍𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S
𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑡 ] = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑥𝑡
for some 𝜑𝑥𝑡 , of which elements corresponding to 𝑍
1
𝑖,𝑡
are time-varying. From this point on, I
describe 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ] as ‘part of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 explained (or picked up) by 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and time’ or ‘predictable
component of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡’, and
{
𝑥𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ]
}
as ‘part of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 unexplained (or not picked up)
by 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and time’ or ‘unpredictable component of 𝑥𝑖,𝑡’. If 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 ], I describe this
equation as ‘𝑥𝑖,𝑡 is explained (or picked up) by 𝑍𝑖𝑡 and time’.













+ `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1, (1.2)
`𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ≥ 0, `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 = 0, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1, (1.3)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝐽𝑖,𝑡 = 0, and (1.4)
𝐽𝑖,𝑡−𝑠∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑄𝑡+𝑠,𝑡+𝑠+ 𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝑠+ 𝑗 =
𝐽𝑖,𝑡−𝑠∑︁
𝑗=0




1 if 𝑗 = 0,
1
(1+𝑟𝑡 )···(1+𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗−1) if 𝑗 ≥ 1
example, S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 needs to include only 𝑟𝑡 , not the whole history (𝑟𝑡− 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0.
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and `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the liquidity constraint in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 .
The definition of ‘households being liquidity-constrained in period 𝑡 + 𝑗’ is ‘`𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 > 0’ in
this chapter. Equation (1.2) shows that the ratio between today’s marginal utility and tomor-
row’s expected marginal utility is greater than what the Euler equation would dictate when `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗
is strictly positive. This occurs because households cannot transform their future resources into
current consumption completely enough to smooth consumption when they are currently liquidity-
constrained.
1.2.2 The Consumption Growth Function
Let 𝑍′
𝑖,𝑡
𝜑𝑐𝑡 := 𝐸 (log𝐶𝑖,𝑡 |𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S
𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑡 ) be the component of log consumption explained by 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 and
time and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 := log𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑐𝑡 be the component unexplained by them.9 The consumption growth
function used throughout the empirical analyses of this chapter is the following equation.
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖,𝑡 Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖,𝑡 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 + b𝑖,𝑡 . (1.6)
The consumption growth function (1.6) is derived by first-order-approximating the optimality
conditions (1.2) and (1.5).10 (See Appendix A.1 for the derivation.) Therefore, each term in the
equation has a structural interpretation.
𝜙𝑃𝐼𝐻
𝑖,𝑡
Z𝑖,𝑡 and 𝜓𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖,𝑡 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 are the consumption responses to income shocks that households would
make if liquidity constraints were not imposed in the model. For example, Blundell et al. (2008)
consider the same model but without liquidity constraints. In such a model, households’ con-
sumption decisions follow the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) with CRRA utilities. From the
9Note that 𝑍 ′
𝑖,𝑡





𝑡 because the optimal consumption path is affected not only by the prefer-
ence shift but also by many other factors. For example, interest rates affect the intertemporal allocation of consumption.
Moreover, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 affects the expectation error in equation (1.2). See Appendix A.1 for details.
10The underlying model features nonlinearity generated by the liquidity constraints. In the system of equations
(1.2), (1.3), (1.4), and (1.5), the nonlinearity manifests through `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1. The first-order approximation
implemented to derive equation (1.6) preserves the nonlinearity because any term including `𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 is not approximated.
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model, they derive the following consumption function.
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙
𝑃𝐼𝐻
𝑖,𝑡 Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓𝑃𝐼𝐻𝑖,𝑡 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + b𝑖,𝑡 . (1.7)
As a result of imposing the liquidity constraints in my model, equation (1.6) has two more
terms, ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 and ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 , compared to equation (1.7). Term ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 is the component of {−(1/𝜎) log(1−






𝑖,𝑡−1) is the shadow cost of the liquidity constraint in terms of con-
sumption goods in period 𝑡 − 1. Therefore, the more household 𝑖 is constrained in period 𝑡 − 1, the
greater the value of ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 is. Term ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 appearing on the right-hand side of equation (1.6) shows
that when households are liquidity-constrained in the current period 𝑡 − 1, they cannot transform
their future resources into current consumption completely enough to smooth consumption, and
therefore, their consumption jumps in the following period 𝑡.
Term ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 is the part of 𝑀𝑡 unexplained by the history of observable characteristics and ag-
gregate states, and 𝑀𝑡 is the weighted sum of [𝐸𝑡 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) − 𝐸𝑡−1 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )]’s for
0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1, which is the expectation change in the effects of the current and future liq-
uidity constraints on the current consumption growth. Term ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 is positively correlated with tran-
sitory income shock 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 because it relaxes the current liquidity constraint for currently constrained
households and reduces the precautionary-saving motive for households that are currently uncon-
strained but are concerned about being constrained in the future. The correlation becomes stronger
as households approach the liquidity constraint. If households are far away from the liquidity con-
straint such that the probability of hitting the constraint in the future is negligible, the correlation
should be close to zero.
The last term b𝑖,𝑡 captures the part of Δ log𝐶𝑖,𝑡 that is explained by the history of observable
characteristics and aggregate states but is not picked up by Δ𝑍′
𝑖,𝑡
𝜑𝑐𝑡 . 𝐸b𝑖,𝑡 = 0 holds by construction,
and b𝑖,𝑡 can be autocorrelated. Since (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , S𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 )𝑡 , we have (b𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (Z𝑖𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖𝑡)𝑡 .11
11These features of b𝑖,𝑡 remain unchanged even when we allow b𝑖,𝑡 to include measurement errors that are mean-
zero, autocorrelated, but uncorrelated with (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 )𝑡 .
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1.2.3 MPC Estimation
I estimate the MPC of each income decile in Peru and the U.S., separately. As in Blundell et al.





each group but can vary across different groups. Under this assumption, equation (1.6) becomes
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝑃𝐼𝐻𝐺 Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓
𝑃𝐼𝐻
𝐺 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 + b𝑖,𝑡 , (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺 (1.8)
in which 𝐺 denotes a group of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s.
As we shall see in section 1.3, households are interviewed annually and one quarterly income
and consumption are available per interview in the Peruvian data. Thus, we have year-over-year
growth of quarterly consumption and income for the Peruvian sample. On the other hand, house-
holds are interviewed biannually and one annual income and consumption are available per inter-
view in the U.S. data. Therefore, we have two-year-over-two-year growth of annual consumption
and income for the U.S. sample. To examine equations (1.1) and (1.8) with these data, I sum each








˜̀𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗−1 + 𝜙𝑃𝐼𝐻𝐺
𝐾−1∑︁
𝑗=0










b𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗 , (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺
(1.10)
in which Δ𝐾𝑥𝑡 := 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−𝐾 for time series (𝑥𝑡)𝑡 . For the Peruvian sample, I set the period as a
quarter and 𝐾 = 4. For the U.S. sample, I set the period as a year and 𝐾 = 2.
As in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014b), I define the partial insurance parameter
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to transitory income shocks 𝜓𝐺 for each group 𝐺 as follows.
𝜓𝐺 :=
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
. (1.11)
Parameter 𝜓𝐺 is the elasticity of consumption with regard to income when the income change is
caused by a transitory income shock. When the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s is independent of




𝑐𝑜𝑣 [𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑣𝑎𝑟 [𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
(1.12)
by substituting equations (1.1) and (1.8) into equation (1.11). Note that 𝜓𝐺 is equal to 𝜓𝑃𝐼𝐻𝐺 when
the liquidity constraints are removed from the model.
When the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s is independent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0 (the income shocks
from period 𝑡 onward), we can derive
𝜓𝐺 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖𝑡 ,Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ,Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
, 𝐾 ≥ 1 (1.13)
from equations (1.9) and (1.10).12 Intuitively, 𝜓𝐺 can be identified by running an IV regression
in which Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable, Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is the endogenous regressor, and Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 is the
instrumental variable.
I use equation (1.13) to identify 𝜓𝐺 . I group observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s based on their unpredictable
component of income in period 𝑡−𝐾 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 , so that the grouping is independent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0.
Since 𝜓𝐺 is an elasticity, I identify the MPC out of a transitory income shock by multiplying 𝜓𝐺 by
the ratio of the average consumption to the average income of group 𝐺 in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 as follows.
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺
𝐸 [𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝐸 [𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
. (1.14)
12We can also verify from equations (1.9) and (1.10) that Blundell et al. (2008)’s formula for the partial insurance
parameter to permanent income shocks, 𝜙 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ
𝐾 𝑐𝑖𝑡 ,Δ
𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾+Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖𝑡+Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 )
𝑐𝑜𝑣 (Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ,Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾+Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖𝑡+Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 ) provides a biased estimate in the pres-
ence of liquidity constraints. This is consistent with Kaplan and Violante (2010)’s finding that Blundell et al. (2008)’s




𝐸 [𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺]
𝐸 [𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺] . To estimate 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 using equations (1.13) and (1.14), I estimate
(^𝐺 , 𝛼𝐺 , 𝜓𝐺) from the following moment conditions using the GMM method.
𝐸 [^𝐺𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺] = 0,
𝐸 [Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺 − 𝜓𝐺Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺] = 0, and
𝐸 [Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 (Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺 − 𝜓𝐺Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡) | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺] = 0.
(1.15)
Standard errors are clustered within each household.13 Once we have the GMM estimates and the
variance-covariance matrix of (^𝐺 , 𝛼𝐺 , 𝜓𝐺), we can obtain the estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 and its standard
error using equation (1.14) or, equivalently,
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺^𝐺 .
Since one period is a quarter for the Peruvian sample and a year for the U.S. sample, equation (1.14)
yields quarterly MPCs for Peru and annual MPCs for the U.S. To compare the quarterly MPC
estimates with the annual MPC estimates, I convert the quarterly MPCs of Peruvian households
to annual MPCs by adopting Auclert (2019)’s conversion formula, which the author uses for the
same purpose of comparing quarterly MPC estimates with annual MPC estimates. The conversion
formula is






denotes the annual MPC and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑄
𝐺
denotes the quarterly MPC of group 𝐺.14 15
13The standard error clustering within each household is important because (i) the error term (Δ𝐾 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝐺 −
𝜓𝐺Δ
𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 ) is autocorrelated as it includes
∑𝐾−1
𝑗=0 ˜̀𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗−1 and
∑𝐾−1
𝑗=0 b𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗 , and (ii) the instrumental variable Δ
𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾
of observation (𝑖, 𝑡) can also be correlated with the error term of observation (𝑖, 𝑡 + 𝐾).
14Auclert (2019) derives equation (1.16) under the assumption that the quarterly consumption response in period
𝑡 + 𝑗 to a shock in period 𝑡 decays exponentially in 𝑗 and the interest rate is close to zero. The author finds that this
conversion formula is a good approximation in partial equilibrium Bewley models.




The MPC estimation for emerging economies using Blundell et al. (2008)’s method requires
a micro dataset that satisfies four requirements. First, the dataset should include both the income
and expenditure of households. Second, the dataset should have a panel structure of at least three
consecutive surveys. Third, the sample should be representative of a country. Fourth, the dataset
should be for an emerging economy. ENAHO is one of the rare datasets, if not the only one, that
satisfies all four requirements. It is the major information source of the quantity indices for the
final household expenditure in Peru’s national accounts (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Infor-
mática, n.d.) and thus is nationally representative and includes detailed categories of household
expenditure. Moreover, ENAHO also collects information on detailed sources of household in-
come. ENAHO tracks a subset of annual cross-sectional observations in the following year and
possibly more. The panel households are also nationally representative. Most panel households
appear two or three times in the data, while the maximum number of appearances is six. I use
2004-2016 waves of ENAHO. These waves give 11 years of consumption and income growth be-
cause the survey is annually conducted and there is no panel structure between the 2006 wave and
the 2007 wave. Appendix A.2.1 provides more details about ENAHO including its coverage and
and non-response rates.
For the MPC comparison between emerging and developed economies, I need another micro
dataset that satisfies the first, second, and third conditions discussed above, but for a developed
economy. I choose Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s replication dataset for U.S. households16. For the
purpose of cross-country comparison, their dataset is relevant for two reasons. First, their sample
years are not too different from the sample years of the Peruvian dataset I use in this chapter.
Specifically, they use the 1999-2011 waves from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
which overlap significantly with my Peruvian sample (waves 2004-2016). Second, they prepare
16Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014a)
13
the dataset to estimate Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameter with regard to transitory
income shocks, which is the same object upon which I base my MPC estimates.
1.3.2 Variable Construction
The baseline consumption measure for both Peruvian and U.S. households includes nondurable
goods and a subset of services, as in many other studies on household consumption, such as Attana-
sio and Weber (1995) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009). Following these studies, I exclude
health and education expenses from the consumption due to their durable nature. I exclude non-
purchased consumption such as donations, food stamps, in-kind income, and self-production from
the consumption. Including these items does not change the results in any meaningful way, as
reported in Appendix A.4.1 and B.2.1. Due to the lack of coverage in the early waves in the U.S.
sample, the consumption of U.S. households does not include clothing, recreation, alcohol, and to-
bacco, while the consumption of Peruvian households includes them. In Appendix A.4.2 and B.2.2,
I conduct a robustness check by consistently excluding these expenses from the consumption of
Peruvian households and verify that the main findings are robust. The constructed consumption of
households in each country is deflated with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) series.
The income measure for both countries is composed of disposable labor income and transfers,
as in Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014b). Capital income is excluded because we
do not want to falsely attribute endogenous capital income changes to unexpected income shocks.
In ENAHO, labor income and capital income are not distinguishable in self-employment income.
Following Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (1997) and Krueger and Perri (2006), I split the
self-employment income into a labor income component and a capital income component using
the ratio of unambiguous labor income to the sum of unambiguous labor income and unambiguous
capital income in the sample.17 Imputed components of missing income are excluded from the
income measure for ENAHO, as these components might blur the identification of income shocks.
I cannot do the same for the income of U.S. households, as the imputed income components are not
17In my ENAHO sample, the ratio is 0.819. This ratio is slightly lower but quite similar to the ratio in the U.S.,
0.864, which Diaz-Gimenez et al. (1997) and Krueger and Perri (2006) use.
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distinguishable in Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset. In Appendix A.4.3, I conduct a robustness check
by consistently including the imputed components of Peruvian households’ income and verify that
it does not change the results in any meaningful way. The income of Peruvian households includes
two expense items that are also included in their consumption: rental equivalence of housing pro-
vided by work (as labor income) and rental equivalence of donated housing (as transfers).18 On the
other hand, the income of U.S. households does not include any expense items that are included
in their consumption. In Appendix A.4.4 and B.2.3, I conduct a robustness check by consistently
excluding the two expense items from Peruvian households’ income and verify that the main find-
ings are robust. The constructed income of households in each country is deflated with the CPI
series.
In ENAHO, reference periods vary over both expense items and income items. More impor-
tantly, individual households report more than 97 percent (in value) of expense items and income
items, respectively, with reference periods shorter than or equal to the previous three months, on
average. Given this feature of the data, I construct quarterly consumption and income by excluding
expense and income items with reference periods longer than the previous three months. Expense
and income items with reference periods shorter than the previous three months are scaled up to
the quarterly expense and income, respectively. Since panel households are tracked only annually,
we can only obtain the year-over-year growth of quarterly consumption and income from ENAHO.
In the PSID, the reference period is fixed to one year, while households are tracked only biannu-
ally during the sample years of Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset. Therefore, we can only obtain
two-year-over-two-year growth of annual consumption and income from their dataset. 19
18However, the income measure does not include rental equivalence of owned housing because it is categorized as
capital income.
19Both the PSID and ENAHO are not free from the problem of time inconsistency between the reference period for
consumption and that for income. In the PSID, the reference period for income is firmly fixed to a calendar year, but
the reference period for consumption can depend on an interpretation, as pointed out by Crawley (2019). For example,
the reference period for food consumption in the PSID questionnaire can be interpreted either as average weekly
consumption during the reference year of income or as the consumption in the last week of the survey. In the baseline
analysis, I accept the former interpretation, as many other studies implicitly do. Under the alternative interpretation,
however, the time inconsistency problem arises in such a way that the reference period for income is longer than that
for consumption. In ENAHO, the reference periods for both consumption and income are restricted to be no longer
than the previous three months, as discussed above. Within these three months, however, the time inconsistency
problem exists in both ways: some expense items have longer reference periods than some income items, while some
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Appendix A.2.2 provides more details of the variable construction.
1.3.3 Sample Selection
Provided that the empirical analyses of this chapter require multiple appearances by house-
holds, it is convenient to define different units of observation for the sake of discussion. I define
an observation of a household in 𝑛 consecutive surveys as a type-𝑛 observation. If a household ap-
pears in three consecutive surveys, this household provides three type-1 observations, two type-2
observations, and one type-3 observation.
Sample selection is implemented for either type-1 observations or type-2 observations. When
I drop some type-1 observations, type-2 and type-3 observations that contain the dropped type-1
observations are also dropped. When I drop some type-2 observations, type-1 observations that do
not have any selected type-2 observations to belong to are also dropped, and type-3 observations
that contain the dropped type-2 observations are also dropped.
The sample selection for ENAHO proceeds as follows. First, I begin with type-1 observations
that belong to at least one type-2 observation. Second, I drop type-2 observations if the inter-
view months are not matched between the two consecutive surveys. Moreover, there are type-2
observations that are likely to falsely connect two different households. Such type-2 observations
are detected and dropped.20 Type-2 observations are also dropped if the head of the household
changes. Third, type-1 observations are dropped if a survey response is categorized as incomplete
by interviewers. Fourth, type-1 observations are dropped if the household heads are younger than
25 or older than 65. Fifth, type-1 observations are dropped if any of the observable characteristics
needed to control income and consumption are missing. Sixth, type-1 observations are dropped if
they have non-positive income or consumption. Seventh, type-1 observations are dropped if they
have too much value in imputed income components. Similarly, type-1 observations are dropped
if they report too much value in expense items or income items with reference periods longer than
expense items have shorter reference periods than some income items. In a robustness check conducted in Appendix
A.4.9, I address this time inconsistency problem using a continuous-time model and find that the main findings are
robust to correcting the problem.
20Appendix A.2.4 provides details of the procedure.
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the previous three months. Eighth, all type-1 observations on households categorized as an income
outlier are dropped.21 This sample selection leaves 47,210 type-1 observations, 21,988 type-2 ob-
servations, and 7,509 type-3 observations. Appendix A.2.3 provides more details of the sample
selection procedure including how many observations of each type are dropped in each step.
For the U.S. households, I adopt Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s sample selection with only a few minor
revisions because their sample selection procedure is similar to mine. Appendix A.2.3 discusses
details of the minor revisions and a remaining difference between my sample selection for ENAHO
and their sample selection for the PSID, as well as a robustness check regarding the difference.
1.3.4 Income Grouping
I estimate the MPC of each income decile in each country. The income distribution for the
deciles is constructed by sorting type-1 observations with their unpredictable component of log
real income, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 . In accordance with the unit time length of each sample (a year for the U.S.
sample and a quarter for the Peruvian sample), I sort the U.S. type-1 observations within each
calendar year and the Peruvian type-1 observations within each calendar quarter.22 The survey
weights are used to compute the quantile of each observation.
The unit of observation in the MPC estimation is the type-3 observation. The observation that
I denote as (𝑖, 𝑡) in subsection 1.2.3 is the type-3 observation of household 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡, and
𝑡 + 𝐾 in which 𝐾 = 4 in the Peruvian sample and 𝐾 = 2 in the U.S. sample. The income decile
of the type-3 observation is determined by its unpredictable component of log real income in the
initial period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 .
My baseline income measure for the Peruvian sample does not include items with reference
periods longer than the previous three months and imputed income components, and I drop type-1
observations that have too much value in these components in the sample selection. If the pro-
21Income growth is used for the criterion of income outliers. See Appendix A.2.3 for details.
22Because I already remove the time-fixed effect when controlling for the predictable components (annually for the
U.S. sample, quarterly for the Peruvian sample), it should also be fine to sort unpredictable component of income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
in a larger observation pool than the pool of the unit time length. In Appendix A.4.5 and B.2.4, I conduct a robustness
check by sorting income in different observation pools and find that the main results are robust.
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portion of these components in household income is correlated with the income level, this sample
selection can cause a selection bias. Dropping observations with too much value in expense items
with reference periods longer than the previous three months can cause the same issue.
To resolve this concern, when constructing the income distribution and determining the income
quantiles of the selected observations in the Peruvian sample, I include the dropped observations
due to having too much value in income or expense items with reference periods longer than the
previous three months or to having too much value in imputed income components. To sort these
dropped observations and the selected observations together, I use the unpredictable component of
the log real income of a comprehensive income measure that includes not only the baseline measure
of income but also the income items with reference periods longer than the previous three months
and the imputed components of income. Although these income components are bad because they
can blur the measurement of income growth, they are helpful in determining the income quantiles
of the selected observations.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Cross-Country MPC Comparison
Figure 1.1 plots the annual MPC estimates and the 95% confidence intervals of the income
deciles in Peru and the U.S.23 The result shows two striking differences between the two countries’
MPCs. First, the MPCs of the Peruvian deciles are substantially higher overall than those of the
U.S. deciles. The mean MPC of the Peruvian deciles (63.2 percent) is 54.3 percentage points
higher than that of the U.S. deciles (8.9 percent).24 Second, in both countries, lower income deciles
23Appendix A.3 reports the numerical values of the estimates and standard errors in a table for interested readers.
24The average U.S. MPC estimate in this chapter, 8.9 percent is in the same ballpark as the estimates of other
studies which also apply Blundell et al. (2008)’s method to the PSID. Auclert (2019) estimates the U.S. MPCs of
income terciles using the 1999-2013 waves of the PSID and plots them. In the plot, the author’s MPC estimates are
located around 2 percent, 10 percent, and 13 percent for the top, middle, and bottom terciles, respectively. Blundell
et al. (2008) estimates 𝜓𝐺 (the partial insurance parameter with regard to transitory income shocks, before converting it
to MPC by multiplying income-to-consumption ratio) using the 1978-1992 waves of the PSID. Due to the insufficient
coverage of expense items in the PSID during their sample period, they impute consumption based on the food demand
estimated from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). They report 5.3 percent as the estimate of 𝜓𝐺 for the whole
sample.
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Figure 1.1: Annual MPCs of the Income Deciles in Peru and the U.S.
Notes: In the 𝑥-axis, 1 is the bottom decile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
tend to have higher MPC, but the within-country MPC heterogeneity over the income deciles is
substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S. The MPC of the bottom decile (94.2 percent) is 64.3
percentage points higher than that of the top decile (29.9 percent) in Peru, while in the U.S., the
MPC of the bottom decile (16.0 percent) is 12.4 percentage points higher than that of the top decile
(3.6 percent).
I also find that these two differences consistently appear in an extensive list of robustness
checks in Appendix A.4. The list of robustness checks includes (i) alternative measures of con-
sumption and income, (ii) alternative choices of observation pools in sorting income, (iii) alterna-
tive underlying models such as a model with persistent (not permanent) income shocks, a model
with a subsistence point25, a model with per-adult equivalent units, and a model in continuous
time26, and (iv) alternative sample selections.
25Specifically, I replace the household utility function with the one developed by Stone (1954) and Geary (1950)
under which households obtain utility only from consumption beyond a subsistence point.
26As Crawley (2019) notes, continuous-time models are useful in dealing with two possible issues in discrete time
models: the time aggregation problem and the time inconsistency problem. The time aggregation problem means that
a completely transitory shock in a continuous-time process can generate an autocorrelation in a discrete-time process
constructed by aggregating the continuous-time process over a specified period. The time inconsistency problem
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Figure 1.1 compares the two economies’ MPC graphs over the income deciles (not over the
income levels). The null hypothesis underlying this comparison is that the U.S. is a scaled-up
version of Peru. In other words, the U.S. and Peru follow the same model economy with the same
parameter values, but all the quantity variables in the U.S. are proportionally scaled up compared
to those in Peru.27 Under the null hypothesis, we should observe identical MPC graphs over the
income deciles between Peru and the U.S. By rejecting this null hypothesis, Figure 1.1 suggests
that whenever we discipline a model using MPC estimates, the parameters governing the MPCs in
the model should be significantly different between emerging and developed economies, and thus
generate a significantly different macroeconomic outcome.
Separately from the relevance of this income-decile comparison in the context of disciplining
a model with MPC estimates, it could also be intuitively appealing to compare the MPC estimates
over income levels. The null hypothesis underlying this income-level comparison can be formal-
ized as follows: MPC is a function of the Purchasing Power Parity(PPP)-converted level of income
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 (including both predictable and unpredictable components) regardless of whether households
live in Peru or in the U.S. To test this null hypothesis, in Appendix A.5, I sort households by 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
(instead of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡) to construct income deciles, estimate MPCs of the deciles, and plot them over the
𝑥-axis of the PPP-converted group-average values of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 . It turns out that the top three deciles in
Peru and the bottom three deciles in the U.S. overlap in their PPP-converted income, and in the
overlapped region, the mean MPC of the top three deciles in Peru (0.442) is significantly greater
than the mean MPC of the bottom three deciles in the U.S. (0.173). This result rejects the null
hypothesis that MPC is determined by the PPP-converted level of income.
means that the reference period for consumption could be inconsistent with the reference period for income because
of the intended design of a survey, unclear description of the questionnaires, or greater difficulties in recalling memory
regarding expenses. As in Crawley (2019), I address these issues using a continuous-time model in Appendix A.4.9.
27For the null hypothesis to be not self-contradictory, the model economy under the null hypothesis should be
scale-free, i.e., the model dynamics do not change when all quantities are proportionally scaled up. For example, the
model in subsection 1.2.1 is scale-free. The model remains scale-free when the lower bound of 𝐴𝑖,𝑡 in equation (LQC)
is replaced with a constant fraction of the household’s income. However, the model becomes non-scale-free if the
lower bound is replaced with a non-zero constant.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter estimates the MPC out of transitory income shocks using micro data for an emerg-
ing economy, Peru. Methodologically, Blundell et al. (2008)’s semi-structural estimation approach
is employed for the estimation. Then, the Peruvian MPC estimates are compared with U.S. MPC
estimates obtained by the same method. The comparison yields two main conclusions. First, the
mean MPC level of Peru is substantially higher than that of the U.S. Second, within-country MPC
heterogeneity in income distribution is substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S.
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 build on the main findings of chapter 1. In chapter 2, I answer the
following question: what drives these cross-country differences in the MPC patterns? Specifically,
I examine possible explanations for these differences and disentangle them using relevant data
patterns appearing in the micro data. In chapter 3, I evaluate the macroeconomic implication of
the MPC gap between Peru and the U.S. on their business cycle differences. To this end, I build a
heterogeneous-agent open economy model that can capture realistic degrees of households’ MPCs.
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Chapter 2: What Drives the Distinct MPC Patterns in Emerging
Economies? : Evidence from Peru
2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, I estimate the marginal propensities to consume out of transitory income shocks
(MPCs) using emerging market micro data from Peru and Blundell et al. (2008)’s method. Then,
I compare the Peruvian MPC estimates with U.S. MPC estimates obtained by the same method.
I report two main findings. First, the mean MPC of Peruvian income deciles is much higher
than that of U.S. deciles. Second, within-country MPC heterogeneity over the income deciles is
substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S. In this chapter, I explore possible explanations for
these differences and disentangle them by carefully examining relevant data patterns.
I begin with the stronger MPC heterogeneity over the income distribution in Peru than in the
U.S. When we see this difference through the lens of the standard incomplete-market precautionary-
saving models, there are three possible explanations. First, households in lower income deciles
could exhibit higher MPC because they are more likely to be constrained than those in higher in-
come deciles. The likelihood of being constrained could increase substantially faster in Peru than
in the U.S. as households move from higher to lower income deciles. Second, households in lower
income deciles could exhibit higher MPC in the absence of liquidity constraints when they tend to
front-load their consumption more heavily in their consumption path governed by the Euler equa-
tion. The tendency of lower-income households to front-load consumption more heavily could
be stronger in Peru than in the U.S. Third, even when households’ consumption path follows the
Euler equation and the degree of front-loading is similar across the income deciles, households in
lower income deciles could exhibit higher MPC by facing higher interest rates. The tendency of
lower-income households to face higher interest rates could be stronger in Peru than in the U.S.
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I disentangle these three theory-guided explanations by examining relevant data patterns. The
last explanation with heterogeneous interest rates makes sense only when the effective interest
rates used by lower-income households for their consumption-saving decision are borrowing in-
terest rates. In the Peruvian sample, however, the share of households participating in borrowing
activities is low (13.3 percent), and this share is even smaller in lower income deciles. Based on
this observation, I eliminate the heterogeneous interest rate explanation.
The remaining two explanations, one with liquidity constraints and the other with front-loading
behavior, are distinguishable by examining consumption growth rates. Under the explanation
with liquidity constraints, households in lower income deciles should exhibit higher consumption
growth because when they become constrained, they fail to bring future resources to current con-
sumption, and therefore, their consumption jumps in the following period. Under the explanation
with front-loading behavior, households in lower income deciles should exhibit lower consump-
tion growth exactly because they front-load consumption more heavily. Under either one of these
explanations, the described pattern of the consumption growth should be stronger in Peru than in
the U.S.
The group-average consumption growth of the deciles in Peru and the U.S. exhibit two clear
patterns. First, lower income deciles exhibit higher consumption growth in both countries. Second,
the tendency of lower income deciles to have higher consumption growth is substantially stronger
in Peru than in the U.S. In the U.S., the average two-year-over-two-year growth of annual con-
sumption in the bottom decile is 7.8 percentage points higher than that in the top decile, while
the standard deviation of the consumption growth is 38.7 percent for the whole sample. In Peru,
the year-over-year growth of quarterly consumption in the bottom decile is 30.2 percentage points
higher than that in the top decile, while the standard deviation of the consumption growth is 45.3
percent for the whole sample. Both of these patterns suggest that liquidity constraints are the main
driver of the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru than in the U.S.
Once we accept that liquidity constraints are the main cause for the stronger MPC heterogeneity
over the income distribution in Peru, we can decompose the cross-country MPC gap into two parts:
23
(i) the gap caused by households being more affected by liquidity constraints in Peru than in the
U.S. and (ii) the gap caused by factors unrelated to liquidity constraints, such as cross-country
differences in preferences and interest rates. We can conduct this decomposition by identifying
a top income group composed of households that are not only currently unconstrained but also
highly unlikely to be constrained in the future (forwardly unconstrained households hereafter) in
each country. The MPC gap between forwardly unconstrained households in Peru and those in the
U.S. captures the gap caused by factors unrelated to liquidity constraints.
To delineate a top income group composed of forwardly unconstrained households, I exploit
the fact that MPC should be homogeneous over the income within this group. I test whether MPC is
homogeneous for the top (10𝑛)% income groups for 𝑛 = 1, · · · , 10 by employing a test suggested
by Davies (1977) and Davies (1987). This test shows that the top 20% or larger income groups
in Peru reject the null hypothesis that MPC is homogeneous over the income, and the top 60% or
larger income groups in the U.S. reject the null hypothesis.
Based on this result, I delineate a top income group composed of forwardly unconstrained
households in each country by the top 10% of households in Peru and the top 50% of households
in the U.S., which are the largest top (10𝑛)% income groups in each country that fail to reject the
null hypothesis of the test. Under this delineation, 56.0 percent of the cross-country MPC gap is
attributable to households being more affected by liquidity constraints in Peru than in the U.S. This
finding is a conservative estimate of the role of liquidity constraints in the MPC gap because the
delineation is likely to overrate the size of a true forwardly unconstrained top income group, which
can cause an overestimation of the MPC of forwardly unconstrained households in Peru.
There is a burgeoning literature examining how macroeconomic dynamics or policy effects are
affected by the presence of liquidity-poor households and their consumption behavior. For ex-
ample, Krueger, Mitman, and Perri (2016) show that in an environment where a sizable fraction
of liquidity-poor households exist, aggregate consumption can drop far more severely during bad
times largely due to their enhanced precautionary-saving behavior in the face of increased unem-
ployment risk. Kaplan et al. (2018) show that in a heterogeneous agent New-Keynesian (HANK)
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model with a two-asset environment, monetary policy works through a different mechanism than
a conventional representative agent New-Keynesian framework (RANK) because liquidity-con-
strained households do not intertemporally substitute consumption much in response to interest
rate changes but instead respond sensitively to temporary income changes. McKay, Nakamura,
and Steinsson (2016) show that the effect of forward guidance is much weaker in a HANK model
than in a RANK model since households do not respond much to a news shock on the real interest
rate because of their shortened effective planning horizon (due to the liquidity constraints) and
precautionary-saving motives. Oh and Reis (2012) show that targeted transfers can be effective
in mitigating recessions by reducing the wealth of marginal workers (thus incentivizing them to
work) and by reallocating wealth from low-MPC to high-MPC households.
It is noteworthy that all these studies are based on quantitative models fitted to the U.S. econ-
omy. The findings of chapter 1 and chapter 2 suggest that all these recently discovered mecha-
nisms, through which liquidity-poor households and their consumption behavior affect aggregate
dynamics or policy effects, could play a significantly larger role in emerging economies than in de-
veloped economies. In this regard, the findings of chapter 1 and chapter 2 suggest a new direction
for the macroeconomic modeling of emerging economies. At the heart of the workhorse models
for emerging market business cycles, such as Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007), and Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010), representative households can borrow fric-
tionlessly in optimizing their consumption paths. There exist other types of emerging market
models that have explicit borrowing limits, such as sudden stop models and sovereign default
models.1 In these models, however, borrowing constraints bind only infrequently because they
aim at explaining macroeconomic dynamics during infrequent episodes such as financial crises or
sovereign defaults. Instead, the findings of chapter 1 and chapter 2 call for a new macroeconomic
model of emerging economies in which there is a substantial fraction of liquidity-poor households
even in normal times, and their MPC is as large as the estimates from the data. Revisiting impor-
1Sudden stop models such as Mendoza (2010) and Bianchi (2011) impose collateral constraints on representative
households’ borrowing. Sovereign default models such as Arellano (2008) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) limit the
access of any domestic agent to the international financial market during periods of sovereign default.
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tant macroeconomic questions for emerging economies – such as their distinctive business cycle
features, aggregate dynamics during crises, and effects of various policies – through the lens of
such a new model would be an important future avenue for the international macroeconomics lit-
erature. In chapter 3, I construct such a new model and evaluate the business-cycle implication of
the substantial presence of the liquidity-poor, high-MPC households in emerging economies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I explore theory-guided
possible explanations for the stronger MPC heterogeneity over income deciles in Peru. Then, I
disentangle them by using relevant data patterns. Based on the finding that liquidity constraints
mainly drive the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru, in section 2.3, I evaluate the role of liquidity
constraints in the cross-country MPC gap. Section 2.4 concludes this chapter.
2.2 The Main Driver of the Stronger MPC Heterogeneity in Peru
Why do we observe the differences between the MPC graph over the income deciles of Peru-
vian households and that of U.S. households in Figure 1.1? I begin an investigation to answer this
question by attempting to determine the main driver of the stronger within-country MPC hetero-
geneity over the income deciles in Peru.
When we see Figure 1.1 through the lens of the standard incomplete-market precautionary-
saving models such as the underlying model discussed in subsection 1.2.1, there are three possible
explanations for the stronger MPC heterogeneity over the income distribution in Peru.
First, households in lower income deciles could exhibit higher MPC because they are more
likely to be constrained. In the underlying model, households that receive negative transitory
income shocks would want to bring their future resources to current consumption by running down
their asset position.2 As a result, they become more likely to be constrained. Since lower-income
households are more likely to have received negative transitory income shocks and want to run
down their asset position, they are more likely to be constrained than higher-income households.
2When the income process is composed of a persistent (not permanent) component and a transitory component,
such as the sum of an AR(1) process and an i.i.d. process as given in Appendix A.4.6, negative income shocks to the
persistent component can also induce households to run down their asset position.
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The likelihood of being constrained could increase substantially faster in Peru than in the U.S. as
households move from higher to lower income deciles, and this difference can explain the stronger
MPC heterogeneity in Peru.
Second, households in lower income deciles could exhibit higher MPC in the absence of liq-
uidity constraints if they tend to front-load consumption more heavily in their consumption path
governed by the Euler equation. For example, consider a variant of the underlying model in which
(i) liquidity constraints are removed, (ii) preference heterogeneity in patience 𝛽𝑖 and intertempo-
ral elasticity of substitution (IES) 1/𝜎𝑖 is allowed, and (iii) (𝛽𝑖, 1/𝜎𝑖) can be correlated with the
unpredictable component of income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 . Moreover, assume that 𝛽𝑖 (1 + 𝑟) < 1 in the steady state,








𝑡+ 𝑗+1𝛽𝑖 (1 + 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗 ) (𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1/𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )−𝜎𝑖
]
= 1, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡−1.
In this model, households in lower income deciles could exhibit higher MPC if they tend to be
less patient (lower 𝛽𝑖) or have higher IES (higher 1/𝜎𝑖) because they front-load consumption more
heavily, as Aguiar, Bils, and Boar (2019) note. If the tendency of lower-income households to
front-load consumption more heavily is stronger in Peru than in the U.S., it could explain the
stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru.
Third, even when households’ consumption path follows the Euler equation and the degree of
front-loading is similar across the income deciles, households in lower income deciles could ex-
hibit higher MPC by facing higher interest rates. When interest rates are different over the income
deciles, the relative prices of consumption between today and tomorrow are also different, and
these different relative prices generate different substitution effects and wealth effects. I eliminate
the difference in the substitution effects by assuming that households’ front-loading behavior is
similar across the income deciles. The different wealth effects remain: when lower-income house-
holds face higher interest rates, they face relatively cheaper prices of future consumption, and thus,
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they consume more today. As a result, they exhibit higher MPC.3 If the tendency of lower-income
households to face higher interest rates is stronger in Peru than in the U.S., this stronger hetero-
geneity in interest rates could explain the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru.
In the rest of this subsection, I try to disentangle these three theory-guided explanations using
data. I begin with the last explanation with heterogeneous interest rates. This explanation makes
sense only when the effective interest rates used by low-income households for their consumption-
saving decision are borrowing interest rates.4 To see if this is the case, I examine which fraction of
households participate in borrowing activities in each of the income deciles in Peru.
In the sample years of 2015 and 2016, ENAHO includes survey questionnaires that make it
possible to identify households that borrowed during the previous twelve months. Using these
questionnaires, I identify type-1 observations as participants of borrowing activities if they fall
into one of the two categories: (i) a household that has at least one member who reports in a
member-level questionnaire that the member borrowed in the previous twelve months or (ii) a
household that reports in a household-level questionnaire that it obtained loans or credit in the
previous twelve months for the purpose of buying, extending or constructing housing. Figure 2.1a
plots the share of type-1 observations identified as participants in borrowing activities in each of
the income deciles from the 2015-2016 sample.5 The income deciles are again constructed using
the unpredictable (with observable characteristics) component of log income. Figure 2.1a shows
that the share of households participating in borrowing activities is only 13.3 percent on average in




𝜎) subject to sequential budget constraints 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟)𝐴𝑡−1, the no-Ponzi game constraint, and a perfectly
foresighted path of {𝑌𝑡 } under a parametric restriction, 𝛽(1 + 𝑟) = 1. The optimized consumption path is flat (no
front-loading), and the MPC out of a one-time transitory income shock is the annuity value of the shock, 𝑟/(1 + 𝑟). If
patience 𝛽𝑖 and interest rate 𝑟𝑖 are allowed to be heterogeneous in such a way that i) 𝛽𝑖 (1 + 𝑟𝑖) = 1 always holds for
each household 𝑖 and ii) 𝑟𝑖 tends to be higher in lower income deciles, the MPC in this model, 𝑟𝑖/(1 + 𝑟𝑖) is higher in
lower income deciles even if their consumption path follows an Euler equation and the degree of front-loading is the
same across all income deciles.
4Saving interest rates are unlikely to be higher for lower-income households. Interest rates on liquid assets such
as checking accounts should be close to risk-free interest rates regardless of who holds them. Interest rates on illiquid
assets can be substantially heterogeneous in such a way that rich households are more accessible to higher returns than
poor households. See Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino, and Pistaferri (2020) for recent empirical evidence on heteroge-
neous returns to wealth.
5Although I use only two years of the sample, the number of type-1 observations used in plotting Figure 2.1a is
large. After implementing the sample selection applicable to type-1 observations discussed in subsection 1.3.3, the
2015 sample and the 2016 sample provide 21,675 and 23,552 observations of type-1, respectively.
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(b) Including All Credit Card Holders
Figure 2.1: The Share of Peruvian Households Participating in Borrowing Activities in Each
Income Decile from the 2015-2016 Sample
Notes: Figure 2.1a plots the share of type-1 observations identified as participants in borrowing activities in each of the
income deciles from the 2015-2016 ENAHO sample. Figure 2.1b extends the definition of participants in borrowing
activities by including credit card holders. In the 𝑥-axis of each figure, 1 is the bottom decile.
the Peruvian sample. Moreover, the share is even smaller in lower income deciles.
In Figure 2.1b, I add one more category of households when defining participants of borrowing
activities: a household that has at least one member who holds a credit card. This definition may be
excessively broad because some households might use credit cards only for transaction purposes
rather than borrowing purposes. Even with this wide definition, the average share of households
participating in borrowing activities is only 23.7 percent. Moreover, the tendency of lower-income
households to be less likely to borrow than higher-income households is even stronger under this
definition.6
Provided that the share of households participating in borrowing activities is as small as 13.3
percent - 23.7 percent in Peru and that the shares are even smaller in lower-income (higher-MPC)
groups, it is unlikely that higher-MPC households face higher interest rates for their consumption-
saving problem. Based on this observation, I eliminate the explanation with heterogeneous interest
6Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, and Van Oudheusden (2015) and Demirguc-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, Ansar, and
Hess (2018) compute similar statistics using their own surveys over a wide range of countries. They report that in Peru,
the share of persons who ‘[b]orrowed from a financial institution (% age 15+)’ is 11.2 percent, the share of persons
who ‘[b]orrowed from a financial institution or used a credit card (% age 15+)’ is 18.0 percent, and the share of persons
who ‘[b]orrowed any money in the past year (% age 15+) ’ including informal borrowings such as borrowing from
family and friends is 32.2 percent in the 2014 survey. The shares are 14.7 percent, 19.1 percent, and 36.5 percent,
respectively, in the 2017 survey.
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rates.
The remaining two explanations, one with liquidity constraints and the other with front-loading
behavior, are distinguishable by examining the consumption growth in the following period. Un-
der the explanation with liquidity constraints, households in lower income deciles should exhibit
higher consumption growth in the following period because when they become constrained, they
fail to bring future resources to current consumption, and therefore, their consumption jumps in
the following period. In equation (1.10), households constrained in period 𝑡−𝐾 have higher values
of
∑𝐾−1
𝑗=0 ˜̀𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗−1 and thus tend to exhibit higher values of Δ
𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 . Moreover, for this explanation to
be able to account for the stronger heterogeneity in Peru, the tendency of lower income deciles to
exhibit higher consumption growth should be stronger in Peru.
Under the explanation with front-loading behavior, households in lower income deciles should
exhibit lower consumption growth in the following period exactly because they front-load con-
sumption more heavily than households in higher income deciles. In equation (1.10), when group
𝐺 is composed of heavy front-loading households, the front-loading behavior manifests as
𝐸 (∑𝐾−1𝑗=0 b𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗 |𝐺) < 07, and thus, the group average Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is low. Moreover, for this explanation
to be able to account for the stronger heterogeneity in Peru, the tendency of lower income deciles
to exhibit lower consumption growth should be stronger in Peru.
To compare the following-period consumption growth among the income deciles of each coun-
try, I run the following regression using type-2 observations.
Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 +
9∑︁
𝑗=1
𝛿 𝑗 𝐼𝐷 𝑗 (𝑖, 𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (2.1)
in which 𝐼𝐷 𝑗 (𝑖, 𝑡) is a dummy variable on whether a type-2 observation of household 𝑖 observed in
period 𝑡 and 𝑡 − 𝐾 belongs to the 𝑗-th income decile in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 . Parameter 𝛿 𝑗 represents the
difference in the average consumption growth between the 𝑗-th income decile and the top income
decile. Standard errors are clustered within each household. Figure 2.2 plots the estimated values
7Term b𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗 captures this front-loading behavior by including term 1𝜎𝑖 log 𝛽𝑖 . See Appendix A.1 for details on
which terms are included in b𝑖,𝑡− 𝑗 .
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Figure 2.2: Group Average Consumption Growth Difference against the Top Income Decile
Notes: In the 𝑥-axis, 1 is the bottom decile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
of 𝛿 𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 9 in Peru and the U.S., respectively.8
Figure 2.2 exhibits two clear patterns. First, lower income deciles exhibit higher consumption
growth in the following period in both countries.9 Second, the tendency of lower income deciles
to have higher consumption growth is substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S. In the U.S.,
the average two-year-over-two-year growth of annual consumption of the bottom decile is 7.8
percentage points higher than that of the top decile, while the standard deviation of the consumption
growth is 38.7 percent for the whole sample. In Peru, the year-over-year growth of quarterly
consumption of the bottom decile is 30.2 percentage points higher than that of the top decile, while
the standard deviation of the consumption growth is 45.3 percent for the whole sample.10
8Appendix B.1 reports the estimates and standard errors in a table for interested readers.
9In the context of the U.S. economy, this chapter is not the first to document the evidence of liquidity constraints
using the negative relationship between consumption growth and lagged income. For example, Zeldes (1989) detects
the presence of liquidity constraints for low-wealth households by regressing consumption growth on lagged income
with other control variables.
10We observe the year-over-year growth of quarterly consumption in the Peruvian sample and two-year-over-two-
year growth of annual consumption in the U.S. sample. Despite this difference in the growth units, the fact that the
standard deviation of the observed consumption growth in the Peruvian sample (45.3 percent) is in the same ballpark
as the standard deviation in the U.S. sample (38.7 percent) justifies the direct visual comparison of the two graphs in
Figure 2.2. To illustrate this point, in Appendix B.2.12, I plot 𝛿 𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 9 in the unit of the standard deviations. The
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These patterns support that liquidity constraints, rather than front-loading behavior, are the
main driver of the stronger MPC heterogeneity over the income deciles in Peru.11 12
2.3 The Role of Liquidity Constraints in the Cross-Country Mean MPC Gap
Once we accept that liquidity constraints are the main cause for the stronger MPC heterogeneity
over the income distribution in Peru, we can decompose the cross-country mean MPC gap into two
parts: (i) the gap caused by households being more affected by liquidity constraints in Peru than in
the U.S. and (ii) the gap caused by factors unrelated to liquidity constraints, such as cross-country
differences in preferences and interest rates. This decomposition can be conducted by identifying
a top income group composed of forwardly unconstrained households in each country. The MPC
gap between forwardly unconstrained households in Peru and those in the U.S. captures the gap
caused by factors unrelated to liquidity constraints.
To delineate a top income group composed of forwardly unconstrained households, I exploit
the fact that MPC should be homogeneous over the income within this group. I test whether MPC
is homogeneous for the top (10𝑛)% income groups for 𝑛 = 1, · · · , 10 by employing a statistical
test suggested by Davies (1977) and Davies (1987) as follows. Let 𝐺 be the top 𝑥% income
figure appears quite similar to Figure 2.2 and exhibits the same two main patterns discussed above.
11As discussed above, lower-income households are more likely to be constrained than higher-income households
because the former are more likely to have received negative transitory income shocks and want to run down their asset
position. If this is indeed the reason why we observe the two main patterns in Figure 2.2, we should observe the same
patterns when we group observations by income growth Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 instead of income level 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 because the income growth
also includes temporary income shock 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , as seen in equation (1.9). In Appendix B.2.11, I verify that this is indeed
the case. This robustness check can reduce the concern that the patterns in Figure 2.2 might be caused by some omitted
factors correlated with both the income level and the consumption growth. For example, if poor households tend to
experience higher inflation, the practice of deflating all nominal variables with the same CPI series can mechanically
generate the pattern of lower-income households exhibiting higher consumption growth. However, this explanation
cannot account for the fact that the same patterns emerge when observations are sorted by the income growth instead
of the income level.
12Admittedly, my analyses in chapters 1 and 2 use income grouping instead of wealth or liquid-wealth grouping
(which are more common grouping strategies in the literature) because ENAHO does not collect wealth information.
However, it is also noteworthy that the income grouping I use in chapters 1 and 2 might have an advantage in detecting
the effect of liquidity constraints compared to wealth or liquid-wealth grouping. In accordance with Aguiar et al.
(2019)’s finding, I find that the consumption growth of hand-to-mouth households in Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset is
not significantly greater than that of non-hand-to-mouth households, indicating that the former might not be necessarily
more constrained than the latter. In contrast, under the income grouping, we observe clear patterns in the same U.S.
sample that lower income deciles exhibit higher consumption growth than higher income deciles. Appendix B.3
provides further details of the discussion.
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group. For any 𝜔 ∈ [𝜔, ?̄?] ( [0, 1], let 𝐺𝑢 (𝜔) be the top (𝜔𝑥)% income group and 𝐺 𝑙 (𝜔) be
𝐺 𝑙 (𝜔) := 𝐺\𝐺𝑢 (𝜔). Let 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) be
𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) :=
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑙 (𝜔) − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑢 (𝜔)
𝑠.𝑒.
(
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑙 (𝜔) − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑢 (𝜔)
)
in which 𝑠.𝑒.(𝑋) represents the standard error of statistic 𝑋 . The test statistic for MPC homogene-
ity within group 𝐺, 𝑧sup
𝐺







The null hypothesis, ‘𝐻0 : 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑙 (𝜔) = 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑢 (𝜔) ,∀𝜔 ∈ [𝜔, ?̄?]’ is rejected in favor of the





For the implementation of the test, three specific details need to be discussed. First, in estimat-
ing 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) for a given value of𝜔, we cannot assume that 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑙 (𝜔) and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑢 (𝜔) are independent
because observations for the same household at different times are correlated and can belong to dif-















from the following moment conditions using the GMM method.
𝐸
[




(𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺] = 0, 𝑠 = 𝑢, 𝑙
𝐸
[
{Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝜔𝐺𝑠 − 𝜓
𝜔
𝐺𝑠
Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡} · 𝐼𝜔𝐺𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑡)
(𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺] = 0, 𝑠 = 𝑢, 𝑙, and
𝐸
[
{Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 (Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼𝜔𝐺𝑠 − 𝜓
𝜔
𝐺𝑠
Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡)} · 𝐼𝜔𝐺𝑠 (𝑖, 𝑡)




(𝑖, 𝑡) (𝑠 = 𝑢, 𝑙) is a dummy variable indicating whether observation (𝑖, 𝑡) belongs to
𝐺𝑠 (𝜔) or not. Standard errors are clustered within each household.
Second, we need to set the boundary of [𝜔, ?̄?] and discretize it to compute 𝑧sup
𝐺
. I set 𝜔 = 0.1,
?̄? = 0.9 and discretize it by the interval size of 0.01.
13Here, I restrict the alternative hypothesis to be one-sided instead of two-sided. This restriction can be supported
by both theory and the empirical evidence presented in chapters 1 and 2.
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Third, we need to set a rejection region. Davies (1977) provides a tight upper bound of sig-
nificance probability (𝑃[sup𝜔∈[𝜔,?̄?] 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) > 𝑐]) under the null hypothesis, and Davies (1987)
provides a way to approximate the upper bound with the data in use. Moreover, Davies (1987)
shows that the 𝑝-value computed by the approximated upper bound performs well in the author’s
simulation example in terms of the rejection probability being close to the targeted significance
level under the null hypothesis. Adopting Davies (1987)’s suggestion, I compute the 𝑝-value of












in which Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function, and
𝑉 = |𝑧𝐺 (𝜔1) − 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) | + |𝑧𝐺 (𝜔2) − 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔1) | + · · · + |𝑧𝐺 (?̄?) − 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔𝑛) |
in which 𝜔1, · · · , 𝜔𝑛 are the discretized points within [𝜔, ?̄?]. I reject the null hypothesis that MPC
is homogeneous in group 𝐺 if the 𝑝-value computed by equation (2.3) is smaller than 0.05.14
Figure 2.3a plots the 𝑝-values computed using equation (2.3) for the top (10𝑛)% income
groups, 𝑛 = 1, · · · , 10. This figure shows that in Peru, the top 10% income group fails to re-
ject the null hypothesis of the MPC homogeneity test, while the top 20% or larger income groups
reject it. In the U.S., the top 50% or smaller income groups fail to reject the null hypothesis, while
the top 60% or larger income groups reject it. Based on this result, in my baseline decomposition,
I delineate a top income group composed of forwardly unconstrained households in each country
by the Peruvian top 10% and the U.S. top 50% income groups, which are the largest top (10𝑛)%
income groups in each country that fail to reject the null hypothesis.
It is worth noting, however, that the Peruvian top 10% and the U.S. top 50% income groups
14Some econometric studies investigate similar problems with Davies (1977) and Davies (1987) in a specific econo-
metric framework and draw an asymptotic distribution of the test statistic for the sup test. The most closely related
setups to my econometric setup are those in Caner and Hansen (2004) and Andrews (1993). However, they require
assumptions that do not fit my econometric setup. Caner and Hansen (2004) study an IV estimation method of a
threshold model with endogenous regressors. Their method requires the threshold variable to be exogenous, but in my
setup, the threshold variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 is endogenous. Andrews (1993) studies tests for the parameter instability of the
GMM estimators. The method is for a change-point model or, equivalently, a threshold model in which the threshold
variable is time.
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(a) 𝑝-value of the MPC Homogeneity Test for the Top 𝑥% Income Group






(b) 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔), 𝜔 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] in Peru








(c) 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔), 𝜔 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] in U.S.
Figure 2.3: MPC Homogeneity Test for Top Income Groups
Notes: Figure 2.3a plots the 𝑝-values of the MPC homogeneity test for the top 𝑥% income groups, 𝑥 = 10, 20, · · · , 100.
Figure 2.3b and Figure 2.3c plot 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔)’s with varying values of 𝜔 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] for different top income groups in Peru
and the U.S., respectively. The vertical black line indicates where 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) is at its maximum for the Peruvian top 20%
income group in Figure 2.3b and for the U.S. top 60% income group in Figure 2.3c.
are likely to be strictly larger than the true largest MPC-homogeneous top income group. Figure
2.3b plots 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔)’s with various values of 𝜔 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] used in the MPC homogeneity test for
the Peruvian top 20% income group, which is the smallest top (10𝑛)% income group that rejects
the null in Peru. In the test, 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) is maximized at the 6.6 percentile from the top, which is
located within the top 10% income group. Moreover, Figure 2.3b plots 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔)’s used in the MPC
homogeneity test for the Peruvian top 10% income group and shows that 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) is maximized
around the 6.6 percentile from the top, again. These patterns suggest that the threshold for MPC
homogeneity is located around the 6.6 percentile from the top, which is located within the top 10%
income group, but the top 10% income group fails to reject the null hypothesis due to a lack of
power.
Similarly, Figure 2.3c plots 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔)’s with various values of 𝜔 ∈ [0.1, 0.9] used in the MPC
homogeneity test for the U.S. top 60% income group, which is the smallest top (10𝑛)% income
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group that rejects the null in the U.S. In the test, 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) is maximized at the 19.2 percentile from the
top, which is located within the top 50%, top 40%, and top 30% income groups. Moreover, in the
test for these smaller top income groups (the top 50%, top 40%, and top 30%), 𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) is maximized
around the 19.2 percentile from the top, again. These patterns suggest that the threshold for the
MPC homogeneity is located around the 19.2 percentile from the top, which is located within the
top 50%, top 40%, and top 30% income groups, but these groups fail to reject the null hypothesis
due to a lack of power.
Overrating the size of a forwardly unconstrained top income group can cause an overestimation
of the MPC of forwardly unconstrained households in Peru and a consequent underestimation of
the role of liquidity constraints in the cross-country mean MPC gap decomposition. In this sense,
the baseline decomposition provides a conservative estimate for the role of liquidity constraints.
To illustrate this point, I also conduct the mean MPC gap decomposition under an alternative
delineation of forwardly unconstrained top income groups, the Peruvian top 5% and the U.S. top
15%. These top income groups are chosen to be above the income percentile cutoffs that maximize
𝑧𝐺 (𝜔) in Figure 2.3b and Figure 2.3c, respectively.
Under each delineation of forwardly unconstrained top income groups, I decompose the cross-
country mean MPC gap into two parts (the gap between the two countries’ forwardly unconstrained
households and the gap caused by households being more affected by liquidity constraints in Peru
than in the U.S.) as follows.
Let G = {𝐺1, 𝐺2, · · · , 𝐺𝑛G } be a partition of the sample over the income distribution. For
example, when I split the sample by the income deciles, 𝑛G = 10 and 𝐺1, · · · , 𝐺10 represent the





𝐺 𝑗 ′∈G 𝑤𝐺 𝑗 ′
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 𝑗 (2.4)
in which 𝑤𝐺 𝑗 is the population weight of 𝐺 𝑗 and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 𝑗 is the MPC estimate of 𝐺 𝑗 . Let U
be a subset of G that is composed of forwardly unconstrained groups. The MPC of forwardly
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𝐺 𝑗 ′∈U 𝑤𝐺 𝑗 ′
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 𝑗 . (2.5)
Let 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑞 be the difference between 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛:






be the statistics computed using equations (2.4), (2.5),












𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛. (2.7)
The MPC gap between forwardly unconstrained households in Peru and those in the U.S.,
𝑀𝑃𝐶
𝑔𝑎𝑝





𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑈𝑆𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛. (2.8)
Under the assumption that liquidity constraints are the sole source of the stronger MPC het-










𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑃𝑅𝑙𝑖𝑞 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶
𝑈𝑆
𝑙𝑖𝑞 . (2.9)
In computing the standard errors of each country’s 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛, 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛, and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑞 in equa-
tions (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6), we cannot assume independence among 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 𝑗 ’s, 𝐺 𝑗 ∈ G because
observations for the same household at different times are correlated and can belong to different
groups. Therefore, I estimate them jointly using the GMM method in the same way that I jointly
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estimate 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑢 (𝜔) and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺𝑙 (𝜔) using moment conditions (2.2) for the MPC homogeneity test.
Standard errors are clustered within each household in the GMM estimation. In computing the





in equation (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9), I assume
independence between the Peruvian sample and the U.S. sample.
In the baseline mean MPC gap decomposition, I partition each country’s sample by the income
deciles and delineate a forwardly unconstrained top income group by the Peruvian top 10% and the
U.S. top 50%, as discussed above. Panel A of Table 2.1 reports the results. The gap between the
mean MPC of Peru (63.2 percent) and that of the U.S.(8.9 percent) is 54.3 percentage points. The
gap between the MPC of forwardly unconstrained households in Peru (29.9 percent) and that in the
U.S.(6.0 percent) is 23.9 percentage points. As a result, 30.4 percentage points, which accounts for
56.0 percent of the mean MPC gap (54.3 percentage points), is attributable to Peruvian households
being more affected by liquidity constraints than U.S. households.
Under the alternative delineation of forwardly unconstrained top income groups by the Peru-
vian top 5% and the U.S. top 15%, the mean MPC gap decomposition requires a finer partition than
deciles. For the finer partition, I group observations by vigintiles of the income. To see whether
the change in the partition itself affects the decomposition, in Panel B of Table 2.1, I conduct the
decomposition under the baseline delineation of forwardly unconstrained top income groups (the
Peruvian top 10%, the U.S. top 50%) and grouping by the income vigintiles. The numbers reported
in Panel B are quite similar to those in Panel A, indicating that the change in the partition itself
does not affect the decomposition in a meaningful way.
Panel C of Table 2.1 reports the decomposition results under the alternative delineation (the
Peruvian top 5%, the U.S. top 15%) and grouping by the income vigintiles. The mean MPC
gap in Panel C (53.8 percentage points) is similar to that in Panel A (54.3 percentage points).
However, the MPC gap between forwardly unconstrained households in Peru and those in the
U.S. in Panel C (13.3 percentage points) is substantially smaller than the gap in Panel A (23.9
percentage points). This is because the MPC of forwardly unconstrained Peruvian households in
Panel C (17.2 percent) is substantially smaller than the MPC in Panel A (29.9 percent) by 12.7
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Table 2.1: Decomposition of the Cross-Country Mean MPC Gap
A. Grouping by Income Deciles, Peru Top 10% and U.S. Top 50%
as Forwardly Unconstrained Income Groups
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑞
Peru 0.632 0.299 0.333
(0.028) (0.086) (0.081)
U.S. 0.089 0.060 0.029
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Gap 0.543 0.239 0.304
(0.031) (0.087) (0.082)
B. Grouping by Income Vigintiles, Peru Top 10% and U.S. Top 50%
as Forwardly Unconstrained Income Groups
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑞
Peru 0.627 0.319 0.308
(0.028) (0.083) (0.079)
U.S. 0.089 0.060 0.029
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Gap 0.538 0.259 0.279
(0.032) (0.084) (0.080)
C. Grouping by Income Vigintiles, Peru Top 5% and U.S. Top 15%
as Forwardly Unconstrained Income Groups
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑞
Peru 0.627 0.172 0.455
(0.028) (0.118) (0.114)
U.S. 0.089 0.039 0.051
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Gap 0.538 0.133 0.405
(0.032) (0.119) (0.116)
percentage points, while the MPC of forwardly unconstrained U.S. households in Panel C (3.9
percent) is only 2.1 percentage points smaller than the MPC in Panel A (6.0 percent). As a result,
40.5 percentage points, which accounts for 75.2 percent of the mean MPC gap (53.8 percentage
points), is attributable to Peruvian households being more affected by liquidity constraints than
U.S. households. The results in Panel C verify that the MPC gap decomposition can underestimate
the role of liquidity constraints when the size of the forwardly unconstrained top income group is
overrated. In this sense, attributing 56.0 percent of the mean MPC gap to liquidity constraints in
the baseline decomposition is a conservative estimation of its role.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter explores possible explanations for the main findings of chapter 1, namely, i) the
higher mean MPC and ii) the stronger MPC heterogeneity over income deciles in Peru compared
to the U.S., and disentangle them by examining relevant patterns appearing in the micro data.
Data patterns including participation rates in borrowing activities, consumption growth rates, and
the MPCs of forwardly unconstrained top income groups delineated by an MPC homogeneity test
suggest that liquidity constraints are important in accounting for both the higher mean MPC and
the stronger MPC heterogeneity in Peru.
In a growing literature examining how micro heterogeneity matters for the macroeconomy, re-
searchers have discovered novel mechanisms through which liquidity-poor households and their
consumption behavior affect macroeconomic dynamics or policy effects in the context of devel-
oped economies. The results of chapter 1 and chapter 2 suggest that these mechanisms could play a
significantly larger role in emerging economies. In this regard, these chapters also suggest that we
need a new macroeconomic model of emerging economies in which a large fraction of households
are affected by liquidity constraints not only during infrequent sudden-stop or sovereign-default
episodes but also even during normal times, and their consumption responses are as strong as the
empirical estimates of chapter 1. Examining the macroeconomic consequences of the liquidity-
poor households’ consumption behavior through the lens of such a new model would be an impor-
tant topic for future research in the field of international macroeconomics. In chapter 3, I construct
such a model and study the macroeconomic implication of the MPC gap between Peru and the
U.S. on their business cycle differences.
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Chapter 3: Emerging Market Business Cycles with Heterogeneous Agents
3.1 Introduction
One of the most salient patterns of emerging market business cycles is the phenomenon of
‘excess consumption volatility’: consumption is more volatile than output in emerging economies,
while it is not in developed economies. An extensive literature is devoted to explaining excess
consumption volatility, and the dominant modeling framework is representative-agent small open
economy models. At the heart of these models, representative households optimize according to
the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) because they can frictionlessly borrow from the interna-
tional financial market. More importantly, the widely accepted mechanisms for excess consump-
tion volatility in the literature crucially depend on the PIH behavior of households. However, micro
data suggest that the PIH is not a good description of the consumption behavior of households in
emerging economies. Chapter 1 estimates the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of tran-
sitory income shocks by applying a standard estimation method devised by Blundell et al. (2008)
to a Peruvian household survey and finds that the MPC estimates of Peru are substantially greater
than those of the U.S. obtained by the same method. Given that the MPC out of transitory income
shocks is close to zero under the PIH, this micro evidence suggests that the consumption behavior
of households deviates significantly from the PIH in emerging economies.
Motivated by this observation, this chapter revisits the driving mechanisms of emerging mar-
ket business cycles through the lens of a heterogeneous-agent small open economy model in which
households’ MPCs are as high as the empirical estimates from the Peruvian data. To the best of my
knowledge, this is a first attempt to study emerging market business cycles using a heterogeneous-
agent model. To achieve empirically realistic MPCs in the model, I introduce Kaplan et al. (2018)’s
two-asset environment over different degrees of liquidity into the model and calibrate the param-
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eters governing financial frictions for illiquid assets (which are incorporated as adjustment costs
for these assets in the model) jointly with the time discount factor by targeting the empirical MPC
estimates.1 I then take this model to Peruvian macro data through Bayesian estimation to explain
emerging market business cycles.
After the Bayesian estimation, the model successfully generates the stylized patterns of emerg-
ing market business cycles, including excess consumption volatility. To evaluate the role of high-
MPC households (or, more precisely, the role of the environment that makes households exhibit
high MPCs) in emerging market business cycles, I run a counterfactual experiment in which Peru-
vian households are replaced with those exhibiting U.S. MPCs, which are substantially lower than
Peruvian MPCs. Specifically, I recalibrate a subset of parameters including the time discount fac-
tor and the parameters governing financial frictions for illiquid assets by targeting the U.S. MPCs.
After the recalibration, I find that aggregate consumption volatility declines by 26%, and as a con-
sequence, the phenomenon of excess consumption volatility disappears. This result suggests that
high-MPC households play an important role in generating excess consumption volatility.
To examine the mechanisms through which high-MPC households contribute to the high con-
sumption volatility of emerging economies, I conduct three decomposition exercises: variance
decomposition, variance change decomposition, and consumption response decomposition. I be-
gin by decomposing the variances into the components generated by each aggregate shock in the
baseline Peruvian economy. This variance decomposition shows that consumption variations are
mostly driven by two aggregate shocks: i) stationary productivity shocks, which are the usual tech-
nology shocks in real business cycle models, and ii) illiquidity shocks, which change the degree of
illiquidity of illiquid assets by shifting their adjustment costs.2
Once I implement the same variance decomposition for the counterfactual economy in which
1I use a two-asset model because it can successfully target both the high MPCs and the correct amount of aggregate
wealth: households can exhibit high MPCs by being liquidity poor while they hold a large amount of illiquid assets.
In a one-asset model, on the other hand, households have to hold a small amount of assets to yield high MPCs. This
leads to an insufficient amount of aggregate capital, which is problematic for a business cycle analysis.
2As we shall see later, Bayesian estimation assigns a sizable explanatory power for consumption variations to illiq-
uidity shocks because of their crucial role in explaining a low correlation between consumption growth and investment
growth, which is commonly observed in Peru and other emerging economies.
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households are replaced with those exhibiting U.S. MPCs, I can decompose the variance changes
between the baseline economy and the counterfactual economy into the changes generated by each
shock. This variance change decomposition shows that consumption volatility substantially de-
creases in the counterfactual economy because both stationary productivity shocks and illiquidity
shocks generate significantly less consumption variation.
Ultimately, consumption is determined by households after they observe the variations in vari-
ables that are relevant for their optimization, including prices and the degree of illiquidity. I name
such variables ‘drivers’. To see why stationary productivity shocks and illiquidity shocks generate
substantially less consumption variation in the counterfactual economy, I decompose households’
total consumption response with respect to these shocks into the consumption responses to each
driver.
In response to a stationary productivity shock, I find that households’ total consumption re-
sponse is mostly driven by two drivers in the baseline economy: labor income per idiosyncratic
labor productivity and illiquid asset returns. In the counterfactual economy, the total consumption
response is substantially weaker because the responses to both drivers are substantially weaker. Im-
portantly, the responses to both drivers are weaker in the counterfactual economy despite the fact
that the equilibrium paths of the two drivers after the shock are similar in the two economies. These
observations reveal the first main channel through which high-MPC households contribute to ag-
gregate consumption volatility: the consumption of high-MPC households in emerging economies
responds to individual resource fluctuations (mainly generated by the two drivers) far more strongly
than that of the counterfactual households exhibiting U.S. MPCs.
In response to an illiquidity shock, households’ total consumption response is mostly driven
by the direct effect of the shock rather than by indirect effects through other drivers in the baseline
economy. The direct effect changes households’ consumption as follows. In my model, house-
holds allocate the vast majority of their savings to illiquid assets because liquid asset returns are
too low compared to illiquid asset returns.3 Because households face large financial frictions in
3The liquid and illiquid asset returns on the balanced growth path are calibrated to match the long-run average
values of deposit rates and lending rates in the data. On the balanced growth path, the aggregate amount of illiquid
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trading illiquid assets in the baseline economy, it is expensive for them to cash out their illiquid
assets when they need to do so by facing bad idiosyncratic income shocks. When an illiquidity
shock hits the economy and the degree of illiquidity increases, it becomes more expensive for
households to cash out their illiquid assets. In response to this shock, both households facing bad
idiosyncratic income shocks and those facing good idiosyncratic income shocks reduce their con-
sumption substantially. For households who face bad idiosyncratic income shocks at the moment
of the illiquidity shock, they need to cash out their illiquid assets to smooth their consumption, but
it is more difficult to do so because their assets are now more illiquid. As a consequence, they
fail to smooth consumption more significantly, and their consumption plunges. For households
who face good idiosyncratic income shocks at the moment of the illiquidity shock, they recognize
that it will be more expensive to cash out their illiquid assets for a while. Therefore, they prepare
themselves for situations in which bad idiosyncratic income shocks are realized in a near future
by reducing consumption and accumulating more buffer stocks. In the counterfactual economy,
this direct effect is substantially weaker because households face much weaker financial frictions
in the first place. Therefore, even if the degree of illiquidity increases, it distorts households’
consumption-saving decisions far more mildly in the counterfactual economy. These observations
reveal the second main channel through which high-MPC households contribute to aggregate con-
sumption volatility: their consumption plunges when assets become more illiquid because some of
them experience aggravated consumption smoothing failure and others come to have an enhanced
precautionary-saving motive.
There are existing theories for the excess consumption volatility of emerging economies based
on representative-agent small open economy models. I find that the driving mechanisms of excess
consumption volatility in these conventional theories do not play an important role in my model.
The key reason is that these conventional mechanisms require the PIH behavior by households,
while the high-MPC households in my model significantly deviate from it.
The first well-accepted theory in the literature is the one developed by Aguiar and Gopinath
assets is 51 times greater than that of liquid assets.
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(2007). The main mechanism of this theory operates through households’ strong consumption re-
sponse to a trend shock (or, equivalently, a shock to the growth of technology) as follows. When a
positive trend shock hits the economy, output not only increases today but also grows substantially
in the future. Representative households who follow the PIH increase their current consumption
substantially more than the current increase in output because their decisions reflect the large in-
crease in their permanent income due to the future income growth. Similarly, when a negative
trend shock hits the economy, households decrease their current consumption substantially more
than the current decrease in output because they recognize the large decrease in their permanent
income due to the negative future income growth. This mechanism enables representative-agent
models to generate excess consumption volatility.
In my model, the future output growth in response to positive trend shocks enters into house-
holds’ budget constraints through two channels. First, the future growth of aggregate labor income
enters into households’ budget constraints as the future growth of labor income per idiosyncratic
labor productivity. Second, the future growth of aggregate capital income is reflected in the asset
price of illiquid assets and thus enters into households’ budget constraints as a jump in illiquid as-
set returns on impact. Both channels make households’ idiosyncratic income profiles either more
increasing or less decreasing, and by this positive wealth effect, households would want to con-
sume more. However, there is a strong counteracting force in my model. The first of these two
channels also increases future idiosyncratic income risk (as labor income per idiosyncratic labor
productivity grows in the future), and households’ precautionary-saving motive becomes stronger.
In particular, because households allocate the vast majority of their savings to illiquid assets and
it is expensive to cash out their illiquid assets when they need to do so by facing bad idiosyn-
cratic income shocks, the amount of additional precautionary saving in response to the increased
idiosyncratic risk is large. This enhanced precautionary-saving motive offsets most of the positive
wealth effect, and as a result, the consumption response is substantially subdued. When negative
trend shocks hit the economy, the mechanism operates in the opposite way. The shocks make
households’ idiosyncratic income profiles either less increasing or more decreasing and generate
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a negative wealth effect. However, a weakened precautionary-saving motive offsets most of this
negative wealth effect. As a result, the consumption decrease in response to negative trend shocks
is substantially dampened.
The second well-accepted theory in the literature is the one developed by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). The main mechanism of this theory operates through households’ intertemporal substi-
tution of consumption in response to interest rate variations. Emerging economies face volatile
interest rate fluctuations, induced either by domestic economic conditions or purely external fac-
tors. These interest rate fluctuations change the relative prices of consumption between different
time periods. When representative households who follow the PIH face these interest rate fluc-
tuations, they intertemporally substitute their consumption. This intertemporal substitution can
generate large consumption variations without any significant variations in output. Representative-
agent models can explain excess consumption volatility by using this mechanism.
In my model, households cannot incorporate this mechanism well for two reasons. First, unlike
representative households whose consumption is solely determined by their lifetime wealth and the
degree of intertemporal substitution, the consumption-saving behavior of households in my model
is also substantially affected by the precautionary-saving motive. Second, the fact that households
in my model allocate most of their savings to illiquid assets makes it even more difficult for them
to shift resources across time.
This chapter is closely related to two strands of literature. The first is a recently growing lit-
erature devoted to understanding how microlevel household behavior shapes macroeconomic dy-
namics or the transmission mechanisms of economic policies. Well-known works in this literature
include Kaplan et al. (2018), Auclert (2019), Krueger et al. (2016), McKay et al. (2016), Auclert
et al. (2018), Bayer, Luetticke, Pham-Dao, and Tjaden (2019), and Oh and Reis (2012), among
many others. Many studies in this literature focus on the fact that even in advanced economies
such as the U.S., a sizable fraction of households exhibit MPCs that are significantly higher than
the MPCs predicted by the PIH. They examine how the model prediction changes once this fact is
realistically incorporated into the model. This chapter contributes to this literature by exploiting
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a different margin: the MPCs of emerging economies are substantially greater than those of de-
veloped economies. It finds that once this margin is incorporated, microlevel household behavior
matters for aggregate dynamics to the extent that it can actually explain one of the most salient
patterns of emerging market business cycles, namely excess consumption volatility.
The second literature is the one devoted to explaining the stylized patterns of emerging mar-
ket business cycles using macroeconomic models. Well-known works in this literature include
Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Uribe and Yue (2006), Garcia-Cicco
et al. (2010), Chang and Fernández (2013), and Fernandez-Villaverde, Guerron-Quintana, Rubio-
Ramirez, and Uribe (2011), among many others. All these studies are based on representative-
agent models. This chapter contributes to this literature by bringing new intuitions and tools re-
garding how household heterogeneity and microlevel behavior affect aggregate dynamics from
the first related literature, applying them in the context of emerging market business cycles, and
deriving new explanations.
In addition to these two most closely related strands of literature, this chapter is also related
to multiple other lines of research. In terms of methodology, this chapter has a commonality with
Bayer, Born, and Luetticke (2020) and Auclert et al. (2020) in that Bayesian methods are applied
to estimate a heterogeneous-agent model. Bayesian estimation requires a model to be solved a
large number of times. It only recently became possible to solve heterogeneous-agent models fast
enough to conduct Bayesian estimation thanks to the development of new computational methods.
The main contributors to this recent computational development include Auclert et al. (2019),
Boppart, Krusell, and Mitman (2018), Ahn, Kaplan, Moll, Winberry, and Wolf (2018), Bayer and
Luetticke (2020), Winberry (2018), and Reiter (2009). Among the new methods, I use the one
developed by Auclert et al. (2019).
This chapter is also related to studies that incorporate household heterogeneity into an open
economy model. In this line of research, the most closely related to my work is Guntin, Ottonello,
and Perez (2020). Guntin et al. (2020) compute the elasticity of group-average consumption to
group-average income for each of income deciles during crises characterized by a large consump-
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tion decline using micro data and use the empirical results to identify the driving mechanism of
the crises in a heterogeneous-agent small open economy model. There are also papers that study
monetary phenomena through the lens of a heterogeneous-agent small open economy model with
nominal frictions. De Ferra, Mitman, and Romei (2020) study how exchange rate fluctuations
induced by a large current-account reversal affect the economy through the revaluation of house-
holds’ foreign-currency-denominated debt. Sunel (2018) examines the welfare implication of a
large and gradual disinflation that emerging economies experienced over the past two decades.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides micro evidence on
differences in MPCs between emerging and developed economies. After specifying the model in
Section 3.3, I take the model to the data in section 3.4 through a two-step procedure that includes
calibration and Bayesian estimation. In section 3.5, I run a counterfactual experiment in which
households are replaced with those exhibiting U.S. MPCs. I then examine the underlying mech-
anisms through decomposition exercises in section 3.6. Section 3.7 examines the extent to which
the mechanisms of conventional theories are dampened in my model and discusses the economic
reasons. Section 3.8 concludes this chapter.
3.2 Micro Evidence
This chapter starts from the empirical finding of chapter 1 that MPCs out of transitory income
shocks in emerging economies are substantially greater than those in developed economies. To
obtain this finding, chapter 1 employs the method devised by Blundell et al. (2008), which is one
of the widely accepted MPC estimation methods in the literature. This method imposes a theory-
guided covariance structure on the joint dynamics of income and consumption and estimates the
MPCs from this structure. Specifically, chapter 1 applies this method to a nationally representative
Peruvian household survey, Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO), which is one of the rare
4These studies and my chapter 3 incorporate household heterogeneity in asset positions and labor productivity as
in Aiyagari (1994) and Kaplan et al. (2018). There are also studies that incorporate household heterogeneity in open
economies by introducing a finite number of different types of households, such as Cugat (2019) and Iyer (2015).
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emerging market micro datasets that satisfy the data requirements of the method.5 Then, the Pe-
ruvian MPC estimates are compared with the U.S. MPC estimates obtained by the same method
using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).6
In this section, I make a few revisions to chapter 1’s procedure that are necessary to use the
MPC estimates in disciplining the model presented in this chapter. These revisions include i) a
change in the consumption measure from nondurable consumption to total consumption (includ-
ing both nondurable and durable consumption) to be consistent with the aggregate consumption
measure, ii) a change in the sample periods necessary for the availability of some key durable
expenses regarding the first change, and iii) a change in the income process specification to be
consistent with the model specification in this chapter. I provide details of the MPC estimation
procedure, the three revisions, and data processing in Appendix C.1.
After reflecting these changes, the final Peruvian sample used in this chapter comes from the
2011-2018 waves of ENAHO. Because ENAHO is conducted annually and provides one quarterly
income and consumption per annual survey, we can obtain seven years of year-over-year growth
of quarterly income and consumption from this sample. From this data structure, we can estimate
quarterly MPCs of Peruvian households by applying Blundell et al. (2008)’s method. The blue
solid line with circle markers in Figure 3.1 plots the MPC estimates over the labor income deciles
of Peru.7 The shaded area around the line represents the 95% confidence intervals.
The final U.S. sample used in this chapter comes from the 2005-2017 waves of the PSID.
The PSID is conducted biannually during the sample period and provides one annual income and
consumption per biannual survey. Therefore, the PSID sample gives six years of two-year-over-
two-year growth of annual income and consumption. From this data structure, we can obtain
5Blundell et al. (2008)’s method requires household surveys to include both income and consumption. It also
requires a panel structure such that households have to appear at least three consecutive times.
6Specifically, chapter 1 uses the replication dataset of Kaplan et al. (2014b), which the authors construct from the
PSID to estimate Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameter upon which MPC estimates in chapter 1 are also
based. In this chapter, instead of reusing Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset, I reconstruct the U.S. data from the PSID to
incorporate the revisions discussed below.
7Admittedly, I do not use wealth grouping, which is a more common grouping strategy in the literature, because
ENAHO does not include wealth data. Instead, I use labor income grouping because it can effectively detect the dif-
ferent degrees of liquidity constraint effects. (For example, Zeldes (1989) detects the presence of liquidity constraints
by using lagged incomes as instruments.) See Appendix C.1.6 for details on how I construct the labor income deciles.
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Figure 3.1: Quarterly/Quarterized MPC Estimates in Peru and U.S.
Notes: Figure 3.1 plots the quarterly MPC estimates of Peru and the quarterized annual MPC estimates of the U.S.




)0.25. Shaded areas represent
95% confidence intervals.
annual MPC estimates of U.S. households using Blundell et al. (2008)’s method. To compare
the annual MPC estimates of the U.S. and the quarterly MPC estimates of Peru without resorting
to a model, here I adopt the frequency-conversion formula that Auclert (2019) uses for the same
purpose of comparing quarterly and annual MPC estimates:
1 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑄
𝐺




denotes the quarterly MPC and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐴
𝐺
denotes the annual MPC of group 𝐺.8
The red dashed line with square markers in Figure 3.1 plots the quarterized U.S. MPC estimates
according to this model-free frequency conversion (3.1) over the U.S. labor income deciles. The
shaded area around the line represents the 95% confidence intervals.9
Figure 3.1 compares the quarterly Peruvian MPC estimates and the quarterized U.S. MPC
8Auclert (2019) derives this formula by assuming that the response of quarterly consumption in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 to a
shock in period 𝑡 decreases exponentially in 𝑗 , and the interest rate is close to zero. He argues that this formula is a
good approximation in partial equilibrium Bewley models.
9When constructing the confidence intervals, the standard errors are also converted using equation (3.1) and the
Delta method.
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estimates. This figure reaffirms the empirical finding of chapter 1 that the MPCs of Peruvian labor
income deciles are substantially higher than those of U.S. labor income deciles.
One important disadvantage in this comparison is that the model-free frequency conversion
(3.1) cannot address the problem that the time frame applied to the Peruvian data is different from
that applied to the U.S. data: Peruvian households are assumed to be subject to quarterly income
processes and make quarterly consumption decisions, while U.S. households are assumed to be
subject to annual income processes and make annual consumption decisions. This discrepancy can
be directly taken into account once we have a model. I revisit this issue in section 3.5.
3.3 The Model
I construct a heterogeneous-agent small open economy model by combining i) the two-asset
household heterogeneity over liquid and illiquid assets of Kaplan et al. (2018)10 and ii) the stan-
dard emerging market, small open economy features of Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010).11 One difficulty
in combining these two structures is that conventional representative-agent small open economy
models already have their own two-asset environment between international debt and capital in
households’ optimization. Since there is no obvious one-to-one mapping between the former two
assets (liquid assets and illiquid assets) and the latter two assets (international debt and capital),
letting households decide all of them requires more than two assets and thus is subject to the curse
of dimensionality. I circumvent this problem by exploiting the following feature of conventional
small open economy models: there are multiple ways to decentralize the economy (while main-
taining the same set of equilibrium conditions), and one of them decentralizes it such that firms
face the two-asset problem between international debt and capital, and households only deal with
one asset, namely firm shares. I start from this decentralized version of the conventional small
10Note, however, that I do not incorporate the nominal rigidity of Kaplan et al. (2018)’s Heterogeneous-Agent New
Keynesian (HANK) model because the model is intended to be as close as possible to the conventional real models of
emerging economies except for household heterogeneity.
11The emerging market, small open economy features of Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) include free access to the
international financial market through which external debt is borrowed, the open goods market in which the gap
between domestic output and demand is offset by net exports, and capital adjustment costs that are necessary for small
open economy models to yield a realistic degree of investment fluctuations (because interest rates are directly affected
by exogenous shocks and thus highly volatile in these models).
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open economy model and incorporate the two-asset environment of Kaplan et al. (2018) into it by
revising the firm shares into illiquid assets (by introducing adjustment costs in trading the shares)
and additionally introducing liquid assets.
3.3.1 Households
A continuum of households live in this economy. Each household 𝑖 is heterogeneous in its
illiquid asset position 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1, liquid asset position 𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1, and idiosyncratic labor productivity 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 in
each period 𝑡. The illiquid assets are the shares of firms that households hold, and the liquid assets
are households’ bank deposits. Households face the following tradeoff between illiquid assets and
liquid assets: illiquid assets pay higher returns than liquid assets on the balanced growth path, but
households have to pay adjustment costs when accumulating or running down illiquid assets (while
liquid assets can be adjusted costlessly). Households cannot take short positions in both illiquid
assets and liquid assets. In each period, household 𝑖 solves the following optimization problem.
max








1 − 𝛾 (3.2)
𝑠.𝑡.
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1,
𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1, and
𝑏𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0, 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0.
In the households’ budget constraint, (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) is the gross return rate on illiquid assets, (1 −
b) (1+𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) is the gross return rate on liquid assets, and [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) is the adjustment cost for the
illiquid asset positions. Parameter b is strictly positive and 𝑟𝑎 = 𝑟𝑏 on the balanced growth path.12
The term 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑙𝑡 is the labor income of household 𝑖, in which 𝑤𝑡 is the wage rate per efficiency unit
12As we shall see in subsection 3.3.3, (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) is banks’ gross financing cost when they finance through intermedi-
ating household deposits. This financing cost consists of an intermediation cost b (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) that banks incur and a gross
return on household deposits (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ).
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of labor and 𝑙𝑡 is the labor supply. The labor supply is common to all households and determined
by the labor union of the economy, which will be specified in the following subsection.13
The adjustment cost for illiquid assets, [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1), is the product of two components: an
aggregate shock to the degree of illiquidity [𝑡 and the adjustment cost on the balanced growth path
𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1). For the functional form of 𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1), I closely follow Auclert et al. (2019)’s
discrete-time version of Kaplan et al. (2018)’s model as follows.
𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝜒1
 𝑣𝑖,𝑡(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜒0𝑋𝑡−1
𝜒2 ((1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜒0𝑋𝑡−1)
in which 𝜒0 > 0, 𝜒1 > 0, and 𝜒2 > 1, and 𝑋𝑡−1 is the stochastic trend of the economy.
Parameter 𝜒1 is the scaling factor for the adjustment cost, and it determines the overall im-
portance of the adjustment cost term in households’ optimization. As parameter 𝜒1 increases,
it becomes more expensive to trade illiquid assets. Importantly, when parameter 𝜒1 is higher,
households i) save more and ii) exhibit higher MPCs. For households facing bad idiosyncratic
income shocks, they need to cash out their illiquid assets to smooth their consumption. However,
it is more difficult to do so when 𝜒1 is higher, and therefore, they have to save more. Moreover,
13When individual households determine their labor supply under widely used preference specifications, the model
exhibits counterfactual patterns in important dimensions. When the labor supply is determined by individual house-
holds under separable labor disutility, the aggregate labor supply declines substantially during booms because of the
wealth effect. This phenomenon is common in macroeconomic models of emerging economies (including those with
representative households) because they are designed to exhibit large consumption fluctuations, which also generate
large fluctuations in the wealth effect. For this reason, macroeconomic models of emerging economies usually impose
the preferences introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) (GHH preferences hereafter) instead of
separable labor disutility because the wealth effect disappears under GHH preferences. In my model, however, when
individual households determine their labor supply under GHH preferences, another counterfactual pattern emerges:
the MPC estimates from the model become abnormally high compared to the estimates from micro data. This is be-
cause under GHH preferences, the per-period utility over consumption 𝑐 and labor supply 𝑙 is given by (𝑐−𝑔 (𝑙))
1−𝛾
1−𝛾 , and
thus households tend to smooth (𝑐 − 𝑔(𝑙)) rather than 𝑐. As a consequence, consumption comoves too strongly with
income.
Note that in the HANK literature, researchers also find that models exhibit counterfactual patterns when individ-
ual households determine their labor supply, although on different aspects than the counterfactual patterns that my
model exhibits under the individual labor supply decisions. Some researchers prefer to circumvent this problem by
introducing a labor union to which the labor supply decision is delegated. (See Auclert and Rognlie (2017) for a
detailed discussion of this issue in the context of the HANK literature.) In the same spirit, I introduce a labor union
to circumvent the problem caused by the individual labor supply decisions in my model. In particular, I write the
objective function of the labor union such that the aggregate labor supply equation is identical to that in a typical
representative-agent model with GHH preferences. See subsection 3.3.2 for details on the optimization problem of the
labor union.
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these households exhibit higher MPCs when 𝜒1 is higher because of the aggravated consumption
smoothing failure they experience. For households facing good idiosyncratic income shocks, their
precautionary-saving motive is stronger when 𝜒1 is higher because they recognize that it will be
more expensive to cash out their illiquid assets when they need to do so by facing bad idiosyncratic
income shocks in the future. Therefore, they prepare themselves for such cases by accumulating
more buffer stocks. Moreover, these households exhibit higher MPCs when 𝜒1 is higher because
of their enhanced precautionary-saving motive.
When parameter 𝜒2 is equal to one, the adjustment cost becomes proportional to the absolute
amount of illiquid asset position adjustment. As 𝜒2 increases above one, the adjustment cost
becomes less costly for rich households (who have higher values of (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1). Therefore,
parameter 𝜒2 captures how less costly it is for wealthier households to adjust their illiquid asset
positions. For this reason, parameter 𝜒2 is useful to make rich and poor households face different
degrees of financial frictions and thus have different MPCs. Later, I calibrate 𝜒1 and 𝜒2 (jointly
with 𝛽) to match the MPC estimates and aggregate wealth. I find that calibrating this small number
of parameters can effectively match the ten MPC moments over the labor income deciles and the
correct amount of aggregate wealth in the economy.
I assume that idiosyncratic labor productivity log 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is composed of a persistent component
that follows an 𝐴𝑅(1) process and a transitory component that follows an 𝐼 .𝐼 .𝐷. process as fol-
lows.14
log 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = log 𝑒1,𝑖,𝑡 + log 𝑒2,𝑖,𝑡 ,
log 𝑒1,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑒1 log 𝑒1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜖1,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖1,𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2𝜖1),
log 𝑒2,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜖2,𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖2,𝑖,𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2𝜖2).
14The labor productivity process specification in the model is consistent with the income process specification
imposed in the MPC estimation. When we generate individual households’ log labor income log𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 𝑙𝑡 from the
model and control for the time fixed effect as in the empirical MPC estimation, we obtain log 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 as the residual.
Therefore, log 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the model counterpart of the residual of log income, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , in the empirical MPC estimation. As
seen in Appendix C.1.1, the specification of the log 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 -process in the model is exactly equal to the specification of
the 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 -process in the MPC estimation.
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Let Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) denote the economy’s cumulative distribution function of (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)
in period 𝑡:
Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) := 𝑃(𝑒1,𝑡 ≤ 𝑒1, 𝑒2,𝑡 ≤ 𝑒2, 𝑏𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑏−, 𝑎𝑡−1 ≤ 𝑎−).
Moreover, let 𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), and 𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) denote the policy func-




2, 𝑏, 𝑎) =
∫
𝑒1,𝑒2,𝑏−,𝑎−
𝑃(𝑒1,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒′1 |𝑒1,𝑡 = 𝑒1)𝑃(𝑒2,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒
′
2)
𝐼{𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1,𝑒2,𝑏−,𝑎−)≤𝑏, 𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1,𝑒2,𝑏−,𝑎−)≤𝑎} (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) 𝑑Ψ𝑡
(3.3)
in which 𝐼{𝑋} (𝑥) is an indicator function (i.e., 𝐼{𝑋} (𝑥) = 1 if 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 , 0 otherwise).
Let 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , and 𝜒
𝑎𝑔𝑔



















[𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−) 𝑑Ψ𝑡 .
(3.4)
By aggregating the individual households’ budget constraints, we can obtain
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐴𝑡 + 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝐵𝑡−1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝐴𝑡−1 (3.5)
15 I attach the time subscript to the policy functions because they depend on the state vector S𝑡 , which includes
the distribution function Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), the stochastic trend 𝑋𝑡−1, other predetermined variables and exogenous
variables in the economy. I specify which objects constitute the state vector S𝑡 in footnote 18 after I complete the
model specification. Using the state vector S𝑡 , one can alternatively denote the policy functions as time-invariant
functions 𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−;S𝑡 ), 𝑏(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−;S𝑡 ), and 𝑎(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−;S𝑡 ).
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in which 𝑒 := 𝐸 [𝑒𝑖,𝑡] is the cross-sectional average of idiosyncratic labor productivity.
3.3.2 Labor Union
The labor supply decision is made collectively by the labor union. The labor union linearly
weights the cross-sectional average of labor income 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 and labor disutility 𝑋𝑡−1 11+𝜔 𝑙
1+𝜔
𝑡 in mak-











in which ^ > 0. As a result of the labor union’s optimization, the labor supply is determined by the
following equation.
𝑤𝑡𝑒
1+𝜔 = ^𝑋𝑡−1(𝑒𝑙𝑡)𝜔. (3.6)
Note that this aggregate labor supply equation is equal to that in conventional representative-agent
small open economy models with GHH preferences. In this sense, my model does not deviate from
the conventional models in the dimension of the aggregate labor supply.
3.3.3 Domestic Banks
There are an infinite number of representative and competitive domestic banks that finance
funds either by intermediating household deposits or by borrowing from the international financial
market and then lend the funds to firms. As introduced above, 𝐵𝑡 is the aggregate amount of
household deposits. Let 𝐷𝑡 be the banks’ debt from the international financial market and 𝐹𝑡 be
the amount of funds that the banks lend to firms. By construction, we have
𝐹𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 .
16In a model with stochastic growth, it is a common practice that labor disutility is augmented with stochastic
growth 𝑋𝑡−1. As explained in Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017), this practice technically enables the quantity variables
of the model to grow along the balanced growth path while labor supply does not in the long run. The augmentation of
𝑋𝑡−1 can be economically interpreted as an advancement of home-production technology, such as the popularization
of dishwashers and microwave ovens.
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(1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) is banks’ gross financing cost when they finance through intermediating household
deposits 𝐵𝑡−1. This financing cost consists of an intermediation cost b (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ) that banks incur
and a gross return on household deposits (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ). The banks can frictionlessly adjust their
sources of financing, and therefore, the financing cost is equalized between the two sources. In
other words, we have
1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 = 1 + 𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑡 ≥ 0 (3.7)
in which 𝑟𝑡−1 is the interest rate on the international debt 𝐷𝑡−1. Because banks are competitive and
there is no additional cost in lending funds to firms, banks lend funds 𝐹𝑡 to firms at interest rates
𝑟𝑡 .
3.3.4 Firms
There are an infinite number of representative and competitive firms that produce outputs 𝑌𝑡
using capital 𝐾𝑡−1 and labor 𝐿𝑡 , make investment 𝐼𝑡 to accumulate capital, and borrow funds 𝐹𝑡
from domestic banks. Moreover, they facilitate trade in their own shares (which are illiquid assets
from the perspective of households) and earn facilitation fees 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 .
17 Specifically, they solve the
following optimization problem.
max











a𝑡 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1,
17This is one way to return 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 to households. Alternatively, one could assume that the trade in firms’ shares
is facilitated by banks, illiquid assets are composed of banks’ shares and firms’ shares, and households can friction-
lessly and instantaneously adjust the proportion of the two shares within the illiquid asset portfolio. This alternative
specification yields the same equilibrium conditions.
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in which Π𝑡 is the per-period profit, Φ(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡−1) is an adjustment cost for the accumulation of
capital, 𝑧𝑡 is the stationary component of firms’ productivity, and 𝑋𝑡 is the nonstationary compo-
nent (or stochastic trend) of firms’ productivity. The variable a𝑡 is an aggregate shock to capital
accumulation: when a𝑡 is higher, firms need to spend a smaller amount of resources as investment
and capital adjustment costs to achieve the same amount of capital 𝐾𝑡 given the same amount of
previous capital 𝐾𝑡−1. This shock is often called an investment shock in the literature, and Jus-
tiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) study its role in U.S. business cycles. Firms discount
profit flows using return rates on illiquid assets. As we shall see in the following subsection, this
objective function is the total value of the firms because illiquid assets are the shares of the firms
that households hold.
3.3.5 Illiquid Asset Return and Price
Households’ illiquid assets are the shares of firms they hold. Let 𝑠𝑖,𝑡 be the share that individual
household 𝑖 holds when the total shares are normalized to 1. Let 𝑞𝑡 be the price of the illiquid assets
after the current profits are distributed as dividends. Since total shares are normalized to 1, 𝑞𝑡 also
represents the total value of the firms after distributing current profits. By construction, we have
the following equations.
𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝑞𝑡−1𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1, and
(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 = Π𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑞𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1.
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From these two equations, we can obtain
1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 =
Π𝑡 + 𝑞𝑡
𝑞𝑡−1
, 𝑡 ≥ 0. (3.9)









Therefore, the objective function of the firms’ optimization problem 𝐸0
∑∞
𝑡=0𝑄0,𝑡Π𝑡 is equal to
Π0 + 𝑞0. In other words, firms maximize their total value before distributing current profits. This
explains why firms discount profit flows with illiquid asset returns in their optimization.
It is worth noting how {𝑟𝑎𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 are determined in equilibrium. The illiquid asset returns from
period 1 onward, {𝑟𝑎𝑡 }∞𝑡=1, are subject to the following optimimality condition for firms with respect







= 1, 𝑡 ≥ 0. (3.10)
When we consider the impulse responses after an MIT shock (i.e., without aggregate uncertainty),
this equation becomes 𝑟𝑎
𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0. On the other hand, the illiquid asset return in period 0, 𝑟
𝑎
0 ,
is not determined by equation (3.10). Instead, 𝑟𝑎0 is solely determined by Π0, 𝑞0, and 𝑞−1 through
equation (3.9).
3.3.6 Interest Rates in the International Financial Market


















+ `𝑡 − 1 (3.11)
in which 𝜓 > 0, \𝑧 > 0, and \𝑔 > 0. 𝑟∗ is the long-run average of the interest rate, and ?̂?𝑡 is
the cross-sectional average of firms’ international debt. Individual firms regard ?̂?𝑡 as exogenously
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given, but in equilibrium, individual firms’ international debt 𝐷𝑡 is equal to their cross-sectional
average ?̂?𝑡 :
?̂?𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡 . (3.12)
?̃?∗ is the long-run average of ?̂?𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , 𝑌 ∗ is the long-run average of 𝑌𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1, and 𝑔∗ is the long-run
average of the gross growth rate of the stochastic trend, 𝑔𝑡 := 𝑋𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1. `𝑡 is an aggregate shock to
interest rates.
A reduced-form specification of the interest rates in the international financial market, as in
equation (3.11), is widely used in small open economy models for business cycle studies, particu-
larly when the models are intended to be first-order approximated with respect to aggregate shocks.
(See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), and Chang and Fernández (2013), for
example.) In equation (3.11), interest rates are determined to be higher when the economy’s inter-
national debt is larger and the productivities of the economy are lower. In this respect, equation
(3.11) reflects the theoretical implication of sovereign default models such as Arellano (2008) and
Mendoza and Yue (2012) in a reduced-form manner.
3.3.7 Aggregate Shock Processes
The model economy is hit by five aggregate shocks: a stationary productivity shock 𝑧𝑡 , a trend
shock 𝑔𝑡 , an interest rate shock `𝑡 , an illiquidity shock [𝑡 , and an investment shock a𝑡 . I assume
that each aggregate shock follows an AR(1) process as follows.
log 𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧 log 𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜖 𝑧𝑡 , 𝜖 𝑧𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2𝑧 ),
log(𝑔𝑡/𝑔∗) = 𝜌𝑔 log(𝑔𝑡−1/𝑔∗) + 𝜖𝑔𝑡 , 𝜖
𝑔
𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2𝑔 ),
log `𝑡 = 𝜌` log `𝑡−1 + 𝜖 `𝑡 , 𝜖
`
𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2`),
log [𝑡 = 𝜌[ log [𝑡−1 + 𝜖[𝑡 , 𝜖
[
𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2[ ), and
log a𝑡 = 𝜌a log a𝑡−1 + 𝜖 a𝑡 , 𝜖 a𝑡 ∼ 𝑁 (0, 𝜎2a ).
(3.13)
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3.3.8 Market Clearing and Trade Balance
The market clearing conditions are specified as follows.
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑒𝑙𝑡 (labor market), (3.14)
𝐹𝑡 − 𝐷𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 (liquid asset market), and (3.15)
𝑞𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡 (illiquid asset market). (3.16)
By Walras’ law, we can derive the following resource constraint (or, equivalently, the goods
market clearing condition in the open economy) using equations (3.5), (3.7), (3.9), (3.14), (3.15),
and (3.16).
𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 +Φ(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡−1) + b (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 = 𝑌𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐷𝑡−1. (3.17)
The trade balance of the economy 𝑇𝐵𝑡 is determined as follows.
𝑇𝐵𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐼𝑡 −Φ(𝐾𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡−1) − b (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1
= −𝐷𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐷𝑡−1.
(3.18)
3.3.9 Equilibrium
Given the initial conditions on Ψ0(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑋−1, 𝐴−1, 𝐾−1, 𝐷−1, 𝐵−1, 𝐹−1, and 𝑟−1,18
i) individual households’ policy functions {𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−),
𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=0 that solve the households’ optimization problem (3.2),
ii) cross-sectional cumulative distributions {Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=1 that evolve over time accord-
ing to equation (3.3),
18 Referring back to footnote 15, state vector S𝑡 is composed of predetermined objects Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑋𝑡−1,
𝐴𝑡−1, 𝐾𝑡−1, 𝐷𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑡−1, 𝐹𝑡−1, and 𝑟𝑡−1 and aggregate exogenous variables 𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , and a𝑡 . The initial conditions
in this subsection specify the predetermined objects of S0.
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iii) aggregate variables {𝐶𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 constructed by aggregating corresponding individ-
ual variables according to equation (3.4),
iv) prices and aggregate variables {𝑟𝑏𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡 ,Π𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡 , 𝐼𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 , 𝐹𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , ?̂?𝑡 , 𝑇𝐵𝑡}∞𝑡=0 sat-
isfying firms’ optimality conditions (including constraints) for their optimization problem
(3.8) and other equilibrium conditions (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16),
and (3.18), and
v) aggregate shocks {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0, which follow the processes specified in (3.13)
constitute the equilibrium of the economy.
3.3.10 Solving the Model
To study business cycles through Bayesian estimation, we need to solve a model a large number
of times. To this end, a model needs to be solved quickly (at least within a second). My model
is a heterogeneous-agent model with aggregate uncertainty, and it only recently became possible
to solve this class of models within a second thanks to the development of new computational
methods.19
Among the new computational methods developed, I adopt Auclert et al. (2019)’s method,
which computes the linearized dynamics of the macroeconomic variables (including aggregate
quantities and prices) based on Boppart et al. (2018)’s finding that the impulse responses after
an MIT shock are equivalent to the MA(∞) representation of the first-order-approximated model
with aggregate uncertainty. Under this method, deviations of the macroeconomic variables from
the balanced growth path caused by aggregate uncertainty are linearized, while the nonlinearity of
individual households’ decisions with respect to idiosyncratic uncertainty on the balanced growth
path is still preserved. Since this method uses the impulse responses after an MIT shock (i.e., no
aggregate uncertainty after a one-time shock) to recover the linearized dynamics of the original
economy with aggregate uncertainty, in Appendix C.2.1, I recharacterize the equilibrium under
19The main contributors to the recent development include Auclert et al. (2019), Boppart et al. (2018), Ahn et al.
(2018), Bayer and Luetticke (2020), Winberry (2018), and Reiter (2009).
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the circumstance in which the economy is subject to deterministic paths of aggregate exogenous
variables {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0.
Another important aspect in solving the model is that the quantity variables in the economy
inherit the stochastic trend, and thus, we need to detrend the equilibrium to make it stationary.
In Appendix C.2.2, I detrend the quantity variables and define a stationary detrended equilibrium
under deterministic paths of {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0. I then solve the detrended equilibrium using Au-
clert et al. (2019)’s method. Appendix C.2.3 briefly describes how the method works to solve
the equilibrium. Once the detrended equilibrium is solved, we can recover the original equilib-
rium. Appendix C.2.4 discusses how to recover the statistics of the original equilibrium from the
detrended equilibrium.
3.4 Taking the Model to the Data
The goal of this chapter is to study the stylized patterns of emerging market business cycles
appearing in macro data through the lens of a model that incorporates the degree of household
heterogeneity and consumption responses appearing in micro data. To achieve this goal, I employ
both calibration and Bayesian estimation. First, I calibrate a subset of parameters to match the
key empirical moments from the micro data. These micro moments include i) the estimates of
the labor income process, which is the ultimate source of household heterogeneity in the model,
and ii) the MPC estimates over the labor income deciles, which capture the degree of households’
consumption responses.20 Then, I estimate the rest of the parameters using Bayesian methods
and macro data. The parameters governing the exogenous shock processes are estimated in this
step. Through this Bayesian estimation, I run a horse race among different aggregate shocks to
identify the main drivers of emerging market business cycles. Conventional candidates in the
literature, including trend shocks and interest rate shocks, are included in the race. Note that
this two-step estimation procedure (calibration in the first step, Bayesian estimation in the second
20There are also parameters that I calibrate either by matching the long-run average statistics from the macro data
or by adopting commonly used values in the literature on emerging market business cycles, as we shall see in the
following subsection.
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step) is possible because the calibration in the first step is conducted by targeting moments on the
balanced growth path, and the Bayesian-estimated parameters in the second step do not affect the
balanced growth path of the economy.
3.4.1 Calibration
The time unit in the model is meant to be one quarter. Table 3.1 reports the calibrated param-
eters, calibrated values, and a brief description of the target moments or sources of information
used for the calibration. The parameters governing the labor income process are 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and
𝜎𝑒2 . These parameters are calibrated by applying Floden and Lindé (2001)’s method to the labor
income data from ENAHO, as discussed in Appendix C.1.1 .
On the balanced growth path, 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟
𝑏
𝑡 , and 𝑟𝑡 are all equal to 𝑟
∗. (See Appendix C.2.2.3 for
details.) I calibrate 𝑟∗ by matching the long-run average of the real lending rates in the data, 0.022.
The real lending rate series are constructed by deflating the data series on quarterly nominal lend-
ing rates for foreign-currency-denominated assets in 1992Q1-2017Q1 from International Financial
Statistics (IFS, hereafter) with the expected inflation on U.S. CPIs.21 22
Parameter b is calibrated such that the liquid asset return (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟∗) is matched with the
long-run average value of the real deposit rates in the data, 0.001. The real deposit rate series are
constructed by deflating the data series on the quarterly nominal deposit rates for foreign-currency-
21The expected inflation is constructed by taking the average of inflation rates in the current and past three quarters,
following Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Uribe and Yue (2006). Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) provide empirical
evidence supporting this practice.
22In the literature on emerging market business cycles, interest rate series are often constructed by adding J.P.
Morgan’s EMBIG spreads of sovereign bonds with real interest rates of U.S. 3-month Treasury Bills. (‘EMBIG
interest rates’ in this footnote). Instead, I construct real interest rates based on IFS data series (‘IFS interest rates’
in this footnote). I find that the EMBIG interest rates and the IFS interest rates are highly correlated (correlation
0.843), but their means are substantially different. In terms of the (nonannualized) quarterly rate, the mean of the
EMBIG interest rates is 0.007, while the mean of the IFS interest rates is 0.022. Given that the long-run average trade-
balance-to-output ratio in the model is targeted to its data counterpart, there is a one-to-one relationship between 𝑟∗
and the ratio of net foreign asset position (NFA, hereafter) to output, −𝐷𝑡/𝑌𝑡 on the balanced growth path through the
following equation: 𝑟∗ = 𝑇 𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡
𝐷𝑡/𝑌𝑡 𝑔
∗ + (𝑔∗−1). (This equation comes from equation (C.66) in Appendix C.2.2.3.) Using
this equation, I recover the value of 𝑟∗ that gives the exact long-run average value of the Peruvian NFA-to-output-ratio
in Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2017)’s dataset. The value of this 𝑟∗ is 0.025, which is much closer to the mean of the
IFS rates than to the mean of the EMBIG rates. Based on this observation, I use IFS interest rates instead of EMBIG
interest rates so that the model generates (𝐷𝑡/𝑌𝑡 ) close to Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2017)’s debt data on the balanced
growth path.
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Table 3.1: Calibrated Parameters for the Peruvian Economy
Description Value Target / source
labor income process
𝜌𝑒1 persistence of the AR(1) component 0.968 ENAHO𝜎𝑒1 S.D. of shocks to the AR(1) component 0.128𝜎𝑒2 S.D. of shocks to the 𝑖.𝑖.𝑑. component 0.470
long-run averages
𝑔∗ long-run average gross growth rate 1.004 𝐸 [𝑌𝑡/𝑌𝑡−1]
𝑟∗ long-run average lending rate 0.022 IFS, U.S. CPI
b long-run average spread 0.020 IFS, U.S. CPI
𝛼 capital income share 0.385 (𝐾/𝑌 ) (𝑟∗ + 𝛿)/𝑔∗
𝛿 depreciation rate 0.014 𝑔∗(𝐼/𝑌 )/(𝐾/𝑌 ) − (𝑔∗ − 1)
parameters from the literature
𝛾 inverse of IES 2.000 Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010)
𝜔 inverse of labor supply elasticity 0.600 Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010)
^ scale parameter of labor disutility 4.038 𝐿 = 1 on the b.g.p
targeting MPCs over the labor income deciles & Aggregate Wealth




𝜒1 scale parameter of illiquid adj. cost 1.347
𝜒2 convexity parameter of illiquid adj. cost 1.496
𝜒0 non-zero denom. in illiquid adj. cost 0.010
Notes: The time unit is one quarter. The abbreviation ‘b.g.p’ in the ‘Target/source’ column of parameter ^ represents
the balanced growth path of the equilibrium.
denominated assets in 1992Q1-2017Q1 from IFS with the expected inflation on U.S. CPIs.
There are other parameters that I calibrate by matching the long-run average statistics from
macro data. Parameter 𝑔∗ is calibrated by matching the long-run average value of (𝑌𝑡/𝑌𝑡−1) in
the quarterly national accounts in 1980-2018 from Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP,
hereafter). Parameter 𝛼 is calibrated by using the following equation on the balanced growth
path: 𝑟∗ + 𝛿 = 𝛼𝑔∗(𝑌𝑡/𝐾𝑡).23 Specifically, I compute the long-run average value of the capital-to-
output ratio using the annual capital stock and output series in 1980-2017 from Feenstra, Inklaar,
and Timmer (2015)’s Penn World Table (version 9.1). I transform the average annual capital-to-
output ratio to a quarterly ratio by multiplying by four and obtain a value of 10.906. Parameter
23This equation comes from (C.54) in Appendix C.2.2.3.
65
𝛿 is calibrated using another equation on the balanced growth path: 𝛿 + 𝑔∗ − 1 = 𝑔∗ 𝐼𝑡/𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡/𝑌𝑡 .
24 The
long-run average investment-to-output ratio is computed using the quarterly national accounts in
1980-2018 from BCRP, and I obtain a value of 0.191.
Parameters 𝛾 and 𝜔 are assigned the values used in Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), which are
common in related business cycle studies. Parameter ^ is calibrated such that aggregate labor
supply is normalized to be one on the balanced growth path.
Given the parameter values assigned above, parameters 𝛽, 𝜒1, and 𝜒2 are calibrated by targeting
the ten MPC estimates over the labor income deciles and the aggregate wealth of the economy (or,
equivalently, the aggregate amount of households’ asset holdings 𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡) on the balanced growth




(𝑇𝐵/𝑌 )𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 − (𝑇𝐵/𝑌 )𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
}2
+ (1 − 𝑤𝑇𝐵/𝑌 )
{ 10∑︁
𝑗=1
𝑤𝐿𝑌𝑑 𝑗 (𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑑 𝑗 ,𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 − 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑑 𝑗 ,𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎)
2
}
in which 𝑤𝑇𝐵/𝑌 denotes the weight on the first target (𝑇𝐵/𝑌 ), (𝑇𝐵/𝑌 )𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 and (𝑇𝐵/𝑌 )𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 denote
the trade-balance-to-output ratio on the balanced growth path of the model and its long-run average
value in the data, respectively, 𝑤𝐿𝑌
𝑑 𝑗
denotes the share of labor income in the 𝑗-th labor income
decile 𝑑 𝑗 in the model, 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑑 𝑗 ,𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 is the model-generated MPC in decile 𝑑 𝑗 , and 𝑀𝑃𝐶𝑑 𝑗 ,𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 is
the MPC estimate of decile 𝑑 𝑗 in the data.
In constructing the objective function 𝐽, I target the trade-balance-to-output ratio instead of the
wealth-to-output ratio (𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡)/𝑌𝑡 . I do so because there are no direct data on aggregate wealth,
𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵𝑡 . Given that there exist data on the capital-to-output ratio 𝐾𝑡/𝑌𝑡 and trade-balance-to-output
ratio 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 , however, the following long-run relationship among stock variables of the model
24This equation comes from (C.53) in Appendix C.2.2.3.
25As discussed in subsection 3.3.1, 𝜒1 and 𝜒2 affect both MPCs and aggregate wealth.
26For 𝜒0, I assign an arbitrary small number, 0.01, as the sole purpose of including the term 𝜒0𝑋𝑡−1 in the functional


























= (𝐴𝑡/𝑌𝑡) + (𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) + (𝐷𝑡/𝑌𝑡) on the b.g.p
⇒ (𝐾𝑡/𝑌𝑡) −
𝑔∗










in which b.g.p denotes the balanced growth path.27 In the last equation, I target the model-
generated value of the right-hand-side toward the data counterpart on the left-hand-side. Such
calibration can be achieved by targeting 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 only because in the step of calibrating 𝛼, the
model’s long-run average value of 𝐾𝑡/𝑌𝑡 is already matched with the data. I compute the long-run
average value of 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 using the quarterly national accounts in 1980-2018 from BCRP and obtain
a value of 0.043.
After the calibration of 𝛽, 𝜒1, and 𝜒2, the model generates both a trade-balance-to-output
ratio and an MPC graph over the labor income deciles that are quite similar to their data coun-
terparts, despite the fact that I only use three parameters to target eleven moments. First, the
model-generated trade-balance-to-output ratio on the balanced growth path is 0.042, and its data
counterpart is 0.043. Second, the model-generated MPCs over the labor income deciles are plotted
as a thick black solid line in Figure 3.2.28 In this figure, the blue solid line with circle markers
and the shaded area around the line represent the quarterly MPC estimates from ENAHO and their
95% confidence intervals, respectively.29 As this figure shows, the MPC graph generated from the
model closely tracks the MPC estimates from the data.
There is one additional noteworthy observation here. After the calibration, the aggregate wealth
27The first line comes from equation (C.69), and the derivation of the third line from the second line comes from
equation (C.66) in Appendix C.2.2.3.
28The model-generated MPCs of the labor income deciles are computed by simulating the consumption and income
of 1,000,000 households over nine quarters, constructing year-over-year growth of consumption and income over two
consecutive years, and applying to the simulated data the exactly same MPC estimation procedure applied to the actual
data (ENAHO).
29The blue solid line with circle markers and the shaded area around the line in Figure 3.2 are identical to those in
Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.2: Quarterly MPCs in Peru: Data vs Model
Notes: Figure 3.2 plots the quarterly MPC estimates from ENAHO and their model counterparts under the calibration
targeting the estimated Peruvian MPC graph.
is saved almost entirely in the form of illiquid assets. On the balanced growth path, the aggregate
amount of illiquid assets is 51 times greater than that of liquid assets. This outcome reflects how
households optimize when they face a large spread between liquid asset and illiquid asset return
rates: the latter (0.022) is approximately 22 times greater than the former (0.001) on the balanced
growth path.
3.4.2 Bayesian Estimation
I estimate model parameters 𝜓 (the debt elasticity of interest rates in the international finan-
cial market), 𝜙 (the parameter governing the capital adjustment cost), \𝑧 and \𝑔 (the sensitivities
of interest rates in the international financial market to stationary and nonstationary productivity
shocks) as well as parameters governing aggregate shock processes 𝜌𝑧, 𝜎𝑧, 𝜌𝑔, 𝜎𝑔, 𝜌`, 𝜎`, 𝜌[, 𝜎[,
𝜌a, and 𝜎a using Bayesian methods. Following previous studies that apply Bayesian methods to es-
timate representative-agent small open economy models using emerging market macro data, such
as Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) and Chang and Fernández (2013), I employ aggregate output, con-
sumption, investment, and trade-balance-to-output ratio series for the Bayesian estimation. These
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macro data series are from the quarterly national accounts of BCRP in the period 1980-2018.
Two specific details are worth noting in determining the counterparts between the model and
the data for the estimation. First, financial intermediation services Z (1+𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 in the model must
be designated either as final consumption or as intermediate consumption in national accounting.
I assume that they are designated as final consumption. Under this assumption, the model coun-
terpart of the final consumption in the national accounts, which I denote by 𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 , is determined as
follows. 30
𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 := 𝐶𝑡 + b (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1.
If the financial intermediation services are instead designated as intermediate consumption, the
model counterpart of output in the national accounts becomes 𝑌𝑡 − Z (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 (in which
𝑌𝑡 is gross value-added and Z (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 is intermediate consumption). However, because
Z (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 is very small relative to 𝐶𝑡 and 𝑌𝑡 in the model and does not fluctuate substan-
tially in equilibrium, whether Z (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 is designated as final consumption or intermediate
consumption has no meaningful effect on the results.31
Second, I use log output growth (Δ log𝑌𝑡), log consumption growth (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 ), log invest-
ment growth (Δ log 𝐼𝑡), and the first difference of the trade-balance-to-output ratio (Δ𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) in
taking the model to the data, as in Chang and Fernández (2013). Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010) use
the same set of statistics except for using 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 instead of Δ𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 . Both choices are acceptable
from a statistical perspective, as neither of them inherits a trend in the data and the model. I choose
Δ𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 over 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 because the countercyclicality of the trade balance, which is a common pat-
tern for both emerging and developed economies, is better reflected in the estimation when Δ log𝑌𝑡
is correlated with Δ𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 rather than with 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 .
30Superscript msd abbreviates ‘measured’.
31In real-world national accounting, financial intermediation services are labeled Financial Intermediation Services
Indirectly Measured (FISIM) and measured as follows. First, ‘reference rates’ are determined according to specific
rules such that they are located between lending rates and deposit rates. Second, FISIM is defined as the sum of the
following two components: the amount of deposits multiplied by the spread between reference rates and deposit rates
and the amount of loans multiplied by the spread between reference rates and lending rates. Third, the former compo-
nent is designated as the final consumption of depositors, while the latter component is designated as the intermediate
consumption of borrowers. Therefore, my assumption of assigning Z (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐵𝑡−1 to final consumption is equivalent
to assuming that the statistical agency determines the reference rates as 𝑟𝑡 .
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For the Bayesian estimation, I implement the Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RWMH)
algorithm described in Herbst and Schorfheide (2015). Specifically, I construct the posterior dis-
tribution by sampling 500,000 draws through the RWMH algorithm and burning the initial 100,000
draws. A successful implementation of the algorithm requires i) a good variance-covariance ma-
trix of the proposal distribution, which should be close to the variance-covariance matrix of the
posterior distribution itself after scaling, and ii) the correct scaling factor for the matrix, which
achieves an acceptance rate in the range 0.2-0.4. To this end, I run multiple preliminary stages
of the RWMH algorithm and its variant before the main RWMH algorithm through which i) the
draws of the chain move closer to the posterior mode, ii) the variance-covariance matrix of the pro-
posal distribution is updated to become closer to the variance-covariance matrix of the posterior
distribution after scaling, and iii) the scaling factor is updated to achieve the target acceptance rate
of 0.27.32
I impose a fairly flat prior distribution, as reported in the left vertical panel of Table 3.2. Re-
garding the autocorrelation coefficients of the exogenous shock processes 𝜌𝑧, 𝜌𝑔, 𝜌`, 𝜌[, and 𝜌a, I
assume that they follow a beta distribution after being scaled by (1/0.99) in the prior. The scaling is
to ensure that the autocorrelation coefficients do not exceed 0.99 under any posterior draw, as the
precision of Auclert et al. (2019)’s computation method becomes compromised when the economy
becomes too persistent.33 I set the mean and standard deviation of the beta distribution as 0.5 and
0.2, respectively, for all the autocorrelation coefficients except 𝜌𝑔. For 𝜌𝑔, I use 0.3 as the mean of
the beta distribution, reflecting the conventional view that trend shocks are transitory.34
The standard deviations of the exogenous shock processes, 𝜎𝑧, 𝜎𝑔, 𝜎`, 𝜎[, and 𝜎a, follow an
inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.02 in the prior distri-
bution. For the parameter governing the capital adjustment cost, 𝜙, I impose a gamma distribution
32The acceptance rate of the main RWMH algorithm is 0.271, which is close to the target.
33An acceptable degree of persistence depends on the length of the sequence used in Auclert et al. (2019)’s
sequence-space approach. I set the sequence length as 𝑇 = 300. (See Appendix C.2.3 for a brief description of
how their sequence space approach works.) Auclert et al. (2019) report that their two-asset HANK model, which has
an almost identical household block to my model, can be solved within an acceptable range of precision under an
autocorrelation coeffieicnt of 0.99 for the stationary productivity shock.
34See Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), for example.
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Table 3.2: Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Bayesian Estimation
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
density [meta1, meta2] mean S.D. [0.05, 0.95]
𝜓 Uniform [0.000,2.000] 1.623 0.294 [1.051,1.975]
𝜙 Gamma [15.000,15.000] 11.863 2.365 [8.073,15.854]
\𝑧 Uniform [0.000,2.000] 0.374 0.181 [0.091,0.692]
\𝑔 Uniform [0.000,2.000] 0.622 0.504 [0.035,1.651]
𝜌𝑧 0.99·Beta [0.500,0.200] 0.849 0.034 [0.794,0.905]
𝜎𝑧 Invgamma [0.010,0.020] 0.017 0.001 [0.015,0.019]
𝜌𝑔 0.99·Beta [0.300,0.200] 0.880 0.105 [0.725,0.960]
𝜎𝑔 Invgamma [0.010,0.020] 0.003 0.001 [0.002,0.004]
𝜌` 0.99·Beta [0.500,0.200] 0.484 0.198 [0.160,0.809]
𝜎` Invgamma [0.010,0.020] 0.005 0.002 [0.002,0.009]
𝜌[ 0.99·Beta [0.500,0.200] 0.835 0.147 [0.527,0.960]
𝜎[ Invgamma [0.010,0.020] 0.329 0.053 [0.243,0.418]
𝜌a 0.99·Beta [0.500,0.200] 0.451 0.129 [0.237,0.663]
𝜎a Invgamma [0.010,0.020] 0.036 0.008 [0.025,0.050]
𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑦 Uniform [0.000,0.007] 0.006 0.000 [0.006,0.007]
𝜎𝑚𝑒𝑐 Uniform [0.000,0.009] 0.009 0.000 [0.008,0.009]
𝜎𝑚𝑒
𝑖
Uniform [0.000,0.045] 0.044 0.001 [0.043,0.045]
𝜎𝑚𝑒
𝑡𝑏𝑦
Uniform [0.000,0.004] 0.004 0.000 [0.004,0.004]
Notes: Estimation is based on the quarterly national accounts of Peru in the period 1980-2018. In the prior density
column, ‘0.99 · Beta’ means that the corresponding parameter multiplied by (1/0.99) follows a beta distribution. The
column labeled ‘[meta1,meta2]’ reports the meta parameters of the prior distributions. For a uniform distribution,
[meta1,meta2] is [lower bound, upper bound]. For inverse gamma distribution and gamma distribution, [meta1,meta2]
is [mean, standard deviation]. For ‘0.99 · Beta’, [meta1,meta2] is [mean, standard deviation] of the beta distribution
part. Posterior statistics are based on 500,000 posterior draws from the RWMH algorithm, of which the initial 100,000
draws are burned.
with a mean of 15.0 and a standard deviation of 15.0 in the prior distribution. For the rest of the
parameters, I impose uniform distributions.








dard deviations of the measurement errors for Δ log𝑌𝑡 , Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 , Δ𝐼𝑡 , and Δ𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡 , respectively.
I allow these measurement errors to explain up to 6.25% of the variances of the observed variables.
The right vertical panel of Table 3.2 reports key statistics of the posterior distribution, including
the mean, standard deviation, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of the marginal posterior distri-
bution of each parameter. I highlight three notable features. First, the posterior means of 𝜎𝑔 and
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𝜎` are very small, implying that trend shocks and interest rate shocks might not play an important
role in explaining emerging market business cycles in my model. Second, \𝑔 is weakly identified,
which is understandable given that I do not employ interest rate series for the estimation.35 As we
shall see in sections 3.5 and 3.6, however, the key model statistics of this chapter do not inherit
the weak identification of \𝑔 because 𝜎𝑔 is very small. Third, the posterior mean of 𝜌[ is 0.835,
which is as large as that of 𝜌𝑧. Moreover, the posterior mean of 𝜎[ is 0.329, which is markedly
large. The combination of the high degree of persistence and the large standard deviation suggests
that illiquidity shocks ([𝑡) might play an important role in accounting for the business cycles. Of
course, we cannot compare which shocks are more important by simply comparing the autocor-
relation coefficients and standard deviations because they hit different objects of different sizes in
the economy. The variance decomposition in subsection 3.6.1 provides a formal comparison of the
relative importance of the shocks in explaining the business cycles.
3.4.3 Model Performance
Table 3.3 compares key business cycle moments between the model and the data after the
Bayesian estimation. This table shows that i) the Peruvian macro data exhibit the stylized patterns
of emerging market business cycles, and ii) the model simulates these patterns quite well.
First, the standard deviation of output growth is 0.027 in the Peruvian data. This number
is far beyond the average standard deviation of output growth in rich countries, 0.008, reported
in Table 1.6 of Uribe and Schmitt-Grohé (2017). In other words, the Peruvian data exhibit the
stylized pattern of emerging economies whereby output volatility is substantially greater than that
of developed economies. The model simulates this pattern well by generating an output growth
volatility of 0.029, which is similar to the data counterpart.
Second, the Peruvian data exhibit the stylized pattern of emerging economies whereby con-
sumption is more volatile than output (excess consumption volatility): the standard deviation of
35As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Garcia-Cicco et al. (2010), and Chang and Fernández (2013), interest rate
series are not used for the estimation because they are available only for substantially shorter time periods than other
observable variables.
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Table 3.3: Standard Deviations and Correlations: Model vs Data
Δ log𝑌𝑡 Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 Δ log 𝐼𝑡 Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡)
standard deviation
model 0.029 0.037 0.140 0.017
data 0.027 0.036 0.179 0.017
contemporaneous correlation
with Δ log𝑌𝑡 model 0.668 0.472 -0.229
data 0.682 0.437 -0.346
with Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) model -0.325 -0.539
data -0.318 -0.460
with Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 model -0.155
data -0.158
autocorrelation
with lag 1 model -0.035 -0.035 -0.153 0.010
data 0.404 0.078 -0.304 0.023
with lag 2 model -0.027 -0.052 -0.078 -0.090
data 0.009 0.036 -0.094 -0.077
with lag 3 model -0.020 -0.049 -0.046 -0.099
data -0.090 -0.112 0.026 -0.061
Notes: The model statistics are computed under each posterior draw, and the means over the posterior distribution are
reported in this table.
consumption growth (0.036) is markedly greater than the standard deviation of output growth
(0.027) in the Peruvian data. The model again simulates this stylized pattern well by generating
a standard deviation of consumption growth (0.037) that is substantially greater than the standard
deviation of output growth (0.029).
In addition to these well-known stylized patterns of emerging market business cycles, the model
also closely matches other business cycle moments reported in Table 3.3, including the standard
deviations of other variables, contemporaneous correlations, and autocorrelations.36 In Appendix
36One exception is the autocorrelation of Δ log𝑌𝑡 with a one-quarter lag: the model yields -0.035, which is no-
ticeably smaller than the data counterpart, 0.404. However, this discrepancy quickly dissipates from a two-quarter
lag forward. Given that this discrepancy survives only one quarter and that output growth variations almost entirely
come from stationary productivity shocks, as we shall see in subsection 3.6.1, it is likely that replacing the conven-
tional AR(1) process of stationary productivity shocks with an ARMA(1,1) process can fix this discrepancy. I do not
impose this unconventional assumption, however, because the model aims to minimize changes from the conventional
representative-agent models other than the heterogeneous household block with high MPCs.
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C.3, I further compare the cross-autocorrelograms between the model and the data and find that
the model again closely mimics the data.
I highlight one more moment in Table 3.3 for later discussion, although it has received less
attention in the literature to date. The correlation between consumption growth and investment
growth is substantially lower than one in the Peruvian data.37 Moreover, low correlation between
consumption growth and investment growth is not an abnormal phenomenon of the Peruvian data:
I find that the correlation of emerging countries is 0.189 on average and that of developed countries
is 0.278 on average.38 The model successfully simulates this pattern by generating a correlation
(-0.158) that is substantially lower than one.
3.5 Counterfactual Experiment
To what extent do high-MPC households (or, more precisely, the environment that makes
households exhibit high MPCs) contribute to the large consumption volatility of emerging economies?
To answer this question, I conduct a counterfactual experiment in which I replace the Peruvian
households with those exhibiting the U.S. MPCs. I then examine whether the phenomenon of
excess consumption volatility survives.
To this end, I recalibrate the parameters that I use to target the Peruvian MPCs in the baseline
calibration, including the parameters governing the adjustment cost for illiquid assets (𝜒1 and 𝜒2)
and the time discount factor (𝛽). These parameters are recalibrated by targeting the ten MPC
estimates of the U.S. labor income deciles from the PSID and the Peruvian trade-balance-to-output
ratio.39 As discussed in subsection 3.4.1, targeting the trade-balance-to-output ratio disciplines
37It is indeed negative in the Peruvian data, but as we shall see in the later discussion, what matters in this chapter
is not its being negative but being substantially less than one.
38 In computing the average correlation for emerging countries and developed countries, I use the quarterly macro
data series and country categorization used for the business cycle statistics in the first chapter of Uribe and Schmitt-
Grohé (2017). From the data set, sample countries are selected if all five data series of output, investment, exports,
imports, and consumption are available for at least twenty years. After the sample selection, 16 emerging countries
and 17 rich countries remain in the sample. In averaging the correlation over multiple countries, I use population
weights.
39Although 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 are important determinants of the MPCs in the model, there are other parameters that
also affect MPCs. Such parameters include the difference in return rates between liquid and illiquid assets b and
the parameters governing the labor productivity process 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and 𝜎𝑒2 . In Appendix C.4, I run an alternative
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Table 3.4: Recalibrated Parameters for the Counterfactual Economy
Description Value Target / source
targeting MPCs over the labor income deciles & Aggregate Wealth




𝜒1 scale parameter of illiquid adj. cost 0.246
𝜒2 convexity parameter of illiquid adj. cost 1.366
the model to have the correct amount of aggregate wealth on the balanced growth path. I target
the Peruvian (not U.S.) trade-balance-to-output ratio because the recalibration aims to minimize
changes in the economy other than households’ MPCs. In targeting the U.S. MPC estimates from
the PSID, I face a frequency mismatch problem between the model and the data: the PSID provides
annual income and consumption, while one period is set equal to one quarter in the model. This
frequency mismatch problem is addressed as follows: I simulate annual consumption and income
series by aggregating model-generated quarterly consumption and income series over every four
quarters and then apply to the simulated annual data the same MPC estimation procedure applied to
the PSID data.40 By doing so, I directly target the annual MPC estimates from the PSID rather than
targeting the quarterized estimates according to Auclert (2019)’s model-free frequency conversion
formula presented in section 3.2.
Table 3.4 reports the values of the recalibrated parameters. The value of 𝜒1 (0.246) under
the recalibration is markedly lower than the value (1.347) under the baseline calibration in Table
3.1. This is because the U.S. MPC estimates discipline the model to exhibit lower MPCs than
the Peruvian MPC estimates do. As discussed in subsection 3.3.1, a lower value of 𝜒1 weakens
financial frictions and thus decreases the MPCs of households. On the other hand, the value of
𝛽 (0.968) under the recalibration is noticeably greater than the value (0.948) under the baseline
counterfactual experiment in which these parameters are also recalibrated. Specifically, I recalibrate b, 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and
𝜎𝑒2 using relevant U.S. data first and then recalibrate 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 by targeting the U.S. MPC estimates and the
Peruvian trade-balance-to-output ratio. I find that the results do not change in any meaningful way.
40Specifically, the PSID provides two-year-over-two-year growth of annual income and consumption because the
survey is conducted biannually, and each wave provides only one annual consumption and income. To create the
same data structure, I simulate the consumption and income of 1,000,000 households over twenty quarters, convert
the twenty-quarter quarterly series into five-year annual series by aggregating them over every four quarters, and
construct two consecutive two-year-over-two-year growth rates of annual income and consumption. I then apply the
same estimation procedure used in the PSID to the simulated data.
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Figure 3.3: Annual MPCs in U.S.: Data vs Model
Notes: Figure 3.3 plots the annual MPC estimates from the PSID and their model counterparts under the calibration
targeting the estimated U.S. MPC graph. In computing the model counterparts of the estimates, I simulate annual
consumption and income series by aggregating model-generated quarterly consumption and income series over every
four quarters and then apply to the simulated annual data the same MPC estimation procedure applied to the PSID
data.
calibration. This is because households save less under the lower value of 𝜒1 as discussed in
subsection 3.3.1, and this weaker saving due to the lower value of 𝜒1 needs to be compensated by
a higher value of 𝛽 to match the correct amount of aggregate wealth in the counterfactual economy.
After the recalibration, both the model-generated trade-balance-to-output ratio and the MPC
graph over the labor income deciles closely match their data counterparts in the counterfactual
economy. The model-generated trade-balance-to-output ratio on the balanced growth path is 0.041,
and its data counterpart is 0.043. The model counterparts of the U.S. MPC estimates are plotted as
a thick black dashed line in Figure 3.3. In this figure, the red dashed line with square markers and
the shaded area around the line represent the the annual MPC estimates from the PSID and their
95% confidence intervals, respectively.41 As this figure shows, the model-generated MPC graph
closely tracks the estimates from the PSID.
Referring back to the problem of time-frame inconsistency under the model-free frequency
41The red dashed line with square markers and the shaded area around the line in Figure 3.3 are different from
those in Figure 3.1 because the latter is the quarterized version of the former according to equation (3.1).
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Figure 3.4: Model-Predicted Quarterly MPCs: Peru and U.S.
Notes: Figure 3.4 compares the model-predicted quarterly MPCs between the baseline economy, which is calibrated
by targeting the quarterly Peruvian MPC estimates, and the counterfactual economy, which is calibrated by targeting
the annual U.S. MPC estimates.
conversion (3.1) in section 3.2, we can now compare Peruvian and U.S. MPCs without this prob-
lem by using the model. Figure 3.4 compares the model-predicted quarterly MPCs between the
baseline economy, which is calibrated by targeting the quarterly Peruvian MPC estimates, and the
counterfactual economy, which is calibrated by targeting the annual U.S. MPC estimates. Two
important observations are made from the comparison between Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.1. First,
the MPC gap between Peru and the U.S. predicted by the model in Figure 3.4 is narrower than that
predicted by the model-free frequency conversion (3.1) in Figure 3.1. Second, despite this ten-
dency, the model still predicts a substantial MPC gap between Peru and the U.S. In Figure 3.4, the
population-weighted average of the Peruvian quarterly MPCs is 0.223, which is 2.0 times greater
than that of the U.S. quarterly MPCs, 0.114. In terms of income-weighted averages, the average
Peruvian quarterly MPC is 0.175, which is 2.1 times greater than the average U.S. MPC, 0.084.
Figure 3.4 suggests that the MPCs of Peruvian households are substantially higher than the
MPCs of U.S. households when we interpret the MPC estimation results through the lens of the
model. Now, we are ready to examine the business cycle implications of this MPC gap.
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Table 3.5: The Absence of Excess Consumption Volatility in the Counterfactual Economy
𝜎(Δ log𝑌𝑡) 𝜎(Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )
𝜎(Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )
𝜎(Δ log𝑌𝑡 )
Baseline 0.029 0.037 1.283
(0.002) (0.002) (0.075)
Counterfactual 0.028 0.027 0.963
(0.002) (0.002) (0.069)
Notes: The statistics are computed under each posterior draw, and their means and standard deviations over the
posterior distribution are reported in this table. The numbers in parentheses are the posterior standard deviations.
Table 3.5 compares the output growth volatility, consumption growth volatility, and the ratio
of the two between the baseline economy and the counterfactual economy. As the first column
shows, the output growth volatility of the counterfactual economy is similar to that of the baseline




1−𝛼. Because 𝐾𝑡−1 is a slow-moving variable and 𝐿𝑡 is determined by 𝑧𝑡 , 𝑋𝑡 , and
𝐾𝑡−1 (through the labor union’s labor supply decision (3.6) and firms’ hiring decision (C.15)), the
processes of 𝑧𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡 almost entirely determine output volatility. Given this feature of the model,
it is not surprising that output volatility is similar between the two economies.
Regarding consumption volatility, on the other hand, there is a substantial difference between
the two economies. As reported in the second column of Table 3.5, the standard deviation of con-
sumption growth is 0.027 in the counterfactual economy, which is 25.8% lower than that of the
baseline economy, 0.037. As a consequence, the ratio between the consumption volatility and out-
put volatility, 𝜎(Δ log𝐶
𝑚𝑠𝑑
𝑡 )
𝜎(Δ log𝑌𝑡 ) , falls from 1.283 in the baseline economy to 0.963 in the counterfactual
economy. In other words, the stylized pattern of emerging economies whereby consumption is
more volatile than output, namely, excess consumption volatility, disappears once Peruvian house-
holds are counterfactually replaced with those with U.S. MPCs. This result strongly suggests that
the high-MPC households in the Peruvian economy generate excess consumption volatility.
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3.6 Driving Mechanisms
Through which mechanisms do the high-MPC households in emerging economies contribute to
the large aggregate consumption volatility? To answer this question, this section conducts three de-
composition exercises: variance decomposition, variance change decomposition, and consumption
response decomposition.
3.6.1 Variance Decomposition
I begin by decomposing the variances of observable variables into the variances generated by
each aggregate shock. Table 3.6 reports the result of this variance decomposition. To understand
the variance decomposition result, in Figure 3.5, I plot the impulse responses of output (𝑌𝑡), con-
sumption (𝐶𝑡), investment (𝐼𝑡), and the trade-balance-to-output ratio (𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) in terms of their
deviations from the balanced growth path after each one-standard-deviation aggregate shock.42 43
Table 3.6 shows that output growth variations are almost entirely driven by stationary produc-
tivity shocks. To generate large variations in output growth (or equivalently, the first difference in
log output), a shock should generate a large response on impact because an abrupt output change
is needed. As the (1,3)-th, (1,4)-th, and (1,5)-th panels of Figure 3.5 suggest, interest rate shocks,
illiquidity shocks, and investment shocks cannot generate any large output response on impact.
Given this feature of the model, the actual candidates for output growth variations are stationary
productivity shocks and trend shocks.
In the model of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), representative households’ strong consumption
response to a trend shock on impact that is substantially stronger than the output response on im-
pact is the key feature of the model that enables it to generate the stylized patterns of emerging
market business cycles, including excess consumption volatility and a countercyclical trade bal-
42In the figures plotting the impulse responses of consumption, such as Figure 3.5, I plot the impulse responses of
𝐶, not 𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑 . The differences between the impulse responses of 𝐶 and those of 𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑 are negligibly small.
43Appendix C.5 presents impulse responses for a more comprehensive set of model variables. In particular, Ap-
pendix C.5.1 presents the impulse responses in the baseline economy with 90-percent credible bands over the posterior
distribution, and Appendix C.5.2 compares the impulse responses between the baseline economy and the counterfac-
tual economy.
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Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition
Δ log𝑌𝑡 Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 Δ log 𝐼𝑡 Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡)
stationary productivity shock (𝑧𝑡) 0.961 0.423 0.228 0.075
(0.019) (0.051) (0.048) (0.040)
trend shock (𝑔𝑡) 0.034 0.023 0.091 0.230
(0.019) (0.011) (0.041) (0.103)
interest rate shock (`𝑡) 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.034
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.032)
illiquidity shock ([𝑡) 0.003 0.423 0.310 0.144
(0.001) (0.054) (0.050) (0.040)
investment shock (a𝑡) 0.002 0.130 0.365 0.518
(0.001) (0.046) (0.066) (0.091)
total 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The statistics of decomposed shares are computed under each posterior draw, and their means and standard
deviations over the posterior distribution are reported in this table. The numbers in parentheses are the posterior
standard deviations.
ance. Unlike this model, however, my model does not exhibit this feature. As seen from the
(2,2)-th panel of Figure 3.5, the consumption response to a trend shock is not much greater than
the output response on impact. Instead, the consumption response grows gradually in the subse-
quent periods as the output response does.44 As a result, the ability of trend shocks to account for
emerging market business cycles is significantly limited in my model, and the model assigns all
the explanatory power for the output growth variations to stationary productivity shocks.
Regarding consumption growth variations, Table 3.6 shows that most of the variations are ex-
plained in equal parts by stationary productivity shocks and illiquidity shocks. To understand why
illiquidity shocks are assigned a sizable explanatory power for consumption growth variations,
we need to focus on the correlation between consumption growth and investment growth. As the
(2,1)-th, (3,1)-th, (2,2)-th, (3,2)-th, (2,3)-th, and (3,3)-th panels of Figure 3.5 suggest, stationary
productivity shocks, trend shocks, and interest rate shocks generate a strongly positive correlation
between consumption growth and investment growth because the impact effects of these shocks on
consumption and investment are in the same direction. However, as Table 3.3 shows, the correla-
























































































































































































Figure 3.5: Impulse Responses of Output (𝑌 ), Consumption (𝐶), Investment (𝐼),
and the Trade-Balance-to-Output Ratio (𝑇𝐵/𝑌 ) to 1 S.D. Shocks
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The unit on the 𝑦-axis in the first three rows is ‘ratio dev from bgp(%)’,
which represents the deviation divided by the value on the balanced growth path, expressed in percent. The unit on
the 𝑦-axis in the last row is ‘level dev from bgp(%)’, which represents the deviation itself, expressed in percent. The
impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the posterior distribution are plotted
in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90% credible bands over the posterior distribution.
81
tion is substantially lower than one in the data. Provided that stationary productivity shocks play
a very large role in generating output growth variations and thus also generate a sizable amount
of consumption growth variations that are strongly positively correlated with investment growth
variations, the model seeks a shock that can generate a negative correlation between consumption
growth and investment growth. As the (2,4)-th, (3,4)-th, (2,5)-th, and (3,5)-th panels of Figure 3.5
suggest, illiquidity shocks and investment shocks can generate a strong negative correlation. Be-
tween the two shocks, the model assigns a greater explanatory power for the consumption growth
variations to illiquidity shocks.45
Illiquidity shocks generate a strong negative correlation between consumption growth and in-
vestment growth for the following reasons. When the degree of illiquidity increases, households
increase saving, as discussed in 3.3.1. As a result, aggregate consumption decreases while aggre-
gate wealth increases. Since the aggregate wealth is almost entirely saved in illiquid assets, which
are firms’ shares, the greater amount of illiquid assets should be explained by a greater amount
of investment from the perspective of firms.46 As a consequence, aggregate consumption plunges
while investment jumps in response to a positive illiquidity shock.
Table 3.6 also reports the variance decomposition of investment growth and the first difference
in the trade-banace-to-output ratio. More than 65 percent of the investment growth variations are
explained in equal parts by investment shocks and illiquidity shocks, and stationary productivity
shocks also contribute to the variations to a lesser extent. More than half of the variations of the
45Between the two shocks that generate a negative correlation between consumption growth and investment growth,
illiquidity shocks generate consumption growth variations (relative to investment growth variations) more intensely
than investment shocks. In terms of the ratio between the absolute size of the impact effect on consumption and that on
investment, illiquidity shocks yield approximately 1/3.5, while investment shocks yield approximately 1/5. Given this
feature of the model, if we Bayesian estimate an advanced economy that features low consumption volatility and a low
correlation between consumption growth and investment growth in its macro data, a sizable fraction of consumption
variations might be captured by investment shocks instead of illiquidity shocks. (As discussed in footnote 38, advanced
economies also tend to have a low correlation between consumption growth and investment growth.)
46The economic mechanism behind this investment increase is as follows. As a result of households’ increased
demand for illiquid assets in response to illiquidity shocks, illiquid asset price jumps on impact, and then gradually
returns to its value on the balanced growth path. Therefore, illiquid asset return jumps on impact, plunges to a negative
value in period 1 (due to the asset price jump in period 0), and then gradually returns to its value on the balanced growth
path. Because firms discount profits with illiquid asset returns, and their investment decision in period 𝑡 is directly
affected by the illiquid asset return in period 𝑡 + 1, investment jumps on impact, and gradually returns to its value on
the balanced growth path. See impulse responses to illiquidity shocks in Figure C.9 for the graphical illustration of the
mechanism.
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first difference in the trade-balanace-to-output-ratio are explained by investment shocks, and trend
shocks and illiquidity shocks also contribute to the variations to a lesser extent.
3.6.2 Variance Change Decomposition
In subsection 3.6.1, I conduct the variance decomposition for the baseline economy. Once
I implement the same variance decomposition for the counterfactual economy calibrated to the
U.S. MPCs in section 3.5, I can examine which shock is responsible for the variance change
between the two economies. Specifically, I decompose the variance changes from the base-
line economy to the counterfactual economy into the changes generated by each shock as fol-
lows. Let 𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 be the variance of consumption growth and 𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 ,
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ {𝑧, 𝑔, `, [, a} be the variances decomposed by each shock in the baseline economy. Sim-
ilarly, let 𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 be the variance of consumption growth, and 𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 ,
𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 ∈ {𝑧, 𝑔, `, [, a} be the variances decomposed by each shock in the counterfactual economy.
The variance change (in ratio terms) is decomposed according to the following equation.
𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟 −𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒




𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 −𝑉 (Δ log𝐶
𝑚𝑠𝑑
𝑡 )𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘
𝑉 (Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒
.
In the same way, I also decompose the variance change of output growth.
Table 3.7 reports the result of this variance change decomposition. As reported in the bot-
tom row of the table, the consumption growth variance decreases by 44.9 percent when Peruvian
households are replaced with those exhibiting U.S. MPCs. Of the 44.9 percent decrease in the con-
sumption growth variance, a 20.7 percent decrease comes from the variance change generated by
stationary productivity shocks, and a 24.5 percent decrease comes from the variance change gen-
erated by illiquidity shocks. This result shows that consumption volatility substantially decreases
in the counterfactual economy because both stationary productivity shocks and illiquidity shocks
generate substantially less consumption variation.
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Table 3.7: Variance Change Decomposition
(from Baseline to Counterfactual)
Δ log𝑌𝑡 Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡
stationary productivity shock (𝑧𝑡) -0.012 -0.207
(0.000) (0.022)
trend shock (𝑔𝑡) -0.011 0.053
(0.008) (0.027)
interest rate shock (`𝑡) 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
illiquidity shock ([𝑡) -0.001 -0.245
(0.001) (0.039)
investment shock (a𝑡) -0.000 -0.049
(0.000) (0.020)
variance change (in ratio) -0.024 -0.449
(0.008) (0.042)
Notes: The last row reports the fraction of [(variance change from the baseline economy to the counterfactual econ-
omy) / (variance in the baseline economy)]. The first five rows report the fraction of [(variance change generated by
each shock) / (variance in the baseline economy)], in which the denominator is the variance generated by all shocks
(i.e., the same denominator used in the fraction reported in the last row.) By construction, the last row is the sum of the
first five rows. The statistics are computed under each posterior draw, and their means and standard deviations over
the posterior distribution are reported in this table. The numbers in parentheses are the posterior standard deviations.
Table 3.7 also reports the variance change decomposition of output growth. The output growth
variance decreases only by 2.5 percent from the baseline economy to the counterfactual economy.
This small variance change comes from the variance changes caused by stationary productivity
shocks and trend shocks.
3.6.3 Consumption Response Decomposition
Ultimately, consumption is determined by households after they observe the paths of variables
that are relevant for their optimization, {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , [𝑡}∞𝑡=0.
47 I name these variables ‘drivers’.
To understand economic reasons why both stationary productivity shocks and illiquidity shocks
generate substantially more consumption variation in the baseline economy than they do in the
47In other words, {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , [𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 are exogenous variables in the partial equilibrium of the households’ opti-
mization, although {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 are endogenous in general equilibrium.
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Figure 3.6: Decomposition of the Consumption Responses to the 𝑧-shock and [-shock
Notes: Panels 3.6a, 3.6b, 3.6c, and 3.6d present the consumption response decomposition with respect to stationary
productivity shocks (𝑧) and illiquidity shocks ([) in the baseline economy and the counterfactual economy, respec-
tively. Each panel consists of three subplots, where the large subplot on the left shows the total consumption response
as well as decomposed consumption responses to each driver of {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , [𝑡 }∞𝑡=0, and the other two small sub-
plots on the right show the equilibrium paths of the two main drivers after the shock. The consumption responses are
computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
counterfactual economy, I decompose households’ consumption response to these shocks into the
responses to each driver.
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Figure 3.6a presents the decomposition of the consumption response with respect to stationary
productivity shocks in the baseline economy. This figure consists of three subplots. The largest
subplot on the left side labeled ‘Decomposition’ presents the total consumption response to a
stationary productivity shock in the baseline economy, as well as the decomposed consumption
responses to each driver. This subplot shows that the consumption response is mainly driven by
two drivers: 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 . The other small subplots on the right side, which are labeled ‘driver1’
and ‘driver2’, plot the equilibrium paths of the two drivers after the shock. The first driver, the
labor income per idiosyncratic labor productivity 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , jumps on impact and then gradually returns
to zero. The second driver, the return rate on illiquid assets 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , also jumps on impact, but then it
suddenly falls below zero in period 1 and gradually returns to zero.48
Figure 3.6b presents the same consumption response decomposition with respect to stationary
productivity shocks but in the counterfactual economy. Three important observations are made
from the comparison between Figure 3.6a and Figure 3.6b. First, the total consumption response
in the counterfactual economy is substantially weaker than that in the baseline economy. Sec-
ond, the weaker total consumption response in the counterfactual economy is due to the weaker
consumption responses to both 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 . Third, the consumption responses to these drivers are
weaker in the counterfactual economy despite the fact that the equilibrium paths of the drivers after
the shock are similar in the two economies.49 These observations reveal the first main mechanism
through which high-MPC households in the baseline economy contribute to the large consumption
volatility: their consumption responds to individual resource fluctuations (mainly generated by the
two drivers, 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) far more strongly than the consumption of the counterfactual households
exhibiting U.S. MPCs.50
48 The jump of the illiquid asset return on impact is due to the jump in the illiquid asset price, which reflects the
high capital returns in the future. From period 1 onward, the illiquid asset return 𝑟𝑎𝑡 is equalized with the interest rate
in the international financial market 𝑟𝑡−1 by firms’ optimality condition (3.10).
49The initial jump of 𝑟𝑎𝑡 is rather larger in the counterfactual economy, which works against the weaker consumption
response.
50Households in the baseline economy exhibit stronger consumption responses to individual resource fluctuations
than those in the counterfactual economy for the same reason why the former households exhibit higher MPCs than the
latter. Households exhibit higher MPCs in the baseline economy because both the degree of consumption smoothing
failure of households who face bad idiosyncratic income shocks and the precautionary-saving motive of households
who face good idiosyncratic income shocks are substantially stronger, and therefore, a positive transitory income
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Figure 3.6c shows the result of the consumption response decomposition with respect to illiq-
uidity shocks in the baseline economy. In response to a positive illiquidity shock, total consumption
plunges on impact and then gradually recovers. The plunge in total consumption is mainly driven
by the direct effect of illiquidity shocks rather than by indirect effects through other drivers. In the
model, the direct effect of illiquidity shocks is realized as follows. When the degree of illiquidity
increases, it becomes more expensive for households to liquidate their illiquid assets. For house-
holds facing bad idiosyncratic income shocks at the moment of the illiquidity shock, they need to
cash out their illiquid assets to smooth their consumption, but it is more difficult to do so because
the assets are more illiquid. Therefore, these households fail to smooth consumption more seri-
ously, and as a result, their consumption plunges. For households facing good idiosyncratic income
shocks at the moment of the illiquidity shock, they recognize that it will be more difficult to cash
out their illiquid assets for a while. Therefore, they prepare themselves for situations in which bad
idiosyncratic income shocks are realized in a near future by reducing consumption substantially
and accumulating more buffer stocks. In other words, these households’ precautionary-saving
motive is significantly enhanced.
There is one more noteworthy observation in Figure 3.6c. The illiquid asset return significantly
jumps on impact in response to a positive illiquidity shock and generates a substantial positive con-
sumption response.51 However, the consumption plunge due to the direct effect of the illiquidity
shock outweighs the consumption increase in response to illiquid asset returns by a sizable mar-
gin. As a result, the total consumption response is negative on impact and over several subsequent
periods.
Figure 3.6d presents the same consumption response decomposition with respect to illiquidity
shocks but in the counterfactual economy. Two important observations are made from the com-
shock relaxes them substantially more in the baseline economy than in the counterfactual economy. For the same
reason, households’ resource fluctuations in response to a positive transitory productivity shock relax the degree of
consumption smoothing failure and the precautionary-saving motive substantially more in the baseline economy than
in the counterfactual economy (despite the fact that households face similar degrees of resource fluctuations in the two
economies), and therefore, consumption responds more strongly in the baseline economy.
51The initial jump of the illiquid asset return is due to the jump of the illiquid asset price. The illiquid asset price
jumps because the stronger degree of illiquidity increases the aggregate adjustment cost 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 , which appears as a part
of firms’ profit.
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parison between Figure 3.6c and Figure 3.6d. First, the total consumption response with respect to
illiquidity shocks is significantly weaker in the counterfactual economy. Second, the weaker total
consumption response is driven by the weaker direct effect of illiquidity shocks on consumption.52
In the counterfactual economy, households face a much smaller adjustment cost for illiquid assets.
Therefore, the same degree of increase in [𝑡 distorts households’ consumption-saving decisions
far more mildly in the counterfactual economy than in the baseline economy. These observations
reveal the second main channel through which high-MPC households in the baseline economy
contribute to aggregate consumption volatility: high-MPC households’ consumption plunges when
assets become more illiquid because some of them experience aggravated consumption smoothing
failure and others come to have an enhanced precautionary-saving motive.
3.7 Inspecting Conventional Theories
In section 3.6, I examine how excess consumption volatility is realized in the model through
the consumption-saving behavior of high-MPC households in emerging economies. I find that the
main mechanisms of this model are quite different from the existing theories on excess consump-
tion volatility based on representative-agent models. In this section, I examine the extent to which
the driving mechanisms of the conventional theories are dampened in my model and discuss the
economic reasons.
3.7.1 Strong Consumption Response to Trend Shocks
The first well-accepted theory in the literature is the one developed by Aguiar and Gopinath
(2007). They argue that households’ consumption responds strongly to trend shocks, and such
consumption behavior can generate excess consumption volatility. When a positive trend shock
hits the economy, output not only jumps on impact but also grows further in the subsequent peri-
ods. Reflecting the future output growth, households’ permanent income increases significantly.
52The competing force generated by the response to illiquid asset returns is also weaker in the counterfactual
economy. However, the direct effect of illiquidity shocks is more significantly weakened, and as a consequence, the
total consumption response is weakened in the counterfactual economy.
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Since representative households follow the PIH, they increase their consumption accordingly. As
a result, their consumption jumps far more than their output on impact. Through this mechanism,
Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s representative-agent model successfully generates excess consump-
tion volatility.
Unlike representative households, the heterogeneous households in my model significantly de-
viate from the PIH because they face both a large amount of idiosyncratic income risk and financial
frictions. In particular, their consumption-saving behavior is different from that of representative
households such that Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s mechanism cannot be accommodated well.
Figure 3.7a presents the result of the consumption response decomposition with respect to trend
shocks in the baseline economy. The total consumption response is mainly driven by consumption
responses to two drivers: 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 . After a positive trend shock, these drivers move as follows.
Driver 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 jumps on impact and then increases further in the subsequent periods. Driver 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , on the
other hand, jumps substantially on impact, plunges to a negative value in the next period, and then
gradually returns to zero.
These observations show how the future output growth in response to a positive trend shock
enters into households’ budget constraints through two channels. First, the future growth of ag-
gregate labor income enters into the households’ budget constraints as the future growth of labor
income per idiosyncratic labor productivity (𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡). Second, the future growth of aggregate capital
income is reflected in the asset price of illiquid assets and thus enters into the households’ budget
constraints as a jump in illiquid asset returns (𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) on impact. Both channels make heterogeneous
households’ idiosyncratic income profiles either more increasing or less decreasing and thus create
a positive wealth effect. Households would want to increase their consumption in response to this
positive wealth effect.
As the large panel on the left of Figure 3.7a shows, households exhibit a strong positive con-
sumption response to driver 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , reflecting the positive wealth effect. However, households sub-
stantially decrease their consumption in response to driver 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , despite the positive wealth effect
it creates. The economic reason for this consumption plunge is an enhanced precautionary-saving
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Figure 3.7: Decomposition of the Consumption Responses to the 𝑔-shock
Notes: Panels 3.7a and 3.7b present the consumption response decomposition with respect to trend shocks (𝑔) in the
baseline economy and the counterfactual economy, respectively. Each panel consists of three subplots, where the
large subplot on the left shows the total consumption response as well as decomposed consumption responses to each
driver of {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , [𝑡 }∞𝑡=0, and the other two small subplots on the right show the equilibrium paths of the two main
drivers after the shock. The consumption responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the
posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
motive. In the model, the future growth of 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 means that idiosyncratic income risk will grow
in the future as the variance of 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑖,𝑡 increases. Households prepare themselves for this greater
income risk by accumulating additional buffer stocks. Since households allocate most of their
savings to illiquid assets, they have to pay a large adjustment cost when they need to cash out
illiquid assets by facing bad idiosyncratic income shocks. In this environment, the amount of addi-
tional buffer stocks that households accumulate in response to increased income risk is also large.
Because of this greatly enhanced precautionary-saving motive, households substantially decrease
their consumption. In terms of the total consumption response, this enhanced precautionary-saving
motive offsets most of the positive wealth effect, and as a consequence, the total consumption re-
sponse is significantly subdued.
Figure 3.7b presents the same consumption response decomposition with respect to trend
shocks but in the counterfactual economy. Two important observations are made from the com-
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parison between Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7b. First, the total consumption response to a trend
shock in the counterfactual economy is substantially stronger than the response in the baseline
economy on impact. Second, the stronger initial jump of total consumption in the counterfactual
economy is driven by the strong and positive consumption response to 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , which is in the op-
posite direction from the strong and negative response to it in the baseline economy. The sign
of the consumption response to driver 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 is flipped because the precautionary-saving motive is
enhanced far less intensely in the counterfactual economy (since households face much smaller
illiquid asset adjustment costs). As a consequence, the positive wealth effect dominates the en-
hanced precautionary-saving motive in the counterfactual economy.53
The observations from Figure 3.7a and Figure 3.7b show that Aguiar and Gopinath (2007)’s
mechanism does not drive the consumption response in the baseline economy because households’
consumption-saving behavior is very different from that of representative households, particularly
due to the precautionary-saving motive.
3.7.2 Intertemporal Substitution in Response to Interest Rate Variations
The second well-accepted theory in the literature is the one developed by Neumeyer and Perri
(2005). Emerging economies face volatile interest rate variations, induced either by domestic eco-
nomic conditions or purely external factors. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) argue that households
intertemporally substitute their consumption in response to interest rate variations, and such con-
sumption behavior can generate the excess consumption volatility of emerging economies.
In my model, the interest rates in the international financial market are determined by equation
(3.11). Provided that interest rate shocks (`𝑡) and trend shocks (𝑔𝑡) both have small volatility as
a result of the Bayesian estimation, a large fraction of interest rate fluctuations are induced by
53The positive consumption response to driver 𝑟𝑎𝑡 is also weakened in the counterfactual economy. There are two
economic reasons. First, the initial jump of 𝑟𝑎𝑡 is far weaker in the counterfactual economy because the aggregate
adjustment cost for illiquid assets 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 increases much less than in the baseline economy. Second, even if we control
for the dynamics of driver 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , households in the counterfactual economy respond much more mildly than those in the
baseline economy because of the MPC difference. Despite all the reasons for the weakened consumption response
to driver 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , the total consumption response is still substantially stronger in the counterfactual economy than in the
baseline economy because the effect of the flipped consumption response to driver 𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 dominates.
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Figure 3.8: Decomposition of the Consumption Responses to the 𝑧-shock,
{𝑟𝑎0 } and {𝑟
𝑎
𝑡 }𝑡≥1 split
Notes: Panels 3.8a and 3.8b present the same consumption response decomposition with respect to stationary produc-
tivity shocks (𝑧) as panels 3.6a and 3.6b except for one difference: the consumption response to {𝑟𝑎𝑡 }𝑡≥0 is further
decomposed into the responses to {𝑟𝑎0 } and {𝑟
𝑎
𝑡 }𝑡≥1. The consumption responses are computed under each posterior
draw, and their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
stationary productivity shocks.
To see how the stationary-productivity-shock-induced interest rate fluctuations affect house-
holds’ consumption, in Figure 3.8a, I report the same consumption response decomposition with
respect to stationary productivity shocks as in Figure 3.6a except for one difference: the con-
sumption response to driver 𝑟𝑎 is further decomposed into the consumption responses to 𝑟𝑎0 and to
𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1. Note that 𝑟𝑎𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑡 ≥ 1, as equation (3.10) dictates. Importantly, only 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1 (but
not 𝑟𝑎0 ) can generate the intertemporal substitution of consumption in households’ optimization.
Specifically, the consumption response to 𝑟𝑎0 purely comes from a positive wealth effect, while the
consumption response to {𝑟𝑎𝑡 }𝑡≥1 comes from both a negative wealth effect and a positive intertem-
poral substitution effect. As Figure 3.8a shows, the consumption response to {𝑟𝑎𝑡 }𝑡≥1 is negative
on impact and in the subsequent periods, meaning that the negative wealth effect dominates the
positive intertemporal substitution effect. Regarding the total consumption response, however, the
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positive wealth effect in the consumption response to 𝑟𝑎0 dominates the negative wealth effect in
the consumption response to 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1.
Figure 3.8b plots the same consumption response decomposition as Figure 3.8a but in the
counterfactual economy. In the consumption response to 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1, the positive intertemporal sub-
stitution effect is no longer dominated by the negative wealth effect on impact in the counterfactual
economy. This change occurs because i) the intertemporal substitution effect recovers as the illiq-
uid asset adjustment cost decreases, and ii) the wealth effect is weakened due to the lower MPCs.
Despite this less negative consumption response to 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 1, however, the total consumption re-
sponse is significantly weaker in the counterfactual economy because the positive wealth effect in
the consumption response to 𝑟𝑎0 is substantially subdued due to the lower MPCs.
The observations from Figure 3.8a and Figure 3.8b show that unlike representative-agent mod-
els, the intertemporal substitution of consumption does not drive the consumption response in
the baseline economy of my model. The economic reasons why this mechanism is dampened in
my model are as follows. First, unlike representative households whose consumption is solely
determined by their lifetime wealth and the degree of intertemporal substitution, the consumption-
saving behavior of households in my model is also greatly affected by the precautionary-saving
motive, as we see in the previous discussions. Second, the fact that households in my model allo-
cate most of their savings to illiquid assets makes it even more difficult for them to shift resources
across time.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter studies the role of high-MPC households in emerging market business cycles
through the lens of a heterogeneous-agent small open economy model. To this end, I discipline
the model using both micro moments (MPC estimates from micro data) and macro moments (co-
variances of macro data) from Peru. Through the counterfactual experiment in which I replace
Peruvian households with those exhibiting U.S. MPCs, which are substantially lower than the Pe-
ruvian MPCs, I find that the high-MPC households play a key role in generating the phenomenon of
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excess consumption volatility. Three decomposition exercises (variance decomposition, variance
change decomposition, and consumption response decomposition) reveal that high-MPC house-
holds contribute to the large aggregate consumption volatility of emerging economies through i)
their strong consumption response to individual resource fluctuations and ii) large consumption
reduction when illiquid assets become more illiquid (because of some households’ aggravated
consumption smoothing failure and other households’ enhanced precautionary saving). The driv-
ing mechanisms in conventional theories do not play an important role in my model because the
high-MPC households, who significantly deviate from the PIH, cannot accommodate them well.
The scope of this chapter is confined to the business cycle implications of high MPC house-
holds in emerging economies. However, it is likely that the presence of high-MPC households in
emerging economies has many other interesting macroeconomic implications, as previous stud-
ies focused on developed economies suggest. Revisiting key macroeconomic issues of emerging
economies – such as aggregate dynamics during financial crises and the transmission mechanisms
of macroeconomic policies – through the lens of a heterogeneous-agent model in which house-
holds exhibit MPCs as high as the empirical estimates from micro data would be an important
future avenue in the field of international macroeconomics.
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Appendix A: Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Derivation of the Consumption Growth Function
In this section, I derive the consumption growth function (1.6) from the optimality conditions
of the underlying model discussed in subsection 1.2.1. The derivation is nearly identical to that of
Blundell et al. (2008), except for the part that deals with liquidity constraints, which are absent in
their underlying model.





𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) be the shadow cost of liquidity constraint in terms of
consumption goods in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 . Equation (1.2) can be re-written as
exp
(
− 𝜎 log𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝










By log-linearizing the marginal utility in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 + 1,
exp(−𝜎 log𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1 + 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1𝜑
𝑝
𝑡+ 𝑗+1),
around its expected value in period 𝑡 + 𝑗 ,
exp
(
− 𝜎 log𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝
𝑡+ 𝑗 − log 𝛽 − log(1 + 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗 ) + log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )
)
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in equation (A.1)1, we can obtain










log(1+ 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗 ) −
1
𝜎
log(1− ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) +[𝑐𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1 (A.2)
in which [𝑐
𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1 is an expectation error satisfying 𝐸𝑡+ 𝑗[
𝑐
𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗+1 = 0.
Note that








































By substituting equation (A.4) into equation (A.3), we can obtain


















𝐸𝑡 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+𝑠−1) − 𝐸𝑡−1 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+𝑠−1)
)
+ [𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 .
(A.5)
The intertemporal budget constraint (1.5) in period 𝑡 is
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 =
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1, (A.6)
1In other words, first-order-Taylor-approximate




−𝜎 log𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝑍 ′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝
𝑡+ 𝑗 − log 𝛽 − log(1 + 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗 ) + log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ).
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The first-order approximation of the intertemporal budget constraint is conducted around the
lifetime path of individual variables predicted by the history of observable characteristics and ag-
gregate states. I choose this path as the path around which the variables are log-linearized because
i) I want the coefficients evaluated on the path to be independent of individual income shocks 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
and Z𝑖,𝑡 , and ii) I want the path to be the most accurate prediction among those satisfying the first
condition.
Let ?̂?𝑡 [·] be the expectation conditional on the history of observable characteristics and aggre-
gate shocks (or, equivalently, the history of all exogenous variables except individual households’
idiosyncratic income shocks, (𝜖𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0 and (Z𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0). In other words,
?̂?𝑡 [𝑥𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ] := 𝐸
[




for any stochastic time series (𝑥𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 .
By taking ?̂?𝑡−1 [·] on both sides of equation (A.6), we can obtain
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ] =
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ] + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)?̂?𝑡−1 [𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1] .
By log-linearizing
{








?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ]
)
0≤ 𝑗≤𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1]
}
in equation (A.6)2, we can obtain
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0




𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (log𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 − log ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ])




?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ]∑𝐽𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ′=0 ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′]
, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝜋𝑖,𝑡 =
∑𝐽𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ′=0 ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′]∑𝐽𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ′=0 ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′] + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)?̂?𝑡−1𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
, and
𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 =
?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ]∑𝐽𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 ′=0 ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ′]







𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 = 1.
Moreover, (\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 , 𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 )𝑡,0≤ 𝑗≤𝐽𝑖,𝑡 are independent of the household’s idiosyncratic income
shocks (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 because they are functions of (𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, (𝜑𝑝1𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, (𝜑
𝑦1
𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, and (𝑟𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0.
By taking the first difference in expectations without hat (i.e., 𝐸𝑡 [·] − 𝐸𝑡−1 [·]) on both sides of
2In other words, first-order-Taylor-approximate{
(log𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+ 𝑗𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )0≤ 𝑗≤𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , (log𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )0≤ 𝑗≤𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , log 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
}
around {(




log ?̂?𝑡−1 [𝑄𝑡 ,𝑡+ 𝑗𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ]
)




equation (A.8), we can obtain
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
















𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (𝐸𝑡 log𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 − 𝐸𝑡−1 log𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ).
(A.9)
By substituting equation (A.5) into equation (A.9) and replacing 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 with 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑦







\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (𝐸𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝








𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (𝐸𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑦








(𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − (1 −
1
𝜎













(𝐸𝑡 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) − 𝐸𝑡−1 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )).
(A.10)
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log 𝛽 + 1
𝜎








\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (𝐸𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝








𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (𝐸𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑦








(𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − (1 −
1
𝜎













(𝐸𝑡 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) − 𝐸𝑡−1 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )).
(A.11)
I re-write equation (A.11) as follows.
• The first line of equation (A.11) includes Δ log𝐶𝑖,𝑡 on its left-hand-side. I decompose log𝐶𝑖,𝑡
into the part explained by current observable characteristics and time, 𝑍′
𝑖,𝑡
𝜑𝑐𝑡 , and the residual
part, 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 . Then, Δ log𝐶𝑖,𝑡 can be re-written as Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + Δ(𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑐𝑡 ).
• In the first line of equation (A.11), 1
𝜎
log 𝛽 + 1
𝜎
log(1 + 𝑟𝑡−1) can be picked up by 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 and




• The first line of equation (A.11) includes − 1
𝜎
log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡−1). I decompose this term into the
part explained by the history of aggregate shocks and observable characteristics up to period














\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (?̂?𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝









𝑡 )𝑡 . By the same reason, the third and the fourth lines of
equation (A.11) can be re-written as
𝐽𝑖,𝑡∑︁
𝑗=0
𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (?̂?𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑦








(𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − (1 −
1
𝜎
)\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) (?̂?𝑡 log𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − ?̂?𝑡−1 log𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ),
respectively.
• In the fifth line of equation (A.11),
𝐸𝑡 (𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡) − 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡) = Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
and
𝐸𝑡 (𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) − 𝐸𝑡−1(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) = Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑗 ≥ 1.
Therefore, the fifth line of equation (A.11) can be re-written as 𝜋𝑖,𝑡Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝜖𝑖,𝑡 .










(𝐸𝑡 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) − 𝐸𝑡−1 log(1 − ˆ̀𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 )).
I decompose this term into the part explained by the history of aggregate shocks and observ-
able characteristics up to period 𝑡, ?̂?𝑡𝑀𝑡 , and the residual part ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑀𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡𝑀𝑡 .
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Then, equation (A.11) becomes
Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜋𝑖,𝑡Z𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝜖𝑖,𝑡 + ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 + b𝑖,𝑡 (A.12)
in which















\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (?̂?𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑝








𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 (?̂?𝑡𝑍′𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗𝜑
𝑦








(𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − (1 −
1
𝜎
)\𝑖,𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) (?̂?𝑡 log𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 − ?̂?𝑡−1 log𝑄𝑡,𝑡+ 𝑗 )
+ ?̂?𝑡𝑀𝑡 .
By construction, we have 𝐸𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐸 ˜̀𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝐸?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = 0 (since they are defined as
residuals). We also have 𝐸 [𝜋𝑖,𝑡Z𝑖,𝑡] = 𝐸 [?̂?𝑡−1 [𝜋𝑖,𝑡Z𝑖,𝑡]] = 𝐸 [𝜋𝑖,𝑡 ?̂?𝑡−1 [Z𝑖,𝑡]] = 𝐸 [𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝐸 [Z𝑖,𝑡]] = 0. In
the same way, we can show 𝐸 [𝜋𝑖,𝑡𝛾𝑖,𝑡,𝑡𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 0. Therefore, from equation (A.12), we have
𝐸b𝑖,𝑡 = 0.
Moreover, because b𝑖,𝑡 is a function of (𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, (𝜑𝑝1𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, (𝜑
𝑦1
𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, and (𝑟𝑡−𝑠)𝑠≥0, we have
(Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (b𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 .
A.2 Details on Data
In this section, I provide details of the ENAHO survey, variable construction, and sample se-
lection that are omitted in the main text for the sake of conciseness.
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A.2.1 ENAHO Survey
ENAHO is a nationally representative household survey in Peru conducted by Instituto Na-
cional de Estadística e Informática (INEI), the national statistical office of Peru. This survey
is conducted nationwide, covering both urban and rural areas. ENAHO targets people living in
private dwellings but excludes inhabitants living in collective housing (such as people living in
hospitals, barracks, police stations, hotels, asylums, religious cloisters, and detention centers, and
armed forces living in barraks, camps, and boats).
In ENAHO, sample dwellings are selected from census data through multiple stages of strati-
fied sampling. For the selected addresses, trained interviewers visit and collect data via face-to-face
interview with the interviewees. ENAHO’s manuals for pollsters (Instituto Nacional de Estadística
e Informática, 2004, 2007, 2010-2016) indicate that interviewers make multiple visits whenever
necessary to correct mistakes or recover missing information.
Table A.1 reports the non-response rates of each year documented in ENAHO’s quality reports
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2009-2016) in which non-response rates are de-
fined as ‘the proportion of occupied dwellings of which informants do not want to be interviewed
or are absent at the time of visit’. The average non-response rate during the sample years (2004-
2016) is 7.5%. According to the quality reports, the non-response rates tend to be higher in urban
areas than rural areas. Moreover, socioeconomic strata with higher income tend to exhibit higher
non-response rates. These patterns raise a usual concern for surveys of this kind that rich house-
holds in urban areas are under-represented. In ENAHO, this concern is at least partially addressed
by adjusting weights at a certain level of sampling strata reflecting geographic regions, urbanity,
and socioeconomic status.
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Table A.1: Non-response Rates in ENAHO
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
9.0% 13.3% 7.9% 5.2% 6.8% 6.4% 7.2%
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 average
8.3% 6.8% 6.8% 6.6% 7.2% 6.6% 7.5%
Notes: The non-response rates of each year in this table are from ENAHO’s quality reports (Instituto Nacional de
Estadística e Informática, 2009-2016).
A.2.2 Variable Construction
My consumption measure for ENAHO builds on Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)’s expen-
diture categories for Consumer Expenditure (CEX) Interview Survey. Most of their categories –
such as food at home, food away from home, alcohol, apparel and footwear, clothing services,
tobacco, heating, utilities, public transportation, gasoline and oil, vehicle maintenance and repairs,
parking fees, newspapers and magazines, club membership fees, ticket admissions, miscellaneous
entertainment expenses, home rent, home maintenance and repairs, telephone and cable, domestic
services, other home services, personal care services, and miscellaneous rentals and repair – have
corresponding expenditure items in ENANO.3 In addition to them, I add two more expenditure
categories including rental equivalence of owned or donated housing and daily nondurable goods.4
Following Attanasio and Weber (1995) and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009), I exclude health
and education expenses from the consumption measure due to their durable nature.
The consumption measure of Kaplan et al. (2014b) is consistent with my consumption measure
for ENAHO in that it is also composed of nondurable goods and a subset of services and that it also
includes home rent and housing service from owned or donated housing. One notable difference
3Among Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009)’s expenditure categories, vehicle expenses, books, home insurance,
and babysitting do not have corresponding expenditure items in ENAHO.
4Daily nondurable goods include laundry items such as detergent and bleach, bathroom items such as toilet papers
and cleaning supplies, and daily care items such as soap, toothpaste, and shampoo. These items are not in CEX
Interview Survey which Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2009) use.
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between the two consumption measures is that their consumption measure includes health and
education expenses. Therefore, I adopt their consumption measure with one revision that health
and education expenses are excluded.
Like many other household surveys, missing information is imputed in both expense and in-
come items in ENAHO. Imputed components of income could be particularly problematic in iden-
tifying income shocks given that many households rely only on a small number of income sources.
Therefore, I exclude the imputed income components from the income of Peruvian households. As
discussed in subsection 1.3.2, I cannot do the same for the income of U.S. households, and there-
fore, I conduct a robustness check by consistently including the imputed components of Peruvian
households’ income in Appendix A.4.3.
Unlike the imputed components of income, I do not remove the imputed components of ex-
pense from the consumption of Peruvian households. Note that imputation is conducted only when
households report that they obtain some items but do not report their values. Given that households
obtain a variety of expense items, when households miss the values on a subset of expense items,
reflecting the fact that households obtain these items using imputed values could still be helpful in
measuring consumption responses.
In ENAHO, some expense items require judgment calls on determining their reference periods.
ENAHO’s questionnaires on expenditure proceed as follows. For each expense item, households
are asked if they obtain it during period A. If the answer is yes, households are asked to report how
much they spent on the item per period B. For most expense items, period A is equal to period B.
Then, this period becomes the reference period for the expense item. However, there are cases in
which period A and period B differ. For example, many food items have ‘last 15 days’ as period
A, but households can choose period B. When period A and period B differ, I use the longer period
between period A and period B as the reference period for the expense item.
As discussed in subsection 1.3.2, in ENAHO, individual households report more than 97 per-
cent (in value) of expense items and income items, respectively, with reference periods shorter
than or equal to the previous three months, on average. Specifically, individual households’ ratio
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between ‘items with reference periods longer than the previous three months’ and ‘items with all
reference periods’ for the baseline measure of consumption is 1.74 percent, on average. The ratio
for the baseline measure of income is 2.51 percent, on average.
Both countries’ income and consumption are deflated with CPI series. Regarding the deflation
of Peruvian households’ income and consumption, ENAHO provides within-year-deflated values
of income and expense items (or, equivalently, values in terms of the CPI index of the survey year).
For example, ENAHO provides the value of a household’s food expense spent on February, 2004 in
terms of the 2004 price level. In constructing the real income and consumption of Peruvian house-
holds, I aggregate these within-year-deflated values of income and expense items, respectively, and
then, deflate the aggregated values using annual CPI series of Peru.
A.2.3 Sample Selection
Here, I provide details of the sample selection omitted in the main text. In the second step,
gender and age are used as the criteria for determining whether the head of the household changes.
In the sixth step, type-1 observations are dropped if any of their (i) baseline consumption measure,
(ii) baseline income measure, and (iii) comprehensive income measure including imputed income
components and income items with reference periods longer than the previous three months are
zero or negative. In the seventh step, the criterion for ‘having too much value’ is set as follows.
For each (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ {(expense items with reference periods longer than the previous three months,
baseline consumption measure), (income items with reference periods longer than the previous
three months, baseline income measure), (income imputation, baseline income measure)}, obser-
vations are dropped if 𝑥/(𝑥 + 𝑦) > 0.05. In the eighth step, I define income outliers as households
whose income growth is in the range of the extreme 1 percent (0.5 percent at the top and 0.5 per-
cent at the bottom) in the calendar-year subsamples at least one time. Table A.2 reports how many
observations of each type are dropped in each step.
For the U.S. households, I adopt Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s sample selection with three minor
revisions. First, they restrict household heads’ ages to be between 25 and 55. I revise this age
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Table A.2: Baseline Sample Selection for ENAHO
type-1 type-2 type-3
initial sample 113,329 74,667 36,005
months not matched, fake type-2 obs., or head changed 100,282 64,103 27,924
incomplete survey 86,396 49,738 20,295
age restriction, 25-65 67,681 38,380 15,496
observable characteristics missing 67,384 38,314 15,493
non-positive 𝑌 and 𝐶 66,961 37,863 15, 244
too much imputation in 𝑌 or 3ml in 𝑌 , 𝐶 47,819 22,354 7,666
outliers on income growth 47, 210 21, 988 7,509
Notes: In the penultimate line of the table, ‘3ml’ is an abbreviation for ‘items with reference periods longer than the
previous three months’.
restriction to be between 25 and 65 for the sake of consistent sample selection with the Peruvian
sample. In Appendix A.4.10 and B.2.6, I conduct a robustness check by revising the age restric-
tion of both the U.S. and Peruvian samples to be between 25 and 55. Second, when controlling
consumption and income with observable characteristics, Kaplan et al. (2014b) use only type-1
observations that belong to at least one type-3 observation. I additionally use type-1 observations
that belong to at least one type-2 observation when controlling consumption and income with ob-
servable characteristics and constructing income distribution. Third, there are type-1 observations
that miss either income or consumption, but not both. Kaplan et al. (2014b) allow them to be
used when controlling income and consumption with observable characteristics. For example, if
a type-1 observation misses income but does not miss consumption, it is used in controlling con-
sumption. Instead, I use only type-1 observations that do not miss both income and consumption
when controlling income and consumption with observable characteristics.
A remaining difference between Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s sample selection and my ENAHO
sample selection is the criteria for income outliers. Kaplan et al. (2014b) categorize households
as income outliers if their nominal income is below 100 Dollars or their income growth is greater
than 5 or less than -0.8 at least one time. I do not use this criteria in my baseline selection for
the Peruvian sample because it is not straightforward to determine the right cutoffs for Peruvian
households reflecting cross-country differences including the difference in growth units (the two-
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year-over-two-year growth of annual income for U.S. households, the year-over-year growth of
quarterly income for Peruvian households). In Appendix A.4.11 and B.2.7, I conduct a robustness
check by defining Peruvian income outliers in a more similar fashion with Kaplan et al. (2014b),
despite the difficulty of finding the right corresponding cutoffs.
A.2.4 Detecting Potentially Fake Type-2 Observations
In ENAHO, panel observations are selected based on addresses. When an old household moves
away and a new household moves into an address selected for a panel interview, ENAHO’s manuals
for pollsters (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática, 2004, 2007, 2010-2016) indicate that
the interview proceeds with the new household. However, the manual does not specify whether the
observation on the new household will be distinguished from the previous observations on the old
household or it will be falsely linked to the observations and create a fake type-2 observation. The
latter case is problematic for the analyses of this paper.
Fortunately, there is an effective way to identify type-2 observations that are subject to this
problem. ENAHO tracks not only households but also their members over time. Specifically,
variable ‘p215’ records each household member’s year-specific identification number (the unique
number assigned in each year’s survey to enumerate each member from 1 onward) in the previous
year. This variable makes it possible to track household members over time. When two different
households are falsely linked as a type-2 observation, we will observe that either household mem-
bers are not linked by variable ‘p215’ or different persons are falsely linked by variable ‘p215’. At
persons’ level, it is easier to determine whether the two persons linked by variable ‘p215’ are the
same person since ENAHO collects household members’ date of birth (dd/mm/yyyy) and gender.
If two persons linked by variable ‘p215’ have the same birth date and gender, it is highly likely
that they are the same person. And if the same person appears in the two households linked as
a type-2 observation, it is highly likely that this type-2 observation is correctly tracking the same
household over time. On the other hand, if we cannot verify any common person appearing in two
households linked as a type-2 observation, it is not free from the problem of linking two different
113
households.
Based on this logic, I link household members over time using variable ‘p215’, and identify
linked persons whose date of birth and gender are exactly equal in the two interviews. I name them
‘verified same members’. Despite a nontrivial chance that household members’ birth dates are
not exactly reported, it turns out that most type-2 observations do have at least one verified same
member. I identify type-2 observations that do not have any verified same member, and define
them as ‘potentially fake type-2 observations’. I drop them in the sample selection.
Combined with the other steps of the sample selection, a selected type-2 observation satisfies
the following conditions: it connects households that (i) live in the same address, (ii) have at
least one verified same member, and (iii) have heads with the same age and gender. It is highly
likely that such a type-2 observation correctly tracks the same household over time. In Appendix
A.4.13 and B.2.9, I apply even a stricter rule in detecting potentially fake type-2 observations at
the cost of a smaller sample size as follows: if the number of verified same members of a type-2
observation is less than half of the household size for any of the two households connected as the
type-2 observation, I identify it as a potentially fake type-2 observation and drop it.5 The main
findings are robust to applying this stricter rule.
A.3 MPC Estimates and Standard Errors in Numerical Values
In this section, I report the numerical values of the MPC estimates and standard errors plotted
in Figure 1.1.
5Under the stricter rule, the number of type-3 observations shrinks from 7,509 to 6,324.
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Table A.3: Annual MPCs of the Income Deciles in Peru and the U.S.
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Peru 0.942 0.668 0.666 0.671 0.678 0.654 0.660 0.528 0.556 0.299
(0.052) (0.104) (0.091) (0.087) (0.083) (0.080) (0.075) (0.084) (0.082) (0.086)
𝑁 758 827 833 787 730 699 724 743 704 704
U.S. 0.160 0.096 0.083 0.129 0.123 0.077 0.087 0.077 0.023 0.036
(0.083) (0.050) (0.043) (0.045) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034) (0.017)
𝑁 1,332 1,467 1,504 1,539 1,573 1,560 1,567 1,472 1,413 1,363
Notes: The estimates and the standard errors reported in this table are used to plot Figure 1.1.
A.4 Robustness for the MPC Estimation
In this subsection, I present the results of the robustness checks that I conduct regarding the
MPC estimation. Each panel of Figure A.1 plots the result of each robustness check. These panels
in Figure A.1 verify that the main findings in Figure 1.1 – (i) the mean MPC being substantially
higher and (ii) within-country MPC heterogeneity over the income distribution being substantially
stronger in Peru than in the U.S.– are robust to the following alternative setups.
A.4.1 Including Non-purchased Consumption
In the baseline consumption measure, I exclude non-purchased consumption such as donations,
food stamps, in-kind income, and self-production. In this robustness check, I use an alternative
consumption measure that includes the non-purchased consumption. Figure A.1a plots the result.
A.4.2 Restricting Expense Categories to Those Available in the PSID
Due to the lack of coverage in the early waves in the U.S. sample, the baseline consumption
of U.S. households does not include clothing, recreation, alcohol, and tobacco, while the baseline
consumption of Peruvian households includes them. Here, I conduct a robustness check by consis-
tently excluding these expenses from the consumption of Peruvian households. Figure A.1b plots
the result.
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(a) Including Non-purchased 𝐶 (b) Expense Categories in PSID (c) Including 𝑌 Imputation
(d) No Expense in 𝑌 (e) Calendar Year Pool (f) Whole Sample Years Pool
(g) AR(1) + I.I.D. (h) Stone-Geary Preference (i) Per-adult Equivalent Units
(j) Continuous 𝑡, Average 𝐶 (k) Continuous 𝑡, Snapshot 𝐶 (l) Head Age 25 - 55
(m) Alternative Income Outliers (n) Male Heads Only (o) Stricter Rule for Fake Type-2
Figure A.1: Robustness – Annual MPCs
Notes: In the 𝑥-axis of each panel, 1 is the bottom decile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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A.4.3 Including Imputed Income Components
The baseline income measure for the Peruvian sample excludes imputed income components.
Moreover, I drop observations that include too much value in the imputed income components in
the Peruvian sample selection. These treatments are not available in the U.S. sample because the
imputed components of income are not distinguishable in Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset. Here, I
conduct a robustness check by consistently including the imputed components of Peruvian house-
holds’ income. Moreover, the observations with too much value in the imputed income components
are not dropped. Figure A.1c plots the result.
A.4.4 Excluding Expense Items from Income
The income measure for ENAHO includes two expense items that are also included in the
consumption of Peruvian households: rental equivalence of housing provided by work and rental
equivalence of donated housing. On the other hand, the income of U.S. households does not
include any expense items that are included in their consumption. Here, I conduct a robustness
check by consistently excluding the two expense items from Peruvian households’ income. Figure
A.1d plots the result.
A.4.5 Sorting Income (𝑦𝑖,𝑡) in Different Observation Pools
In the baseline analysis, I sort unpredictable component of income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 within each calendar
year for the U.S. sample and within each calendar quarter for the Peruvian sample, in accordance
with the unit time length of each sample (a year for the U.S. sample, a quarter for the Peruvian
sample). However, because I already remove the time-fixed effect when controlling for the pre-
dictable components (annually for the U.S. sample, quarterly for the Peruvian sample), it should
also be fine to sort unpredictable component of income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 in a larger observation pool than the
pool of the unit time length. In this robustness check, I sort income in different observation pools
such as (i) the pool of each calender year (not only for the U.S. sample, but also for the Peruvian
sample), and (ii) the pool of the whole sample years. Figure A.1e and Figure A.1f plot the MPC
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estimation results under the pool of each calendar year and the pool of the whole sample years,
respectively.
A.4.6 Replacing the Permanent Component of Income with an AR(1) Process
In the baseline analysis, the unpredictable component of income 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is assumed to be composed
of a permanent component and a transitory component, following Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan
et al. (2014b). This income process is restrictive in that an income shock cannot have a persistent
effect without being permanent. Kaplan and Violante (2010) propose a way to identify Blundell
et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameters under an alternative income process composed of an
AR(1) component and a transitory component. Adopting their identification strategy, I estimate
the MPCs under the alternative income process.




𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + Z𝑖,𝑡 ,
Z𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑝𝑠), 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟), (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , and
(𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 .
As before, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 := log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦
𝑡 represents the unpredictable component of income. Let





𝜌𝑠Z𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾𝜖𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 (A.13)
for any 𝐾 ≥ 1. As in equation (1.11), the partial insurance parameter to transitory income shocks
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𝜓𝐺 for each group 𝐺 is defined as follows.
𝜓𝐺 :=
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
.
When the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s is independent of 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , the characterization of 𝜓𝐺 in equa-




𝑐𝑜𝑣 [𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑣𝑎𝑟 [𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
.
When the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)’s is independent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0, we can derive
𝜓𝐺 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖𝑡 , Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖𝑡 , Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
(A.14)
from equations (1.10) and (A.13).
To identify 𝜓𝐺 using equation (A.14), we need to know the value of 𝜌𝐾 to compute Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and
Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 . I estimate 𝜌𝐾 using the following equation.
𝜌𝐾 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−2𝐾]





In the Peruvian sample, the estimate (standard error6) of 𝜌4 is 0.939 (0.020). Since the time unit
is a quarter, the estimate of 𝜌4 represents Peruvian households’ annual autocorrelation coefficient
for their persistent income shocks. In the U.S. sample, the estimate (standard error) of 𝜌2 is 0.923
(0.010). Since the time unit is a year, the estimate of 𝜌2 represents U.S. households’ biannual
autocorrelation coefficient for their persistent income shocks. The fact that the estimates of 𝜌𝐾 for
both countries are close to 1 assures that the specification of the income process imposed in the
baseline analysis (random walk + i.i.d) is not seriously flawed.
Figure A.1g plots the MPCs I estimate using equation (A.14), the estimates of 𝜌𝐾 from equation
(A.15), and equation (1.14).
6In the estimation, standard errors are clustered within each household.
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A.4.7 Incorporating a Subsistence Point into the Preference
Consumption being close to a subsistence level is more likely in Peru than in the U.S. In
this robustness check, I estimate MPCs after incorporating a subsistence level into the model.
Specifically, I replace the household uitility function of the baseline model with the one developed
by Stone (1954) and Geary (1950) under which households obtain utility only from consumption
beyond a subsistence point. Under the Stone-Geary preference, households solve the following
problem.
max















𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + 𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡+ 𝑗−1)𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗−1, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 , (SBC)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽𝑖,𝑡 − 1, (LQC)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡+𝐽𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0 (NPG)
in which 𝐶 represents the subsistence point of consumption. To make sure the problem is well-
defined, I assume that households’ income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is always greater than 𝐶 and is determined by
log(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶) = 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑
𝑦∗
𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + Z𝑖,𝑡 ,
Z𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑝𝑚), 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟), (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 , and
(𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (Z𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 .
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Let
𝐶∗𝑖,𝑡 := 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶, and
𝑌 ∗𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶.
(A.16)
By substituting equation (A.16) into the households’ problem and the income process specified
above, we can observe that the model with Stone-Geary preference is isomorphic to the base-















𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
, 𝐾 ≥ 1, and (A.17)
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺
𝐸 [𝐶∗
𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝐸 [𝑌 ∗























using equation (A.16), I use the consumption measure including
non-purchased consumption for 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and the baseline measure of income for 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 . I calibrate the
subsistence point 𝐶 to be equal to one of the poverty lines that World Bank uses, $ 3.20 per day in









. As in the baseline analysis, when constructing income groups I include observations
dropped due to having too much value in imputed income components or to having too much value
in items with reference periods longer than the previous three months. For the purpose of income
sorting, I use the unpredictable component of the comprehensive income measure (which includes
not only the baseline measure of income but also the income items with reference periods longer
than the previous three months and the imputed income components) minus the subsistence point,
𝐶. Figure A.1h plots the result of the MPC estimation.
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A.4.8 Treating Unpredictable Components as Per-Adult Equivalent Units
In the model discussed in subsection 1.2.1, the vector of observable characteristics 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 appears









𝑡 . They appear in these places to make the model consistent with the data pattern that
a sizable portion of income and consumption variations are explained by observable characteristics.
Some studies such as Guvenen and Smith (2014) do not have these terms in the model and
instead assume that the residuals of income and consumption after controlling for observable char-
acteristics are income and consumption of per-adult equivalent units, and the residuals should
be explained by the model. This alternative approach does not affect the estimation of Blundell
et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameters, but affects which consumption-to-income ratio to be
multiplied in converting the partial insurance parameters to MPC. In the baseline analysis, I use
𝐸 [𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺]








𝑡−𝐾 . On the other hand, in the approach of treating 𝑐𝑖,𝑡
and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 as the log consumption and log income of per-adult equivalent units,
𝐸 [exp(𝑐𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 ) | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺]
𝐸 [exp(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 ) | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺]
should be multiplied, instead.
In this robustness check, I take this alternative approach and estimate MPCs by multiplying the
Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameters with 𝐸 [exp(𝑐𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 ) | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺]
𝐸 [exp(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 ) | (𝑖,𝑡)∈𝐺] . Figure A.1i plots the
MPC estimation result under this approach.
A.4.9 Addressing the Time Aggregation Problem and the Time Inconsistency Problem in a Con-
tinuous Time Model
As Crawley (2019) notes, continuous-time models are useful in dealing with two possible is-
sues in discrete time models: the time aggregation problem and the time inconsistency problem.
The time aggregation problem means that a completely transitory shock in a continuous-time pro-
cess can generate an autocorrelation in a discrete-time process constructed by aggregating the
continuous-time process over a specified period. The time inconsistency problem means the refer-
ence period for consumption could be inconsistent with the reference period for income because
122
of the intended design of a survey, unclear description of questionnaires, and greater difficulties
in recalling memory regarding expenses. In this robustness check, I address these issues using a
continuous-time model, as in Crawley (2019).
Crawley (2019) presents a continuous-time model in which a level income process and a level
consumption function are specified (instead of a log income process and a log consumption func-
tion) because level variables are more convenient to aggregate over time than log variables. In
the model, the level consumption follows a random walk that moves only in response to current
shocks on the level income. Then, the author shows in appendix that the identifying equations in
the continuous-time model with the level specifications become equal to the identifying equations
in a discrete-time model with log specifitaions under a first-order approximation as the discrete
timeframe approaches to a continuous one in a limit. However, the income process specified in
the author’s discrete-time model is different from the income process in Blundell et al. (2008).
Moreover, it is not clear how the consumption function should be specified in the discrete-time
model for the equivalence of the identifying equations between the discrete-time model and the
continuous-time model.7
The model presented here is borrowed from Crawley (2019) but with two modificiations. First,
as in the appendix of Crawley (2019), I begin from a discrete-time model with log specifications,
derive the identifying equations under a first-order approximation, and obtain their limits as the
discrete timeframe approaches to a continuous one, but I use a different first-order approximation
which allows my discrete-time model to have the same income process as the one in Blundell et al.
(2008). Second, I specify the consumption function in such a way that the dynamic consumption
responses to a transitory income shock decay exponentially over time.8
As in the appendix of Crawley (2019), I begin with a discrete-time model with 𝑚 sub-periods.
7Crawley (2019)’s appendix only shows the equivalence of the identifying equation for the variance in income
growth.
8This specification is consistent with Auclert (2019)’s conversion formula between quarterly MPC and annual
MPC. Admittedly, however, the consumption function is not derived from the optimality condition of households’
problem. Deriving testable implications from the optimality conditions of a continuous-time model (or from the
optimality conditions of a discrete-time model in a continuous-time limit), would be an interesting extension in this
line of investigation.
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, · · · , 𝑚−1
𝑚
, 1, 1 + 1
𝑚
, · · · . The
time length of 1 in the 𝑡-axis (i.e., Δ𝑡 = 1) corresponds to the unit time length of the observations. It
is a quarter in the Peruvian sample and a year in the U.S. sample. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐶𝑖,𝑡 represent income and
consumption during sub-period 𝑡. 𝑌𝑇 and ?̄?𝑇 represent the total income and consumption during
the period of the unit time length (Δ𝑡 = 1) ending at 𝑡 = 𝑇 . In other words,




+ · · · + 𝑌𝑖,𝑇 (A.19)
and




+ · · · + 𝐶𝑖,𝑇 . (A.20)
The log income process and the log consumption function are specified as follows.
log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 (A.21)
in which
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡− 1
𝑚
+ Z𝑖,𝑡 ,
Z𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑝𝑚,𝑚), 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟,𝑚), (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 .
Δ
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in which Δ𝑠𝑥𝑡 := 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥𝑡−𝑠 for any time-series (𝑥𝑡)𝑡 and any 𝑠 > 0. As in the main text, I omit 𝑠




:= 𝜓0 + 𝜓 1
𝑚














By summing up equation (A.22) over 𝑗 sub-periods, we get
Δ
𝑗
𝑚 log𝐶𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 =
(
𝜓0 + 𝜓 1
𝑚





other terms unrelated with 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
)
.
Therefore, the dynamic consumption response in sub-period 𝑡 + 𝑗 to a transitory income shock







. The MPC out of a transitory income shock during the period of the
unit length (Δ𝑡 = 1) after the shock (or, equivalently, the cumulative consumption response to the






𝐸 [𝑌 ] . (A.23)
From equation (A.19), we have












around 𝐸𝑇−1 log( 1𝑚𝑌𝑖,𝑇 ) for 𝑗 = 1, · · · , 𝑚 in this










In the same way, equation (A.20) can be re-written as












around 𝐸𝑇−1 log( 1𝑚 ?̄?𝑖,𝑇 ) for 𝑗 = 1, · · · , 𝑚 in this














be the observed income and consumption in the data during period 𝑇 . In
terms of the relationship between the variables in the model and the variables observed in the




) = (𝑌𝑖,𝑇 , ?̄?𝑖,𝑇 ), (ii) (𝑌 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 , 𝐶
𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇






) = (𝑌𝑖,𝑇 , ?̄?𝑖,𝑇 ).
Regarding the time inconsistency problem, the first case does not have it as the reference period
of the observed income matches that of the observed consumption. In the second case, the observed
consumption is the consumption flow during the last sub-period of the reference period for the
observed income. This case has the time inconsistency problem in such a way that the reference
period for the observed income is longer than that of the observed consumption. In the third case,
the observed income is the income flow during the last sub-period of the reference period for the
observed consumption. In this case, the time inconsistency problem is present in such a way that
the reference period for the observed income is shorter than that for the observed consumption. As
discussed in footnote 19 of subsection 1.3.2, the PSID is subject to the time inconsistency problem
of the second case, while ENAHO is subject to the time inconsistency problems of both the second
and third cases.
The time aggregation problem is present when the observed income is an aggregated income
over multiple sub-periods. Therefore, the first and the second cases have the time aggregation
problem, while the third case does not.












From equation (A.24) and (A.25), we have


































By substituting equations (A.21) and (A.22) into (A.26) and (A.27) and computing variances
and covariances of the observed income growth Δ𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇
and consumption growth Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇
, we can
obtain the following equations.


























𝑖,𝑇+𝑁 ] = 0, 𝑁 ≥ 2,
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠









































































































, 𝑁 ≥ 2.
Now let’s consider a limit in which 𝑚 approaches infinity, i.e., the discrete-time model ap-
proaches a continuous-time model. For the model in the limit to be stationary, we should have
𝜎2𝑝𝑚 := lim
𝑚→∞








Moreover, I assume that the dynamic consumption response to a past transitory shock Ψ 𝑗
𝑚
decays exponentially over time. In the continuous-time model, this assumption becomes
Ψ𝑡 = 𝜏_𝑒
−_𝑡 , 𝑡 ∈ [0,∞) (A.30)





Ψ𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝜏(1 − 𝑒−_𝑡), 𝑡 ∈ [0,∞). (A.31)
Under equations (A.28), (A.29), (A.30), and (A.31), we have the following equations for vari-
ances and covariances of the continuous-time model in the limit.
𝑣𝑎𝑟 [Δ𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ] =
2
3






𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , (A.33)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠






𝜙𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{2 −
1
_






𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜏{1 −
1
_
(1 − 𝑒−_)}𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , (A.36)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠






𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{−1 +
1
_
(1 − 𝑒−_) (𝑒−2_ − 3𝑒−_ + 3)}𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , (A.38)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇−𝑁 ] = −𝜏
1
_
𝑒−_(𝑁−2) (1 − 𝑒−_)4𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , 𝑁 ≥ 2. (A.39)
From equations (A.32), (A.33), (A.34), (A.35), (A.36), (A.37), (A.38), and (A.39), we can
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𝜙𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{2 +
1
_





𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{−1 +
1
_
(1 − 𝑒−_)}𝜎2𝑡𝑟 (A.43)














𝜙𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{2 +
1
_





𝜎2𝑝𝑚 + 𝜏{−1 +
1
_
(1 − 𝑒−_)}𝜎2𝑡𝑟 (A.47)
for 𝐾 = 4.
To estimate the MPC using these equations, we need to identify 𝜏. To do so, I exploit the
following fact: when the real interest rate is close to zero, the cumulative consumption response to







𝐸 [𝑌 ] = 𝜏 ·
𝐸 [𝐶]
𝐸 [𝑌 ] ≈ 1.
Under the assumption that the effective real interest rates for households’ consumption-saving
problem are close to zero in both Peru and the U.S.9, I use the following equation to identify 𝜏.
9In the real world, the real interest rates in Peru are noticeably higher than those in the U.S. Reflecting this fact
will widen the gap between the MPC estimates of the two countries.
129
𝐸 [𝜏𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐾] = 0. (A.48)
Under the assumption, the MPC after the unit time length (Δ𝑡 = 1) becomes
𝑀𝑃𝐶 = 1 − 𝑒−_.
For the Peruvian sample, I estimate the quarterly MPC (= 1 − 𝑒−_) together with 𝜎2𝑝𝑚, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , 𝜙,
and 𝜏 using equations (A.44), (A.45), (A.46), (A.47), and (A.48). For the U.S. sample, I estimate
the annual MPC (= 1− 𝑒−_) with the other four parameters using equations (A.40), (A.41), (A.42),
(A.43), and (A.48). As in the baseline analysis, the estimation is separately conducted for each of
the income deciles. The income deciles are constructed by sorting type-3 observations of period
𝑡−𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡+𝐾 by 𝑦𝑡−𝐾 . For the estimation, I use the GMM method. For comparison between the
quarterly MPCs and the annual MPCs, again I convert the Peruvian quarterly MPCs into annual
MPCs using Auclert (2019)’s conversion formula (1.16).
Figure A.1j plots the annual MPC estimates of Peru and the U.S. We can see from this figure
that the two main patterns – (i) the mean MPC being substantially higher and (ii) within-country
MPC heterogeneity over the income distribution being substantially stronger in Peru than in the
U.S.– robustly appear in the continuous-time model in which the time aggregation problem does
not exist any more.









) = (𝑌𝑖,𝑇 , 𝐶𝑖,𝑇 ), we have the following variances and covariances in the discrete-
time model.



























𝑖,𝑇+𝑁 ] = 0, 𝑁 ≥ 2, (A.51)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠






















































, 𝑁 ≥ 1.
(A.55)
As𝑚 approaches infinity satisfying equations (A.28), (A.29), (A.30), and (A.31), the continuous-
time model in the limit has the following equations for the variances and covariances.
𝑣𝑎𝑟 [Δ𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ] =
2
3






𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , (A.57)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠












𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑒−_)𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , (A.60)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇+𝑁 ] = 0, 𝑁 ≥ 2, (A.61)
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ𝑦
𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝑖,𝑇−𝑁 ] = {−𝜏𝑒
−_(𝑁−1) (1 − 𝑒−_)2 + 𝜏𝑒−_𝑁 (1 − 𝑒−_)2}𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , 𝑁 ≥ 1. (A.62)
From equations (A.56), (A.57), (A.58), (A.59), (A.60), (A.61), and (A.62), we can obtain the
























𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑒−_)𝜎2𝑡𝑟 (A.66)



















𝜎2𝑝𝑚 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑒−_)𝜎2𝑡𝑟 (A.70)
for 𝐾 = 4.
Under the identification of 𝜏 by equation (A.48) as in the first case, I estimate Peruvian house-
holds’ quarterly MPC (= 1 − 𝑒−_) together with 𝜎2𝑝𝑚, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟 , 𝜙, and 𝜏 using equations (A.67), (A.68),
(A.69), (A.70), and (A.48). For the U.S. sample, I estimate annual MPC (= 1− 𝑒−_) with the other
four parameters using equation (A.63), (A.64), (A.65), (A.66), and (A.48). Again, the estimation
is separately conducted for each of the income deciles, and the income deciles are constructed by
sorting type-3 observations of period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡 + 𝐾 by 𝑦𝑡−𝐾 . As in the first case, I use the
GMM estimation method, and the quarterly MPCs of the Peruvian households are converted into
annual MPCs using Auclert (2019)’s conversion formula (1.16).
Figure A.1k plots the annual MPC estimates of Peru and the U.S. This figure verifies that the
two main findings – (i) the mean MPC being substantially higher and (ii) within-country MPC
heterogeneity over the income distribution being substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S.–
are robust in the continuous-time model in which both the time aggregation problem and the time
inconsistency problem with a longer reference period for income than that for consumption are
explicitly addressed.
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It is noteworthy that the time inconsistency problem with a reference period for income being
longer than that for consumption could be more serious in the PSID than in ENAHO. In ENAHO,
both the reference periods for income and expense items included in the baseline measures of
income and consumption are restricted to be within the previous three months. On the other hand,
in the PSID, the reference periods for income items are fixed at a year, while the reference periods
for expense items could be as short as a week, depending on the interpretation of the questionnaires.
(See the discussion in footnote 19 of the main text.) As another robustness check for the concern
that this time inconsistency problem is more serious in the PSID than in ENAHO, we can consider
a case in which this time inconsistency problem is present only in the U.S. In this case, the relevant
comparison should be between the MPC estimates of Peruvian households in Figure A.1j and those
of U.S. households in Figure A.1k. The two main findings robustly appear even in this comparison.





























𝑖,𝑇+𝑁 ] = 0, 𝑁 ≥ 2.
From these four equations, we can derive
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑇 ,Δ





































the MPC out of a transitory income shock approaches infinity as 𝑚 goes to infinity. This conclu-
sion is contradictory to any continuous-time model with finite interest rates. In other words, the




) = (𝑌𝑖,𝑇 , ?̄?𝑖,𝑇 ) cannot explain data that exhibits inequality
(A.74).











equation (A.73) is not necessarily inconsistent with the discrete-time model. More importantly,
equation (A.73) is helpful to understand the bias caused by the time-inconsistency problem with a
longer reference period for consumption. When the true lengths of the reference periods for con-
sumption and income are 1 and 1
𝑚
, respectively, and we falsely treat the length for the reference
periods for both income and consumption as 1 in the estimation, there is a time inconsistency prob-
lem in such a way that the true reference period for income is shorter than that for consumption.









. As equation (A.73) shows, this is
an underestimation.
It is worth noting that the time inconsistency problem with a longer reference period for con-
sumption can be present in the Peruvian sample but not in the U.S. sample, as discussed in footnote
19. In other words, the MPCs of Peruvian households are underestimated, while those of U.S.
households are not, if any significant bias is generated by this problem. In this case, correcting this
problem will only widen the MPC gap between Peru and the U.S.
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A.4.10 Using a Different Age Restriction for Household Heads in the Sample Selection
In the baseline sample selection, I restrict the ages of household heads to be between 25 and
65 in both the Peruvian and U.S. samples. Kaplan et al. (2014b) uses a narrower selection by
restricting the ages of household heads to be between 25 and 55. Here, I conduct a robustness
check by adopting Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s age restriction (or, equivalently, dropping observations
with household heads younger than 25 or older than 55). Figure A.1l plots the result.
A.4.11 Using an Alternative Definition of Income Outliers in the Sample Selection
As discussed in Appendix A.2.3, there is a difference in the definition of income outliers in
the Peruvian sample selection and the U.S. sample selection. In the Peruvian sample selection, I
define income outliers as households whose income growth is in the range of the extreme 1 percent
(0.5 percent at the top and 0.5 percent at the bottom) in the calendar-year sub-samples at least one
time. In the U.S. sample selection, I adopt Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s definition of income outliers.
They categorize households as income outliers if their nominal income is below 100 Dollars or
their income growth is greater than 5 or less than -0.8 at least one time. I do not use this criteria
for the Peruvian sample selection because it is not straightforward to determine the right cutoffs
for Peruvian households reflecting cross-country differences including the difference in growth
units (the two-year-over-two-year growth of annual income for U.S. households, the year-over-
year growth of quarterly income for Peruvian households).
Regarding the difference in the definition of outliers, I conduct a robustness check by defining
Peruvian income outliers in a more similar fashion with Kaplan et al. (2014b), despite the difficulty
of finding the right corresponding cutoffs. Specifically, I categorize Peruvian households as income
outliers if their nominal income is below 150 Sols10 or their income growth is greater than 5 or less
than -0.8 at least one time. Figure A.1m plots the MPC estimates under the alternative definition
of income outliers in the Peruvian sample selection.
10The cutoff of 150 Sols is chosen by reflecting the fact that the ‘PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international
$)’ of World Development Indicators (WDI) varies from 1.34 to 1.56 during 2004-2016.
135
A.4.12 Selecting Male Heads Only in the Sample Selection
In the baseline sample selection, I include both households with male heads and those with
female heads in both the Peruvian and U.S. samples. In this robustness check, I drop households
with female heads. Figure A.1n plots the result.
A.4.13 Applying a Stricter Rule in Detecting Potentially Fake Type-2 Observations
In the sample selection for the Peruvian sample, I detect and drop potentially fake type-2 obser-
vations, which are likely to connect two different households. As discussed in Appendix A.2.4, I
identify them by type-2 observations that do not have any verified same member. In this robustness
check, I apply a stricter rule in detecting them at the cost of a smaller sample size as follows: if the
number of verified same members of a type-2 observation is less than half of the household size for
any of the two households connected as the type-2 observation, I identify it as a potentially fake
type-2 observation and drop it. Figure A.1o plots the MPC estimation result under the stricter rule.
A.5 MPC Comparison over the PPP-converted level of income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
In this section, I test a null hypothesis that MPC is a function of the PPP-converted level
of income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 (including both predictable and unpredictable components), regardless of whether
households live in Peru or in the U.S. To this end, I sort households by 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 (instead of 𝑦𝑖,𝑡) to
construct income deciles, estimate MPCs of the deciles, and plot them over the 𝑥-axis of the PPP-
converted group-average values of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 in Figure A.2.11 It turns out that the top three deciles in
Peru and the bottom three deciles in the U.S. overlap in their PPP-converted income, and in the
overlapped region, the MPC estimates of the Peruvian top three deciles are substantially higher
than those of the U.S. bottom three deciles. To see if the cross-country MPC gap in the overlapped
region is statistically significant, I conduct a two-sided test on the null hypothesis that the mean
MPC of the Peruvian top three deciles is equal to that of the U.S. bottom three deciles. As Table
11For the PPP conversion, I use WDI’s data series, ‘PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $)’.
136
A.4 reports, the mean MPC of the Peruvian top three deciles (44.2 percent) is significantly different
from the mean MPC of the U.S. bottom three deciles (17.3 percent) at the 1% confidence level.
Figure A.2: Annual MPCs of 𝑌𝑖,𝑡-deciles on the 𝑥-axis of PPP-converted group-average 𝑌𝑖,𝑡
Notes: Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
Table A.4: Mean MPC Comparison in the Overlapped Region
Peruvian Top Three Deciles U.S. Bottom Three Deciles
mean MPC 0.442 0.173
(0.062) (0.046)
𝑝-value 0.00048
Notes: The last row of the table reports the 𝑝-value of the two-sided test on the null hypothesis that the mean MPC of
the top three income(𝑌𝑖,𝑡 ) deciles in Peru is equal to that of the bottom three deciles in the U.S.
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Appendix B: Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Consumption Growth Rates and Standard Errors in Numerical Values
In this section, I report the numerical values of the consumption growth rates and standard
errors plotted in Figure 2.2.
Table B.1: Group Average Consumption Growth Difference against the Top Income Decile
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Peru 0.302 0.232 0.197 0.168 0.142 0.108 0.097 0.051 0.044 0
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (n.a.)
N 2,364 2,375 2,309 2,230 2,177 2,080 2,116 2,116 2,134 2,087
U.S. 0.078 0.049 0.048 0.030 0.039 0.035 0.029 0.032 0.027 0
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (n.a.)
N 1,811 1,949 2,031 2,058 2,076 2,091 2,055 1,978 1,938 1,859
Notes: The estimates and the standard errors reported in this table are used to plot Figure 2.2.
B.2 Robustness for the Group Average Consumption Growth Difference against the Top
Income Decile
This subsection presents robustness checks for the patterns in the group-average consumption
growth difference against the top income decile. Each panel of Figure B.1 plots the consumption
growth differences of each robustness check. From the panels in Figure B.1, we can observe
that the two main patterns in Figure 2.2 – (i) lower income deciles exhibiting higher consumption
growth in both countries and (ii) the first pattern being substantially stronger in Peru than in the
U.S. – robustly appear in the following alternative setups.
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B.2.1 Including Non-purchased Consumption
As in Appendix A.4.1, I include non-purchased consumption in the measures of consumption
in both the Peruvian and U.S. samples. Figure B.1a plots the result.
B.2.2 Restricting Expense Categories to Those Available in the PSID
As in Appendix A.4.2, I exclude clothing, recreation, alcohol, and tobacco from the consump-
tion of Peruvian households. Figure B.1b plots the result.
B.2.3 Excluding Expense Items from Income
As in Appendix A.4.4, I exclude rental equivalence of housing provided by work and rental
equivalence of donated housing from the income of Peruvian households. In principle, this change
of income definition can affect the group-average consumption growth by changing the income
quantiles of the households. Figure B.1c plots the result.
B.2.4 Sorting Income (𝑦𝑖,𝑡) in Different Observation Pools
As in Appendix A.4.5, I sort income in different observation pools from the baseline analysis,
including (i) the pool of each calendar year (not only for the U.S. sample, but also for the Peruvian
sample), and (ii) the pool of the whole sample years. Figure B.1d and Figure B.1e plot the results
under the pool of each calendar year and the pool of the whole sample years, respectively.
B.2.5 Incorporating a Subsistence Point into the Preference
As in Appendix A.4.7, I incorporate the subsistence point in the form of Stone-Geary prefer-
ence into the model. Figure B.1f plots the result.
B.2.6 Using a Different Age Restriction for Household Heads in the Sample Selection
As in Appendix A.4.10, I change the age restriction from 25 - 65 to 25-55 in the sample
selection for both the Peruvian and U.S. samples. Figure B.1g plots the result.
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(a) Including Non-purchased 𝐶 (b) Expense Categories in PSID (c) No Expense in 𝑌
(d) Calendar Year Pool (e) Whole Sample Years Pool (f) Stone-Geary Preference
(g) Head Age 25 - 55 (h) Alternative Income Outliers (i) Male Heads Only
(j) Stricter Rule for Fake Type-2 (k) First Two of Type-3 Obs. (l) Last Two of Type-3 Obs.
(m) Sorted by Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑡 (n) Normalized by 𝜎(Δ𝐾 𝑐𝑡 )
Figure B.1: Robustness – Group-average Consumption Growth Difference against the Top
Income Decile
Notes: In the 𝑥-axis of each panel, 1 is the bottom decile. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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B.2.7 Using an Alternative Definition of Income Outliers in the Sample Selection
In this robustness check, I use the alternative definition of income outliers for the Peruvian
sample selection discussed in Appendix A.4.11. Figure B.1h plots the result.
B.2.8 Selecting Male Heads Only in the Sample Selection
As in Appendix A.4.12, I drop households with female heads in both the Peruvian and U.S.
samples. Figure B.1i plots the result.
B.2.9 Applying a Stricter Rule in Detecting Potentially Fake Type-2 Observations
As in Appendix A.4.13, I apply the stricter rule in detecting potentially fake type-2 observations
in the sample selection for the Peruvian sample. Figure B.1j plots the result.
B.2.10 Using Type-3 Observations Only
In the main text, the analysis of comparing group-average consumption growth of the income
deciles against the top decile uses type-2 observations, while the MPC estimation uses type-3
observations. As a consequence, the former uses a far larger number of observations than the
latter. The larger number of observations in the consumption growth comparison improves the
precision of the estimates but can also cause a concern of not using the same set of observations
as the MPC estimation. To resolve this concern, I conduct the consumption growth comparison
using only the type-3 observations that are used in the MPC estimation. Specifically, a type-3
observation of household 𝑖 in 𝑡−𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡 +𝐾 is sorted by its unpredictable component of income
in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , and the consumption growth Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is used for the group-average consumption
growth comparison. Figure B.1k plots the result. Although the confidence intervals are wider than
Figure 2.2 due to a smaller sample size, we can robustly observe the two main patterns – (i) lower
income deciles exhibiting higher consumption growth in both countries and (ii) the first pattern
being substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S.
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Each type-3 observation includes two type-2 observations: the first two and last two survey
responses. In Figure B.1k, I use the former type-2 observation of each type-3 observation. In
Figure B.1l, I instead use the latter type-2 observation of each type-3 observation. Specifically,
when a type-3 observation is composed of a household’s survey responses in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡, and
𝑡 + 𝐾 , I sort it by its unpredictable component of income in period 𝑡, and the consumption growth
Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 is used for the group-average consumption growth comparison. Again, the confidence
intervals are wider than Figure 2.2, but we can robustly observe the two main patterns.
B.2.11 Sorting Observations with Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡
As discussed in subsection 2.2, households with lower income are more likely to be constrained
because they are more likely to have received negative transitory income shocks and want to run
down their asset position. If this is indeed the main reason why we observe the two main patterns
– (i) lower income deciles exhibiting higher consumption growth in both countries and (ii) the first
pattern being substantially stronger in Peru – in Figure 2.2, we should observe the same patterns
when we group observations based on income growth Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 instead of income level 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 because
the income growth also includes temporary income shock 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 , as seen in equation (1.9). To verify
whether it is the case, I group type-3 observations of household 𝑖 appearing in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡,
and 𝑡 + 𝐾 using income growth Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , and compare the group averages of consumption growth
Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 . Figure B.1m plots the result. The two main patterns of Figure 2.2 robustly appear in this
figure.
For the comparison between the income growth grouping and the income level grouping, the
right point of comparison against Figure B.1m is Figure B.1l. This is because both figures use the
consumption growth of the second type-2 observation of each type-3 observation (i.e., Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡+𝐾
for each type-3 observation of period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡 + 𝐾) and the only difference between the two
figures is that one figure groups observations by Δ𝐾 𝑦𝑡 , while the other one groups them by 𝑦𝑡 . For
the sake of comparison, I plot the point estimates of Figure B.1l in Figure B.1m as black thin lines
with star markers. As the comparison shows, the degree of within-country heterogeneity in the
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consumption growth under the income growth grouping is similar to that under the income level
grouping in both countries.
B.2.12 Normalizing the Consumption Growth Differences with Standard Deviations
We observe the year-over-year growth of quarterly consumption in the Peruvian sample and the
two-year-over-two-year growth of annual consumption in the U.S. sample. Despite this difference
in growth units, in Figure 2.2, I plot the graphs of both countries for the consumption growth
differences against the top income decile in percent points and make visual comparison. This
comparison is justifiable because the standard deviation of the observed consumption growth in
the Peruvian sample (45.3 percent) is in the same ballpark as the standard deviation in the U.S.
sample (38.7 percent). To illustrate this point, I plot the consumption growth differences in the
unit of the standard deviation in Figure B.1n. The graphs in this figure do not look much different
from those in Figure 2.2, and the two main patterns – (i) lower income deciles exhibiting higher
consumption growth and (ii) the first pattern being substantially stronger in Peru than in the U.S.–
robustly appear in this figure.
B.3 The Advantage of Income Grouping in Detecting Liquidity Constraints
I use income deciles to split the sample into groups. The income measure I use to construct the
income deciles is the unpredictable (by observable characteristics) component of labor income and
transfers. As discussed in subsection 2.2, the standard incomplete-market precautionary-saving
models predict that this income grouping can pick up the effect of liquidity constraints since lower-
income households are more likely to be constrained than higher-income households. This paper
is not the first to exploit this fact. For example, Zeldes (1989) tests for the presence of liquidity
constraints for groups of households using lagged income as an instrument.
In the literature, wealth grouping or liquid-wealth grouping are more common grouping strate-
gies for the identification of households that are at or close to liquidity constraints. For example,
Zeldes (1989) uses net worth to split the sample into groups. Kaplan et al. (2014b) focus on
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households that hold little liquid wealth. In particular, they emphasize the existence of wealthy
hand-to-mouth households, who are wealthy in illiquid assets but hold little liquid wealth, and
find that their consumption response to transitory income shocks is as sensitive as that of poor
hand-to-mouth households, who are poor in both illiquid and liquid assets.
Admittedly, I choose income grouping because wealth grouping or liquid-wealth grouping are
not available for the Peruvian sample, as ENAHO does not collect detailed information on wealth.
However, it is also noteworthy that the income grouping I use in this paper might have an advantage
in detecting the effect of liquidity constraints compared to wealth grouping or liquid-wealth group-
ing. As Aguiar et al. (2019) point out, low-wealth or low-liquid-wealth households may exhibit
high MPC not because they are at or close to liquidity constraints but because they have preferences
for low wealth targets. If preference heterogeneity is allowed in the standard incomplete-market
precautionary-saving models, households with a low degree of patience (𝛽𝑖) or a high degree of
IES (1/𝜎𝑖) will have low wealth targets because they front-load consumption. At the same time,
they would exhibit high MPC even in the absence of liquidity constraints exactly because of their
front-loading behavior.
In supporting their argument that wealth-poor or liquid-wealth-poor households are not neces-
sarily at or close to liquidity constraints, Aguiar et al. (2019) show that the average consumption
growth of U.S. hand-to-mouth households is not greater than that of non-hand-to-mouth house-
holds. To see if this is also the case in the U.S. sample I use in this paper, I repeat the analyses
of subsection 1.4.1 and 2.2 but using the U.S. hand-to-mouth groups. In doing so, I adopt Kaplan
et al. (2014b)’s definition of poor-hand-to-mouth (PHM), wealthy-hand-to-mouth (WHM), and
non-hand-to-mouth (NHM) households and use the identifiers of these groups included in their
dataset.
Figure B.2a plots the annual MPC estimates for the U.S. PHM, WHM, and NHM groups. For
the sake of comparison, Figure B.2a also plots the MPC estimates for the U.S. income deciles and
the Peruvian income deciles presented in Figure 1.1.
Two patterns are worth noting from Figure B.2a. First, as Kaplan et al. (2014b) highlight,
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(a) Annual MPCs (b) Average Consumption Growth Differences
Figure B.2: Comparison with U.S. Hand-to-Mouth Groups
Notes: Figure B.2a plots the annual MPCs of the poor hand-to-mouth (PHM), wealthy hand-to-mouth (WHM), and
non-hand-to-mouth (NHM) groups defined in Kaplan et al. (2014b) on top of Figure 1.1. The unfilled circle markers
represent the point estimates for these groups, and the vertical lines passing the markers represent 95% confidence
intervals. Figure B.2b plots the difference between the group-average consumption growth of PHM and WHM against
that of NHM on top of Figure 2.2.
the consumption of PHM and WHM households responds more sensitively to transitory income
shocks than that of NHM households in their dataset. The annual MPCs of PHM (11.7 percent)
and WHM (10.3 percent) are approximately twice as large as that of NHM (5.4 percent).1 Second,
even when compared with PHM and WHM in the U.S., the MPCs of Peruvian income deciles are
substantially higher.
Figure B.2b plots the difference between the average consumption growth in the following
period of PHM and WHM against that of NHM. For the sake of comparison, Figure B.2b also
plots the difference between the average consumption growth of the income deciles against that of
the top income decile in Peru and the U.S. presented in Figure 2.2.
In accordance with Aguiar et al. (2019)’s finding, Figure B.2b shows that the following-period
consumption growth of PHM households and that of WHM households are not significantly greater
than that of NHM households in Kaplan et al. (2014b)’s dataset. This result suggests that PHM and
WHM households might not necessarily be more constrained than NHM households in the U.S.
1The annual MPC estimates I report here are different from the numbers reported in Kaplan et al. (2014b) for
the following reasons. First, they report estimates on Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameter 𝜓, while I
compute MPC by multiplying 𝜓 with the consumption-output ratio. Second, I revise their consumption measure and
sample selection procedure as discussed in section 1.3.
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In contrast, under the income grouping, we can observe clear patterns in the same U.S. sample
that lower income deciles tend to exhibit higher consumption growth and all the other nine deciles
exhibit significantly greater consumption growth than the top income decile. This result suggests
that unlike the wealth grouping, the income grouping used in this paper successfully picks up the
effect of liquidity constraints.
Theoretically, this outcome may arise because labor income and transfers are less affected by
preference heterogeneity than wealth. For example, when preference heterogeneity is introduced
into the standard models in such a way that it is independent of the labor income process and
transfers (which is a common assumption in such models with preference heterogeneity), prefer-
ence heterogeneity affects individual wealth levels by changing the target wealth, while it does not
affect individual levels of labor income and transfers.
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Appendix C: Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Details on MPC Estimation
C.1.1 Method
The method I use in this paper to estimate MPCs out of transitory income shocks is an extended
version of Blundell et al. (2008). Let the individual labor income 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 be specified as follows.
log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑡 + 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + Z𝑖,𝑡 ,
Z𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑝𝑠), 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 ∼𝑖𝑖𝑑 (0, 𝜎2𝑡𝑟), and (Z𝑖,𝑡)𝑡 ⊥ (𝜖𝑖,𝑡)𝑡
in which (𝑥𝑡)𝑡 represents time series (· · · , 𝑥𝑡−2, 𝑥𝑡−1, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑡+2, · · · ). 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 denotes a vector of
dummy variables for observable characteristics of household 𝑖.1
Let 𝜓𝐺 be Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameter to transitory income shocks for
group 𝐺, which is defined as follows.
𝜓𝐺 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
in which 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 and 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 are the log consumption and log income after controlling for the observable
characteristics. (By definition, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = log𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑍′𝑖,𝑡𝜑𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 .) In other words, parameter
𝜓𝐺 is the elasticity of consumption with respect to income when the income change is caused
1The observable characteristics of households include education, ethnicity, employment status, region, cohort,
household size, number of children, urban area, the existence of members other than heads and spouses earning
income, and the existence of persons who do not live with but are financially supported by the household. Among
these characteristics, education, ethnicity, employment status, and region are allowed to have time-varying effects.
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by a transitory income shock. We can obtain the estimate of 𝜓𝐺 following Kaplan and Violante
(2010)’s identification strategy for Blundell et al. (2008)’s partial insurance parameters under the
‘AR(1)+I.I.D.’ specification of the income process as follows. Let Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 and Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 be
Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 , 𝐾 ≥ 1, and





𝜌𝑠Z𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜌𝐾𝜖𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 .
When the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡) is independent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0 and Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 is indepen-
dent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥1, we can derive
𝜓𝐺 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ𝐾𝑐𝑖,𝑡 , Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝑐𝑜𝑣 [Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , Δ̃𝐾 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
. (C.1)
To identify 𝜓𝐺 using equation (C.1), we need the value of 𝜌. Adopting Floden and Lindé (2001)’s






𝐸 [𝑦𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑛𝐾] =
𝜎2𝑝𝑠
1 − 𝜌2
𝜌𝑛𝐾 , 𝑛 ≥ 1.
Once 𝜌 is estimated, I estimate 𝜓𝐺 using equation (C.1). Since 𝜓𝐺 is an elasticity, I obtain the
MPC estimate by multiplying 𝜓𝐺 with the consumption-to-income ratio as follows.
𝑀𝑃𝐶𝐺 = 𝜓𝐺
𝐸 [𝐶𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
𝐸 [𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 | (𝑖, 𝑡) ∈ 𝐺]
.
As discussed in section 3.2, ENAHO provides year-over-year growth of quarterly income and
2In this estimation, I obtain the estimates of 𝜌, 𝜎𝑝𝑠 , and 𝜎𝑡𝑟 . I also use these estimates in calibrating the idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity process in the model of this paper in subsection 3.4.1.
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consumption. Therefore, I set one period as a quarter and 𝐾 = 4 for the Peruvian sample. As a
result of estimation, I obtain the quarterly MPCs of Peruvian households. On the other hand, the
PSID provides two-year-over-two-year growth of annual income and consumption. Thus, I set one
period as a year and 𝐾 = 2 for the U.S. sample. As a result of estimation, I obtain the annual MPCs
of U.S. households.
C.1.2 Revisions on the MPC estimation procedure of chapter 1
In section 3.2, I make three revisions to the MPC estimation procedure of chapter 1 that are
necessary to use the MPC estimates in disciplining the model presented in this paper. First, I
change the consumption measure from non-durable consumption to total consumption (including
both non-durable consumption and durable consumption). When taking the model to data in sec-
tion 3.4, after the model is calibrated by targeting the MPC estimates, aggregate shock processes
(together with a few other model parameters) are Bayesian-estimated using macro data. In this
step, I use total consumption series (as most studies in the literature of emerging market business
cycles do) because non-durable consumption series is not available in Peruvian national accounts.
To make the consumption concept consistent between micro and macro data, I use the total con-
sumption measure when analyzing the micro data, too. Second, I change the sample periods for
both ENAHO and the PSID because some of the key durable expenses are available only after cer-
tain years in both surveys. Specifically, I use the 2011-2018 waves of ENAHO and the 2005-2017
waves of the PSID.3 Third, the income process specification is revised to be consistent with the
3My ENAHO sample starts from 2011 because of the following reason. ENAHO is conducted continuously (i.e.,
households are interviewed in different months) and the reference periods of income and expense items are usually in
the format of a specified period before the interview (such as ‘previous 𝑛 months’) rather than a fixed calender period
(such as ‘during 2014’). Naturally, I set the reference periods of the consumption and income measures in the same
format (i.e., a specified period before the interview such as ‘previous 𝑛 months’). One exception is Questionnaire
612. This questionnaire collects information on household furnishings, equipment, and vehicles, which take a sizable
portion of durable goods. Until 2010, this questionnaire asks which calendar year each item is acquired, and thus it
is not possible to aggregate this questionnaire’s expense items with other expense items under a consistent reference
period format. From 2011 onward, Questionnaire 612 asks the acquisition month instead of the acquisition year, which
makes it possible to recover this questionnaire’s expense items during a specified period before the interview (such as
‘previous 𝑛months’) and to aggregate these expense items with other expense items under a consistent reference period
format. My PSID sample starts from 2005 because the survey began to collect expenses on household furnishings and
equipment since then. Moreover, some non-durable items including clothing and recreation are also collected from
2005 onward.
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model in this paper. Blundell et al. (2008)’s estimation method requires the structural specification
of the income process. In the baseline estimation of chapter 1, the income process is specified as
the sum of a permanent component and a transitory component in which the permanent component
follows a random walk, as in the original specification of Blundell et al. (2008). In this paper, I
instead specify the income process as the sum of a persistent (but not permanent) component and a
transitory component by replacing the random walk component with an AR(1) process so that the
income process used in the empirical estimation is consistent with the model in this paper.4
C.1.3 Reference Periods
In ENAHO, the reference periods are not equal across income and expense items. Typically,
expenses or incomes that occur less frequently tend to have longer reference periods. More impor-
tantly, households report most items (97.7% of income items, 92.9% of expense items, on average)
with reference periods no longer than the previous three months. Given this feature of the data, I
set the reference period of consumption and income measures as the previous three months. In ag-
gregating items to construct income and consumption, items with different reference periods than
the previous three months are scaled to three-month expenses or incomes. (For example, monthly
tobacco expenses are scaled up to three-month expenses by multiplying by three.) Moreover, in
order to remove any comovement between income and consumption generated by income shocks
prior to the previous three months, I exclude income items with reference periods longer than the
previous three months in constructing income.
In the PSID, the reference periods of incomes are firmly fixed to a calendar year. However,
the reference periods of expense items can depend on interpretation, as Crawley (2019) points out.
For example, food expenses in the PSID can be interpreted either as the last week’s expense or the
average weekly expense during the calendar year. I adopt the latter interpretation as many other
studies do, and treat the reference periods of expense items as being synchronized with those of
income items. Naturally, I set the reference period of consumption and income measures as the
4I also use this income process specification in one of the robustness checks of chapter 1 in Appendix A.4.6.
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corresponding calender year.
As discussed in section 3.2, ENAHO is conducted annually, and I use the 2011-2018 waves.
This ENAHO sample provides seven years of year-over-year growth of quarterly income and con-
sumption. For the PSID, I use the 2005-2017 waves, and the survey is conducted biannually during
the sample period. This PSID sample provides six years of two-year-over-two-year growth of an-
nual income and consumption.
C.1.4 Variable Construction
The consumption measure used in the MPC estimation is total consumption, which includes
both non-durable consumption and durable consumption. To this end, I aggregate the following
expenses in each of ENAHO and the PSID: non-durable expenses including 1) food, 2) clothing
(including clothing services, footwear, watches and jewelry), 3) housing rent, rental equivalence
of owned or donated housing, 4) utilities (heat, electricity, water, etc.), 5) telephone and cable,
6) vehicle repairs and maintenance, 7) gasoline and oil, 8) parking, 9) public transportation, 10)
household repairs and maintenance, 11) recreation, 12) insurance (home insurance, car insurance,
health insurance, etc.), 13) childcare, 14) domestic services and other home services, 15) per-
sonal care, 16) alcohol, 17) tobacco, and 18) daily non-durables (laundry items, bathroom items,
matches, candle, stationeries, etc.), and durable expenses including 19) vehicles, 20) furnishings
and equipment (textiles, furniture, floor coverings, appliances, housewares, etc.), 21) health, and
22) education.5 Among the listed expenses, ENAHO does not have expenses on 13) childcare,
and the PSID does not have expenses on 14) domestic services and other home services, 15) per-
sonal care, 16) alcohol, 17) tobacco, and 18) daily non-durables (laundry items, bathroom items,
matches, candle, stationeries, etc.).
For both ENAHO and the PSID, the income measure used in the MPC estimation is the sum of
disposable labor income and transfers, as in Blundell et al. (2008). Capital income is excluded in
5In listing the expenses, I categorize expenses on 21) health and 22) education as durable expenses because of
their durable nature. In national accounts, however, they are categorized as non-durable consumption. Since I use total
consumption, whether these expenses are categorized as durable expenses or non-durable expenses do not have any
effect.
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order not to falsely attribute endogenous capital income changes as income shocks. In ENAHO,
capital income and labor income are not distinguishable in self-employment income. As in Diaz-
Gimenez et al. (1997), Krueger and Perri (2006), and my chapter 1, I split the self-employment
income into labor income part and capital income part using the ratio between unambiguous capital
income and unambiguous labor income in the sample.6 In ENAHO, there are a small fraction of
income items that have reference periods longer than the previous three months. As discussed in
subsection C.1.3, I exclude them from the income measure. In the PSID, I closely follow Kaplan
et al. (2014b) in constructing disposable labor income and transfers. Specifically, disposable labor
income and transfers are constructed by i) estimating federal income taxes for total income (in-
cluding both the component of labor income and transfers and the component of capital income)
by TAXSIM program, ii) allocating federal taxes for the component of labor income and transfers
using the ratio between this component and the component of capital income in the total income,
and iii) subtracting the estimated federal taxes for labor income and transfers from gross labor
income and transfers.
For both ENAHO and the PSID, consumption and income are deflated using CPI series. Unlike
the reference periods in the PSID sample, the reference periods in the ENAHO sample are not fixed
to a calendar period. For example, the three-month window of the reference periods for households
surveyed in January, 2015 is one-month earlier than the three-month window for households sur-
veyed in February, 2015. Fortunately, this data feature does not complicate the deflation procedure
because ENAHO provides within-year-deflated values for income and expense items. For exam-
ple, the within-year-deflated values of the food expenses spent on July 2018 are expressed in terms
of the 2018 price level. Using these within-year-deflated values, I construct real income and con-
sumption of the ENAHO sample as follows. I first aggregate the within-year-deflated values of
income and expense items to construct the within-year-deflated income and consumption mea-
sures. Then, I deflate these within-year-deflated income and consumption measures using annual
6In the ENAHO sample, the ratio of (unambiguous labor income)(unambiguous labor income)+(unambiguous capital income) is 0.817. This




The sample selection procedure closely follows chapter 1. To describe the procedure, it is con-
venient to distinguish different units of observations. Let type-𝑛 observation be an observation of a
household over 𝑛 consecutive periods. For example, if a household appears three consecutive times
in the sample, we obtain three type-1 observations, two type-2 observations, and one type-3 obser-
vation associated with this household. Note that observation (𝑖, 𝑡) in the MPC estimation procedure
described in Appendix C.1.1 represents a type-3 observation, as it is composed of observations on
income and consumption of household 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡 + 𝐾 .
Each of the sample selection criteria is applied to either type-1 or type-2 observations. When a
type-1 observation is dropped, any type-2 and type-3 observations containing the dropped type-1
observation are dropped. When a type-2 observation is dropped, any type-1 observations that do
not belong to any other type-2 observation are dropped, and any type-3 observations that contain
the dropped type-2 observations are dropped.
In ENAHO, the sample selection proceeds as follows. First, type-1 observations are dropped
if they do not belong to any type-2 observation. Second, type-2 observations that have at least one
of the following problems are dropped: i) the interview months are not matched between the two
consecutive surveys, ii) the observations are likely to falsely connect two different households7, or
iii) the head of the household changed between the two consecutive surveys. Third, type-1 obser-
vations are dropped if the interviews are categorized as ‘incomplete’ by pollsters. Fourth, type-1
observations are dropped if household heads are younger than 25 or older than 65. Fifth, type-1
observations are dropped if any of the household characteristics in 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 are missing. Sixth, type-1
observations are dropped when consumption or income are non-positive. Seventh, type-1 observa-
7In ENAHO, panel households are selected based on addresses. The risk of falsely connecting two different
households exists when an old household moves out and a new household moves in to a selected address. Type-
2 observations subject to this risk, which is defined as ‘potentially fake type-2 observations’ in chapter 1, can be
effectively detected and dropped by checking the household-member-level match between the two consecutive periods.
For detailed discussion on why this problem exists and how to detect the potentially fake type-2 observations, see
Appendix A.2.4.
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tions are dropped when they have too much value in income items with reference periods longer
than the previous three months, or more specifically, when
(
income items with reference periods




(baseline income measure)+(income items with reference
periods longer than the previous three months)
)
is greater than 5%. Eighth, type-1 observations
are dropped when households are categorized as income outliers. Households are categorized as
income outliers if their income growth falls into the range of extreme 1% (0.5% at the top, 0.5% at
the bottom) in calendar-year subsamples at least one time. As a result of the sample selection, I ob-
tain 40,677 type-1 observations, 22,936 type-2 observations, and 9,906 type-3 observations. Panel
A of Table C.1 reports the selected observations in each step of the sample selection in ENAHO.
The sample selection in the PSID proceeds similarly to the sample selection in ENAHO as fol-
lows. First, type-1 observations are dropped if they do not belong to any type-2 observation with
Table C.1: Sample Selection
type-1 type-2 type-3
A. ENAHO
type-1 obs. not belonging to any type-2 obs. 87,305 59,691 32,077
months not matched, fake type-2 obs., or head changed 73,248 47,950 22,652
incomplete survey 63,410 38,343 17,386
age restriction, 25-65 48,636 28,983 12,971
observable characteristics missing 48,403 28,904 12,955
non-positive 𝑌 and 𝐶 48,144 28,613 12,788
too much 3ml in 𝑌 41,357 23,397 10,154
outliers on income growth 40,677 22,936 9,906
B. The PSID
type-1 obs. not belonging to any type-2 obs. 57,560 45,553 33,546
with a continued head
SEO sample 1968 and Latino sample 1990/1992 39,660 31,523 23,386
topcoded obs. 39,650 31,507 23,369
age restriction, 25-65 31,447 24,380 17,711
observable characteristics missing 30,225 23,277 16,805
non-positive 𝑌 and 𝐶 30,028 23,021 16570
outliers on income growth 29,145 22,345 16,092
Notes: In the penultimate line of panel A, ‘3ml’ is an abbreviation for ‘items with reference periods longer than the
previous three months’.
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a continued household head. Second, I drop type-1 observations if they belong to the sample from
Survey of Economic Opportunities (SEO) (added to the PSID in 1968) or to the Latino sample
(added to the PSID in 1990 and 1992). Third, I drop type-1 observations if they have topcoded
values in income or expense items. Fourth, type-1 observations are dropped if household heads
are younger than 25 or older than 65. Fifth, type-1 observations are dropped if any of the house-
hold characteristics in 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 are missing. Sixth, type-1 observations are dropped when income or
consumption are non-positive. Seventh, type-1 observations are dropped when households are cat-
egorized as income outliers. The definition of income outliers is the same as in the ENAHO sample
selection. Through this sample selection, I obtain 29,145 type-1 observations, 22,345 type-2 ob-
servations, and 16,092 type-3 observations. Panel B of Table C.1 reports the selected observations
in each step of the sample selection in the PSID.
C.1.6 Labor Income Grouping
As discussed in section 3.2, I group observation (𝑖, 𝑡)s into labor income deciles and estimate
the MPCs of each decile. The labor income deciles are constructed as follows. In the estimation
procedure described in Appendix C.1.1, observation (𝑖, 𝑡) is composed of household 𝑖’s income and
consumption in period 𝑡−𝐾 , 𝑡, and 𝑡+𝐾 . These observation (𝑖, 𝑡)s are sorted with the unpredictable
component of labor income in period 𝑡−𝐾 , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 .8 Specifically, in accordance with the time unit of
each survey (a quarter for ENAHO, a year for the PSID), observations are sorted within a calender
quarter subsample in ENAHO and within a calendar year subsample in the PSID. Survey weights
are taken into account when computing the quantiles of the sorted observations.
As discussed in subsection C.1.4, the income measure of Peruvian households does not include
income items with reference periods longer than the previous three months. Moreover, observa-
tions having too much value in this component are dropped in the sample selection, as discussed
in subsection C.1.5. If the share of this component in the household income is correlated with the
income level, this sample selection can create a selection bias. To resolve this concern, I follow
8Because observations are sorted by 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝐾 , the grouping of observation (𝑖, 𝑡)s is independent of (Z𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 , 𝜖𝑖,𝑡+ 𝑗 ) 𝑗≥0,
which is a necessary condition for the identification equation (C.1).
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chapter 1’s approach as follows. When sorting observations and computing their quantiles, I in-
clude dropped observations due to having too much value in income items with reference periods
longer than the previous three months. When sorting the selected observations together with the
dropped observations, I use the unpredictable component of a comprehensive income that includes
not only the baseline income measure but also the income items with reference periods longer than
the previous three months. The income items with reference periods longer than the previous three
months are bad because it generates comovement between income and consumption caused by
income shocks prior to the previous three months. However, they are helpful in determining where
the selected observations are located in the income distribution.
C.2 Details on How to Solve the Model
C.2.1 Equilibrium under Deterministic Paths of Aggregate Exogenous Variables
In this subsection, I characterize the equilibrium when the economy is subject to deterministic
paths of {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0.
C.2.1.1 Households
Under deterministic paths of {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0, households’ optimization problem can be
expressed as the following Bellman equation.
𝑉𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) = max
𝑐,𝑏,𝑎
𝑐1−𝛾













𝑐 + 𝑏 + 𝑎 + [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑎 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−) = 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝑏− + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−,
𝑎 ≥ 0, 𝑏 ≥ 0, and
log 𝑒 = log 𝑒1 + log 𝑒2.
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On the balanced growth path in which {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0 are constant at their long-run average
values, 𝑉𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0 grows with the rate of (𝑔∗)1−𝛾 (or equivalently, 𝑉𝑡+1 = (𝑔∗)1−𝛾𝑉𝑡).
Given the parametrization of 𝜒𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) in the main text, its first-order derivatives are
𝜒1,𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑣) 𝜒1𝜒2
 𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎− + 𝜒0𝑋𝑡−1
𝜒2−1 and
𝜒2,𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) = 𝜒1(1 − 𝜒2)
 𝑣(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎− + 𝜒0𝑋𝑡−1
𝜒2 (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ).
Both 𝜒1,𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) and 𝜒2,𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) are continuous everywhere, including the area around 𝑣 = 0.
Therefore, 𝜒𝑡 (𝑣, 𝑎−) is continuous and differentiable everywhere.
The optimality conditions of the households’ problem can be derived as follows.
𝑉𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) = max
𝑐,𝑏,𝑎,_,𝜑𝑏 ,𝜑𝑎
𝑐1−𝛾












+_{𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝑏− + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−
− 𝑐 − 𝑏 − 𝑎 − [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑎 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−)} + 𝜑𝑏𝑏 + 𝜑𝑎𝑎.












2, 𝑏, 𝑎) + 𝜑
𝑏, (C.3)











2, 𝑏, 𝑎) + 𝜑
𝑎, (C.4)
𝑉𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) = (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )_, (C.5)
𝑉𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) = _{(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )[𝑡𝜒1,𝑡 (𝑎 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−)
− [𝑡𝜒2,𝑡 (𝑎 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−)},
(C.6)
𝑐 + 𝑏 + 𝑎 + [𝑡𝜒𝑡 (𝑎 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, 𝑎−) = 𝑤𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )𝑏− + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎−, (C.7)
𝜑𝑏 ≥ 0, 𝑏 ≥ 0, 𝜑𝑏𝑏 = 0, and (C.8)
157
𝜑𝑎 ≥ 0, 𝑎 ≥ 0, 𝜑𝑎𝑎 = 0. (C.9)
C.2.1.2 Firms
Under deterministic paths of {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0, firms solve the following optimization prob-
lem.
max










a𝑡 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡−1, (C.12)






















The optimality conditions of the problem can be obtained as follows.
max



























































, 𝑡 ≥ 0,
(C.13)
1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0, and (C.14)
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The rest of the model (other than the households’ problem in Appendix C.2.1.1 and the firms’
problem in Appendix C.2.1.2) remains the same regardless of whether aggregate uncertainty is
present or not. In other words, the law of motion for Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−) (equation (3.3)), aggregation
of quantities (equation (3.4)) and households’ budget constraints (equation (3.5)), the labor union’s
intratemporal labor supply decision (equation (3.6)), domestic banks’ intratemporally equalized
financing costs between the two sources (equation (3.7)), the relationship between illiquid asset
returns and firms’ profits and total values (equation (3.9)), the determination of the interest rates
in the international financial market (equations (3.11) and (3.12)), the market clearing conditions
(equations (3.14), (3.15), and (3.16)), the resource constraint (equation (3.17)), and the identity
equation for the trade balance (equation (3.18)) hold true regardless of whether the economy faces
aggregate uncertainty or it faces deterministic paths of {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0.
C.2.1.4 Equilibrium under Deterministic Paths of Aggregate Exogenous Variables
Given the initial conditions on Ψ0(𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑋−1, 𝐴−1, 𝐾−1, 𝐷−1, 𝐵−1, 𝐹−1, 𝑟−1, and
deterministic paths of aggregate exogenous variables {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0,
i) individual households’ policy functions {𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−),
𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=0, first-order derivatives of the value functions {𝑉𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−),
𝑉𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=0, and Lagrangian multipliers {_𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−), 𝜑
𝑏
𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−),
𝜑𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=0 that satisfy households’ optimality conditions (C.2), (C.3), (C.4), (C.5),
(C.6), (C.7), (C.8), and (C.9),
ii) cross-sectional cumulative distributions {Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, 𝑏−, 𝑎−)}∞𝑡=1 that evolve over time accord-
ing to equation (3.3),
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iii) aggregate variables {𝐶𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , 𝜒𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 constructed by aggregating corresponding individ-
ual variables according to equation (3.4),
iv) prices and aggregate variables {𝑟𝑏𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑤𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡 ,Π𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡 , 𝐼𝑡 , 𝐾𝑡 , 𝐹𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , ?̂?𝑡 , 𝑇𝐵𝑡}∞𝑡=0 satis-
fying firms’ optimality conditions (C.10), (C.11), (C.12), (C.13), (C.14), and (C.15), and
other equilibrium conditions (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), (3.14), (3.15), (3.16), and
(3.18)
constitute the equilibrium of the economy.
C.2.2 Detrended Equilibrium under Deterministic Paths of Aggregate Exogenous Variables
C.2.2.1 Detrending
Since the equilibrium characterized in subsection C.2.1 exhibits nonstationarity inherited from
the stochastic trend {𝑋𝑡}∞𝑡=0, we need to detrend the equilibrium to make it stationary. To this end,
I detrend the variables and functions as follows.9
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑐𝑖,𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑏𝑖,𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 := 𝑎𝑖,𝑡/𝑋𝑡 ,


















𝑡 /𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?𝑡 := 𝑤𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1, Π̃𝑡 := Π𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1, ˜𝑇𝐵𝑡 := 𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1,
?̃?𝑡 := 𝐵𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 := 𝐴𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 := 𝑞𝑡/𝑋𝑡 ,
?̃?𝑡 := 𝐷𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , ˜̂𝐷𝑡 := ?̂?𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 := 𝐾𝑡/𝑋𝑡 , and ?̃?𝑡 := 𝐹𝑡/𝑋𝑡 .
9I detrend flow variables with 𝑋𝑡−1 and stock variables with 𝑋𝑡 as I find the consequent detrended equilibrium con-
ditions convenient to deal with. However, how the variables are detrended is immaterial to the equilibrium dynamics
of the original equilibrium once recovered from the equilibrium dynamics of the detrended equilibrium.
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Ψ̃𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) := Ψ𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1),
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) := 𝑉𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋−𝛾𝑡−1,
?̃?𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) := 𝑉𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋−𝛾𝑡−1,
𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = 𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋𝑡−1,
?̃?𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = 𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋𝑡 ,
?̃?𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = 𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋𝑡 ,
_̃𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = _𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋−𝛾𝑡−1,
?̃?𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = 𝜑𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋
−𝛾
𝑡−1,
?̃?𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = 𝜑𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1, ?̃?−𝑋𝑡−1)/𝑋
−𝛾
𝑡−1, and
?̃?𝑡 (?̃?, ?̃?−) := 𝜒1
 ?̃?(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?− + 𝜒0
𝜒2 ((1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?− + 𝜒0) .
The first-order derivatives of ?̃?𝑡 (?̃?, ?̃?−) are
?̃?1,𝑡 (?̃?, ?̃?−) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(?̃?)𝜒1𝜒2
 ?̃?(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?− + 𝜒0
𝜒2−1, and
?̃?2,𝑡 (?̃?, ?̃?−) = 𝜒1(1 − 𝜒2)
 ?̃?(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?− + 𝜒0
𝜒2 (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ).
Note that when 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 and ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖,𝑡/𝑋𝑡−1 = 𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑖,𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1, the following
relationships hold.
?̃?𝑡 (?̃?𝑖,𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝜒𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1)/𝑋𝑡−1,
?̃?1,𝑡 (?̃?𝑖,𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝜒1,𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1), and
?̃?2,𝑡 (?̃?𝑖,𝑡 , ?̃?𝑖,𝑡−1) = 𝜒2,𝑡 (𝑣𝑖,𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1).
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The optimality conditions of households are detrended as follows.














2, ?̃?, ?̃?) + ?̃?
𝑏, (C.17)














2, ?̃?, ?̃?) + ?̃?
𝑎,
(C.18)
?̃?𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )_̃, (C.19)
?̃?𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = _̃{(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )[𝑡 ?̃?1,𝑡 (𝑔𝑡 ?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?−, ?̃?−)
− [𝑡 ?̃?2,𝑡 (𝑔𝑡 ?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?−, ?̃?−)},
(C.20)
𝑐 + 𝑔𝑡 ?̃? + 𝑔𝑡 ?̃? + [𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 (𝑔𝑡 ?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?−, ?̃?−) = ?̃?𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )?̃?− + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?−, (C.21)
?̃?𝑏 ≥ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0, ?̃?𝑏 ?̃? = 0, and (C.22)
?̃?𝑎 ≥ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0, ?̃?𝑎 ?̃? = 0. (C.23)
The optimality conditions of firms are detrended as follows.





























































, 𝑡 ≥ 0,
(C.27)
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1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝑟𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0, and (C.28)






The other equilibrium conditions (3.3), (3.4), (3.6), (3.7), (3.9), (3.11),(3.12), (3.14), (3.15),
(3.16), and (3.18) are detrended as follows.
Ψ̃𝑡+1(𝑒′1, 𝑒
′
2, ?̃?, ?̃?) =
∫
𝑒1,𝑒2,?̃?−,?̃?−
𝑃(𝑒1,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒′1 |𝑒1,𝑡 = 𝑒1)𝑃(𝑒2,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒
′
2)



















[𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 (𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 )?̃?−, ?̃?−) 𝑑Ψ̃𝑡 ,
(C.31)
?̃?𝑡𝑒
1+𝜔 = ^𝐿𝜔𝑡 , (C.32)
1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 = 1 + 𝑟𝑡−1, 𝑡 ≥ 0, (C.33)
1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 =
Π̃𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡𝑞𝑡
𝑞𝑡−1

















+ `𝑡 − 1, (C.35)
˜̂𝐷𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 , (C.36)
𝐿𝑡 = 𝑒𝑙𝑡 , (C.37)
?̃?𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 , (C.38)
𝑞𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡 , and (C.39)
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˜𝑇𝐵𝑡 = −𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)?̃?𝑡−1. (C.40)
In addition, the aggregated budget constraint of households (3.5) and the resource constraint
(3.17) are detrended as follows.
?̃?𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 + ?̃?𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 = ?̃?𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡 )?̃?𝑡−1 + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ) ?̃?𝑡−1, and (C.41)










?̃?𝑡−1 + b (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)?̃?𝑡−1
= 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 ?̃?𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑡−1)?̃?𝑡−1.
(C.42)
C.2.2.2 Detrended Equilibrium under Deterministic Paths of Aggregate Exogenous Variables
Given the initial conditions on Ψ̃0(𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), ?̃?−1, ?̃?−1, ?̃?−1, ?̃?−1, ?̃?−1, 𝑟−1, and determin-
istic paths of aggregate exogenous variables {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0,
i) individual households’ detrended policy functions {𝑐𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), ?̃?𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−),
?̃?𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−)}∞𝑡=0, detrended first-order derivatives of the value functions
{?̃?𝑏,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), ?̃?𝑎,𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−)}∞𝑡=0, and detrended Lagrangian multipliers
{_̃𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), ?̃?𝑏𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), ?̃?𝑎𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−)}∞𝑡=0 that satisfy households’ detrended
optimality conditions (C.16), (C.17), (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), (C.21), (C.22), and (C.23),
ii) cross-sectional cumulative distributions {Ψ̃𝑡 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−)}∞𝑡=1 that evolve over time accord-
ing to equation (C.30),
iii) detrended aggregate variables {?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 constructed by aggregating correspond-
ing detrended individual variables according to equation (C.31),
iv) detrended prices and aggregate variables {𝑟𝑏𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , 𝑞𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 , 𝐿𝑡 , Π̃𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡 , 𝐼𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ˜𝑇𝐵𝑡}∞𝑡=0
satisfying firms’ optimality conditions (C.24), (C.25), (C.26), (C.27), (C.28), and (C.29),
and other equilibrium conditions (C.32), (C.33), (C.34), (C.35), (C.37), (C.38), (C.39), and
(C.40)
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constitute the detrended equilibrium of the economy.
C.2.2.3 Steady State of the Detrended Equilibrium
I solve the detrended equilibrium using Auclert et al. (2019)’s method, and the first step is to
solve its steady state. This subsection specifies the equilibrium conditions in the steady state of the
detrended equilibrium. For any variable 𝑈𝑡 and any function 𝐹𝑡 (·), 𝑈𝑠𝑠 and 𝐹𝑠𝑠 (·) represent their
steady state values, respectively.
The steady state values of the exogenous variables {𝑧𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡 , `𝑡 , [𝑡 , a𝑡}∞𝑡=0 are determined as fol-
lows.
𝑧𝑠𝑠 = 1, 𝑔𝑠𝑠 = 𝑔∗, `𝑠𝑠 = 1, [𝑠𝑠 = 1, and a𝑠𝑠 = 1
By the definition of ?̃?∗ and 𝑌 ∗, we have
?̃?𝑠𝑠 = ?̃?
∗ and 𝑌𝑠𝑠 = 𝑌 ∗.
In the steady state, households’ detrended policy functions 𝑐𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−),
?̃?𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), and ?̃?𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), detrended first-order derivatives of the value functions
?̃?𝑏,𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) and ?̃?𝑎,𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), and detrended Lagrangian multipliers _̃𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−),
?̃?𝑏𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−), and ?̃?𝑎𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) solve the following optimality conditions (C.43), (C.44),
(C.45), (C.46), (C.47), (C.48), (C.49), and (C.50).














2, ?̃?, ?̃?) + ?̃?
𝑏, (C.44)


















?̃?𝑏,𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑠𝑠)_̃, (C.46)
?̃?𝑎,𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) = _̃{(1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠) + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠) ?̃?1,𝑠𝑠 (𝑔𝑠𝑠?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠)?̃?−, ?̃?−)
− ?̃?2,𝑠𝑠 (𝑔𝑠𝑠?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠)?̃?−, ?̃?−)},
(C.47)
𝑐 + 𝑔𝑠𝑠 ?̃? + 𝑔𝑠𝑠?̃?+?̃?𝑠𝑠 (𝑔𝑠𝑠?̃? − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠)?̃?−, ?̃?−)
= ?̃?𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑠 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑠𝑠)?̃?− + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠)?̃?−,
(C.48)
?̃?𝑏 ≥ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0, ?̃?𝑏 ?̃? = 0, and (C.49)
?̃?𝑎 ≥ 0, ?̃? ≥ 0, ?̃?𝑎 ?̃? = 0. (C.50)
The detrended optimality conditions of firms become the following equations in the steady
state.








𝐼𝑠𝑠 = (𝑔𝑠𝑠 − 1 + 𝛿)?̃?𝑠𝑠, (C.53)










𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑠𝑠, and (C.55)









The other detrended equilibrium conditions become the following equations in the steady state.
Ψ̃𝑠𝑠 (𝑒′1, 𝑒
′
2, ?̃?, ?̃?) =
∫
𝑒1,𝑒2,?̃?−,?̃?−
𝑃(𝑒1,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒′1 |𝑒1,𝑡 = 𝑒1)𝑃(𝑒2,𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑒
′
2)




















?̃?𝑠𝑠 (𝑔𝑠𝑠?̃?𝑠𝑠 (𝑒1, 𝑒2, ?̃?−, ?̃?−) − (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠)?̃?−, ?̃?−) 𝑑Ψ̃𝑠𝑠,
(C.58)
?̃?𝑠𝑠𝑒
1+𝜔 = ^𝐿𝜔𝑠𝑠, (C.59)
𝑟𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑠𝑠, (C.60)
Π𝑠𝑠 = (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠 − 𝑔𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑠𝑠, (C.61)
𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟
∗, (C.62)
𝐿𝑠𝑠 = 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑠, (C.63)
?̃?𝑠𝑠 − ?̃?𝑠𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠𝑠, (C.64)
𝑞𝑠𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠𝑠, and (C.65)
˜𝑇𝐵𝑠𝑠 = (1 + 𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝑔𝑠𝑠)?̃?𝑠𝑠 . (C.66)
In addition, the detrended aggregated budget constraint of households (C.41) and the detrended
resource constraint (C.42) become the following equations in the steady state.
?̃?𝑠𝑠 + 𝑔𝑠𝑠 ?̃?𝑠𝑠 + 𝑔𝑠𝑠 ?̃?𝑠𝑠 + ?̃?𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡 + (1 − b) (1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑠𝑠)?̃?𝑠𝑠 + (1 + 𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑠) ?̃?𝑠𝑠, and (C.67)
?̃?𝑠𝑠 + 𝐼𝑠𝑠 + b (1 + 𝑟𝑠𝑠)?̃?𝑠𝑠 = 𝑌𝑠𝑠 − (1 + 𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝑔𝑠𝑠)?̃?𝑠𝑠 . (C.68)
By combining equations (C.61), (C.65), (C.51), (C.55), (C.56), (C.53), (C.54), and (C.64), we
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can obtain the following relationship among stock variables in the steady state.
?̃?𝑠𝑠 +
1
1 + 𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝑔𝑠𝑠
?̃?
𝑎𝑔𝑔
𝑠𝑠 = ?̃?𝑠𝑠 + ?̃?𝑠𝑠 + ?̃?𝑠𝑠 (C.69)
C.2.3 Solving the Detrended Equilibrium using Auclert et al. (2019)’s Method
I solve the detrended equilibrium using Auclert et al. (2019)’s method. In this subsection, I
briefly describe how this method solves the equilibrium. The first step is to solve heterogeneous
households’ policy functions and the stationary distribution over the household heterogeneity in
the steady state. For this step, Auclert et al. (2019) develop a fast algorithm that extends Carroll
(2006)’s method of endogenous gridpoints to the two-asset environment in order to solve the steady
state of their two-asset HANK model. Since the household block of my model is almost identical
to the household block of their model, I closely follow this algorithm to compute the steady state
of my model. See Appendix B.1 of Auclert et al. (2019) for the details of this algorithm.10
Once the steady state is pinned down, Auclert et al. (2019)’s method computes the Jacobians of
‘blocks’. Here, a ‘block’ is a function that maps the sequences of input variables {𝑥1,𝑡 , · · · , 𝑥𝑛𝑥 ,𝑡}𝑇𝑡=0
into the sequences of output variables {𝑦1,𝑡 , · · · , 𝑦𝑛𝑦 ,𝑡}𝑇𝑡=0 using a subset of equilibrium conditions.
The Jacobian of the block is a matrix composed of the following elements. { 𝜕𝑦 𝑗 ,𝑠
𝜕𝑥𝑖,𝑡
}1≤𝑖≤𝑛𝑥 , 1≤ 𝑗≤𝑛𝑦 , 0≤𝑠,𝑡≤𝑇 .
For example, the household block of my model maps the sequences of its input variables {?̃?𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 ,
𝑔𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 , [𝑡}𝑇𝑡=0 into the sequences of its output variables {?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡 , ?̃?𝑡}
𝑇
𝑡=0 using equilibrium conditions
(C.16), (C.17), (C.18), (C.19), (C.20), (C.21), (C.22), and (C.23). The Jacobian of the household




𝑥∈{?̃?,𝑟𝑎 ,𝑟𝑏 ,𝑔,𝑙,[}, 𝑦∈{?̃?,?̃?,?̃?}, 0≤𝑠,𝑡≤𝑇 .
Figure C.1 is the directed acyclical graph (DAG) representation of the detrended equilibrium,
in which blocks, input variables, and output variables are indicated. Each of the blue rectangles and
red ellipses in the figure represent the blocks of the equilibrium. For each block, variables coming
into the block and variables coming out of the block (indicated by arrows connecting blocks) are
inputs and outputs of the block, respectively. Within each block, the bullet points and following
10For grids, I use 9 gridpoints for 𝑒1, 13 gridpoints for 𝑒2, and 70 gridpoints for each of ?̃?− and ?̃?−.
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parentheses indicate the names of the equilibrium conditions, corresponding equation numbers,
and output variables pinned down by the equilibrium conditions.
Following the notations of Auclert et al. (2019), let 𝑍 be a stacked vector of the sequences of
exogenous variables and𝑈 be a stacked vector of the sequences of unknown variables indicated in
the black diamond box in Figure C.1. Moreover, let 𝐻 (𝑈, 𝑍) be a function that maps𝑈 and 𝑍 into
a stacked vector of {𝐻1,𝑡 , 𝐻2,𝑡 , 𝐻3,𝑡}𝑇𝑡=0 in which 𝐻1,𝑡 ,𝐻2,𝑡 , and 𝐻3,𝑡 are defined as




as indicated in the red ellipses of Figure C.1.
Under this formulation, ‘solving the model’ boils down to finding𝑈 that satisfies
𝐻 (𝑈, 𝑍) = 0
for given 𝑍 . Under the first-order approximation, this equation becomes
𝐻𝑈𝑑𝑈 + 𝐻𝑍𝑑𝑍 = 0
⇔ 𝑑𝑈 = −𝐻−1𝑈 𝐻𝑍𝑑𝑍. (C.70)
By combining the Jacobians of the blocks through the Chain Rule, Auclert et al. (2019)’s
method computes 𝐻𝑈 and 𝐻𝑍 . Then, the method solves 𝑑𝑈 using equation (C.70), and recovers
the linearized dynamics of other variables by again combining the Jacobians through the Chain
Rule along the directed acyclical graph in Figure C.1.
In the whole computation procedure, the most time-consuming steps are i) solving the steady
state and ii) computing the Jacobian of the household block. In particular, calibrating 𝛽, 𝜒1, and
𝜒2 requires solving the steady state multiple times, and this step takes longer than a day. However,
once these parameters are calibrated and I have both the computed steady state and the Jacobian of
the household block in my hand, the rest of the computation steps are very quick (taking less than
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exogenous: 𝑧, 𝑔, `, [, a




→ ?̃?, 𝐿, ?̃?
)












• illiquid asset price(
(C.28) + (C.34)→ 𝑞
)










(C.16) - (C.23) → ?̃?, ?̃?, ?̃?
)
• illquid asset market clear
𝐻1,𝑡 := ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡 = 0(
(C.39) → 𝐻1
)
• liquid asset market clear








𝑧, 𝑔, a, 𝑟


















Figure C.1: Directed Acyclical Graph (DAG) representation of the detrended equilibrium
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a second). This is why the Bayesian estimation of the model is possible as long as the parameters
to be estimated are not inside the household block.
C.2.4 Recovering the Original Equilibrium
Once the detrended equilibrium is solved, we can recover the original equilibrium. In par-
ticular, the figures and tables in this paper report results based on the following statistics of the
original equilibrium: i) the standard deviations and correlations of Δ log𝑌𝑡 , Δ log𝐶𝑡 , Δ log 𝐼𝑡 , and
Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡), and ii) the impulse responses of the model variables in terms of their deviations from
the balanced growth path.
C.2.4.1 Δ log𝑌𝑡 , Δ log𝐶𝑡 , Δ log 𝐼𝑡 , and Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) of the original equilibrium
Δ log𝑌𝑡 , Δ log𝐶𝑡 , Δ log 𝐼𝑡 , and Δ(𝑇𝐵𝑡/𝑌𝑡) of the original equilibrium are recovered using the
following equations.
Δ log𝑌𝑡 = Δ log𝑌𝑡 − Δ log𝑌𝑡−1 + log 𝑔𝑡−1,
Δ log𝐶𝑡 = Δ log ?̃?𝑡 − Δ log ?̃?𝑡−1 + log 𝑔𝑡−1,








C.2.4.2 Impulse Responses in terms of Deviations from the Balanced Growth Path
The impulse responses of the model variables in terms of their deviations from the balanced
growth path in the original equilibrium are recovered as follows. First, I define the ‘constant-
growth trend of the balanced growth path’ 𝑋∗𝑡 as follows. Given that a shock is realized in period
0,
𝑋∗𝑡 = (𝑔∗)𝑡+1𝑋−1.
Let 𝑀 𝑓𝑡 be one of the flow variables in the original equilibrium, which is detrended with 𝑋𝑡−1
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in constructing the detrended equilibrium. (Variables 𝑌𝑡 , 𝐶𝑡 , 𝐼𝑡 , Π𝑡 , and 𝑤𝑡 belong to this category.)
Let ?̃? 𝑓𝑡 := 𝑀
𝑓
𝑡 /𝑋𝑡−1 be the detrended variable, and ?̃?
𝑓
𝑠𝑠 be the steady state value of ?̃?
𝑓
𝑡 in the










𝑡−1, 𝑡 ≥ 0.
This is the path of {𝑀 𝑓𝑡 }∞𝑡=0 when there is no shock in period 0. The impulse response of 𝑀
𝑓
𝑡 in
terms of their ratio deviations from the balanced growth path is constructed by



















I compute this impulse response as follows. By solving the detrended equilibrium using Auclert




𝑠𝑠, in which the 𝑑-operator on the left hand side
means the level deviation from the steady state of the detrended equilibrium. Then, I use the
following equation, which holds under the first-order approximation, to obtain 𝑑 (𝑀 𝑓𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡−1) =
𝑀
𝑓
𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡−1 − ?̃?
𝑓
𝑠𝑠.

































By dividing 𝑑 (𝑀 𝑓𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡−1) with ?̃?
𝑓
𝑠𝑠, I obtain 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀 𝑓 (𝑡).
Impulse responses for the stock variables can be computed in a similar way. Let 𝑀 𝑠𝑡 be one
of the stock variables in the original equilibrium, which is detrended with 𝑋𝑡 in the detrended
equilibrium. (Variables 𝐾𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡 , 𝐵𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡 , and 𝐹𝑡 belong to this category.) Let ?̃? 𝑠𝑡 := 𝑀 𝑠𝑡 /𝑋𝑡 be the
detrended variable, and ?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠 be the steady state value of ?̃?
𝑠
𝑡 in the detrended equilibrium. {𝑀 𝑠𝑡 }∞𝑡=0
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on the balanced growth path, which I denote as {𝑀 𝑠∗𝑡 }∞𝑡=0, is determined by




𝑡 , 𝑡 ≥ 0.
The impulse response of 𝑀 𝑠𝑡 in terms of their ratio deviations from the balanced growth path is
constructed by
𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝑠 (𝑡) =
𝑀 𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀 𝑠∗𝑡
𝑀 𝑠∗𝑡
=
𝑀 𝑠𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡 − ?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠
?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠
.
After obtaining 𝑑?̃? 𝑠𝑡 = ?̃?
𝑠
𝑡 − ?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠 by solving the detrended equilibrium with Auclert et al.
(2019)’s method, I compute 𝑑 (𝑀 𝑠𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡 ) = 𝑀 𝑠𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡 −?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠 using the following first-order-approximated
equation.








By dividing 𝑑 (𝑀 𝑠𝑡 /𝑋∗𝑡 ) with ?̃? 𝑠𝑠𝑠, I obtain 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝑠 (𝑡).
There are variables in the original equilibrium that are not detrended in the detrended equilib-
rium. (Variables 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟
𝑏
𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 , and 𝐿𝑡 belong to this category). Let 𝑀
𝑛
𝑡 be one of such variables. By
construction, these variables have the same steady state values between the original equilibrium
and the detrended equilibrium. For their impulse responses, I use their level deviations from their




This section compares the cross-autocorrelograms between the model (the baseline economy)
and the data.
11In all the impulse response plots reported in this paper, I indicate in the label of the 𝑦-axis whether the ratio
deviations are plotted or the level deviations are plotted.
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Figure C.2: cross-autocorrelogram 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 [𝑥1,𝑡 , 𝑥2,𝑡+𝑙]: model vs data
Notes: This figure plots the cross-autocorrelograms computed from the Peruvian macro data and those generated from
the model after the calibration and Bayesian estimation discussed in section 3.4. The model statistics are computed
under each posterior draw, and their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
C.4 Broader Recalibration for the Counterfactual Economy
I only recalibrate 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 in the counterfactual experiment of the main text in section 3.5.
Although 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 are key determinants of the MPCs in the model, there are other parameters
that also affect MPCs. Such parameters include the difference in return rates between liquid and
illiquid assets b, and the parameters governing the labor productivity process 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and 𝜎𝑒2 .
In this section, I run an alternative counterfactual experiment in which these parameters are also
recalibrated. Specifically, I recalibrate b, 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and 𝜎𝑒2 using relevant U.S. data first and then
recalibrate 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 by targeting the U.S. MPC estimates and the Peruvian trade-balance-to-
output ratio. Table C.2 reports the recalibrated values of the parameters.
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Table C.2: Broader Recalibration for the Counterfactual Economy
Description Value Target / source
labor income process
𝜌𝑒1 persistence of the AR(1) component 0.988 PSID𝜎𝑒1 S.D. of shocks to the AR(1) component 0.073𝜎𝑒2 S.D. of shocks to the 𝑖.𝑖.𝑑. component 0.605
long-run averages
b long-run average spread 0.006 FRB, OECD, U.S. CPI
targeting MPCs over the labor income deciles & Aggregate Wealth




𝜒1 scale parameter of illiquid adj. cost 0.204
𝜒2 convexity parameter of illiquid adj. cost 1.365
Parameters 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and 𝜎𝑒2 are recalibrated using the PSID data. Note that these parameters
specify the quarterly labor productivity process in the model, while the PSID provides annual
data. Given the frequency mismatch between the model and the data, I estimate these parameters
according to the following steps. First, I estimate the annual income process from the PSID sample
using Floden and Lindé (2001)’s method. Then, I find parameters 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , and 𝜎𝑒2 for the quarterly
labor productivity process that yield the same estimation result when I simulate annual income
series by aggregating the model-generated quarterly income series over every four quarters and
apply to the simulated annual series the same estimation procedure applied to the PSID data.
Parameter b is recalibrated to match the gap between U.S. real lending rates and deposit rates.
The real lending rates and deposit rates are constructed by subtracting the expected inflation of the
U.S. CPIs from the nominal lending rates and deposit rates, respectively. For the nominal lending
rates, bank prime loan rates from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (retrieved
from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) are used. For the nominal deposit rates, 3-month
rates on Certificates of Deposit from OECD (retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis) are used.12
Once parameters 𝜌𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒1 , 𝜎𝑒2 , and b are recalibrated, I recalibrate parameters 𝜒1, 𝜒2, and 𝛽 by
12Although these two data series come from different sources, the real lending rates and real deposit rates con-
structed from each data series track each other very closely once the gross rates of the former are scaled by (1 − b).
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Figure C.3: Annual MPCs in U.S.: Data vs Model
under Broader Recalibration
Notes: Figure C.3 plots the annual MPC estimates from the PSID and their model counterparts under the broader
recalibration in Appendix C.4. In computing the model counterparts of the estimates, I simulate annual consumption
and income series by aggregating model-generated quarterly consumption and income series over every four quarters
and then apply to the simulated annual data the same MPC estimation procedure applied to the PSID data.
targeting the U.S. MPC estimates of the labor income deciles and the Peruvian trade-balance-to-
output ratio. Again, the calibration is successful despite the fact that I only use three parameters to
target eleven moments. The model-generated trade-balance-to-output ratio on the balanced growth
path is 0.042, and its data counterpart is 0.043. Moreover, Figure C.3 shows that the model-
generated U.S. MPCs of the labor income deciles closely track the data counterparts.
Figure C.4 shows that under the broader recalibration of the counterfactual economy, the fol-
lowing patterns robustly appear: i) the MPC gap between Peru and the U.S. predicted by the model
is narrower than that predicted by the model-free frequency conversion in Figure 3.1, and ii) de-
spite this tendency, the model still predicts a substantial MPC gap between Peru and the U.S. In
fact, the MPC gap under the broader recalibration in Figure C.4 is slightly larger than the gap under
the benchmark recalibration in Figure 3.4.
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Figure C.4: Model-Predicted Quarterly MPCs: Peru and U.S.
under Broader Recalibration
Notes: Figure C.4 compares the model-predicted quarterly MPCs between the baseline economy and the counterfac-
tual economy under the broader recalibration in Appendix C.4.
Table C.3 compares the standard deviations of output growth, consumption growth, and the
ratio of the two between the baseline economy and the counterfactual economy under the broader
recalibration. As we can see from this table, the phenomenon of excess consumption volatility
robustly disappears in this alternative counterfactual experiment.
In the rest of this section, I also report the results of variance change decomposition and con-
sumption response decomposition in this alternative counterfactual experiment under the broader
Table C.3: Absence of Excess Consumption Volatility in the Counterfactual Economy
under Broader Recalibration
𝜎(Δ log𝑌𝑡) 𝜎(Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )
𝜎(Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡 )
𝜎(Δ log𝑌𝑡 )
Baseline 0.029 0.037 1.283
(0.002) (0.002) (0.075)
Counterfactual 0.028 0.026 0.914
(0.002) (0.002) (0.071)
Notes: The statistics are computed under each posterior draw, and their means and standard deviations over the
posterior distribution are reported in this table. The numbers in parentheses are the posterior standard deviations.
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recalibration. These results verify that all the main observations from variance change decomposi-
tion and consumption response decomposition discussed in the main text remain unchanged.
Table C.4: Variance Change Decomposition under Broader Recalibration
(from Baseline to Counterfactual)
Δ log𝑌𝑡 Δ log𝐶𝑚𝑠𝑑𝑡
stationary productivity shock (𝑧𝑡) -0.012 -0.207
(0.000) (0.021)
trend shock (𝑔𝑡) -0.011 0.049
(0.008) (0.024)
interest rate shock (`𝑡) 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001)
illiquidity shock ([𝑡) -0.001 -0.296
(0.001) (0.050)
investment shock (a𝑡) -0.000 -0.049
(0.000) (0.020)
variance change (in ratio) -0.025 -0.504
(0.008) (0.049)
Notes: The last row reports the fraction of [(variance change from the baseline economy to the counterfactual econ-
omy) / (variance in the baseline economy)]. The first five rows report the fraction of [(variance change generated by
each shock) / (variance in the baseline economy)], in which the denominator is the variance generated by all shocks
(i.e., the same denominator used in the fraction reported in the last row.) By construction, the last row is the sum of the
first five rows. The statistics are computed under each posterior draw, and their means and standard deviations over
the posterior distribution are reported in this table. The numbers in parentheses are the posterior standard deviations.
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Figure C.5: Decomposition of the Consumption Responses to the 𝑧-shock and [-shock
under Broader Recalibration
Notes: Panels C.5a, C.5b, C.5c, and C.5d present the consumption response decomposition with respect to stationary
productivity shocks (𝑧) and illiquidity shocks ([) in the baseline economy and the counterfactual economy, respec-
tively. Each panel consists of three subplots, where the large subplot on the left shows the total consumption response
as well as decomposed consumption responses to each driver of {𝑤𝑡 𝑙𝑡 , 𝑟𝑎𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑡 , [𝑡 }∞𝑡=0, and the other two small sub-
plots on the right show the equilibrium paths of the two main drivers after the shock. The consumption responses are
computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
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Figure C.6: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Stationary Productivity Shock (𝑧): Baseline Economy
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and
their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90%




















































































































































































































































































































Figure C.7: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Trend Shock (𝑔): Baseline Economy
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and
their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90%






























































































































































































































































































































Figure C.8: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Interest Rate Shock (`): Baseline Economy
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and
their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90%

























































































































































































































































































































Figure C.9: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Illiquidity Shock ([): Baseline Economy
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and
their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90%

















































































































































































































































































































Figure C.10: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Investment Shock (a): Baseline Economy
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line represents the impulse responses in terms of the deviation from the balanced
growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and
their means over the posterior distribution are plotted in this figure. The shaded area in each plot represents 90%
credible bands over the posterior distribution.
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Figure C.11: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Stationary Productivity Shock (𝑧): Baseline vs Counterfactual
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line and the red dashed line represent the impulse responses in terms of the deviation
from the balanced growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock in the baseline economy and the counterfactual
economy, respectively. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the

























































































































































































































































































Figure C.12: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Trend Shock (𝑔): Baseline vs Counterfactual
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line and the red dashed line represent the impulse responses in terms of the deviation
from the balanced growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock in the baseline economy and the counterfactual
economy, respectively. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the

































































































































































































































































































Figure C.13: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Interest Rate Shock (`): Baseline vs Counterfactual
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line and the red dashed line represent the impulse responses in terms of the deviation
from the balanced growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock in the baseline economy and the counterfactual
economy, respectively. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the






























































































































































































































































































Figure C.14: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Illiquidity Shock ([): Baseline vs Counterfactual
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line and the red dashed line represent the impulse responses in terms of the deviation
from the balanced growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock in the baseline economy and the counterfactual
economy, respectively. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the
























































































































































































































































































Figure C.15: IRFs to a 1 S.D. Investment Shock (a): Baseline vs Counterfactual
Notes: In each plot, the blue solid line and the red dashed line represent the impulse responses in terms of the deviation
from the balanced growth path to a one-standard-deviation shock in the baseline economy and the counterfactual
economy, respectively. The impulse responses are computed under each posterior draw, and their means over the
posterior distribution are plotted in this figure.
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